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Cover
The year 2002 marks the first century of
destroyers in the U.S. Navy, beginning
with the commissioning of “Destroyer No. 1,”
USS Bainbridge. This milestone is being
marked in Newport by “Destroyers: 100
Years,” a series of commemorative events
initiated by the Surface Warfare Officers
School Command and the Surface Navy
Association. The Naval War College is
participating in a number of ways, includ-
ing an exhibition in the museum and this
issue’s cover—a portrait of the destroyer
USS Mahan (DD 364), seen in U.S. De-
stroyers: Mahan Class, painted by the
American maritime artist Jack Coggins in
1991. (The destroyer astern, on the reverse,
was not identified by the artist.)
The pictured Mahan, second of that name
and the first of its class, was commis-
sioned in 1936 and participated in the
Pacific War from 1941 until its sinking on
7 December 1944 after an attack by
kamikaze aircraft off Leyte. The painting
was given by the USS Mahan Association
to the Naval War College Foundation,
which made it available to the museum
for exhibit.
By courtesy of the Naval War College
Museum and Naval War College Foun-
dation.
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Rear Admiral Rempt is a 1966 graduate of the U.S.
Naval Academy. Initial assignments included deploy-
ments to Vietnam aboard USS Coontz (DLG 9) and
USS Somers (DDG 34). He later commanded USS
Antelope (PG 86), USS Callaghan (DDG 994), and
USS Bunker Hill (CG 52). Among his shore assign-
ments were the Naval Sea Systems Command as the ini-
tial project officer for the Mark 41 Vertical Launch
System; Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) staff as the
Aegis Weapon System program coordinator; director of
the Prospective Commanding Officer/Executive Officer
Department, Surface Warfare Officers Schools Com-
mand; and Director, Anti-Air Warfare Requirements
Division (OP-75) on the CNO’s staff. Rear Admiral
Rempt also served in the Ballistic Missile Defense Orga-
nization, where he initiated development of Naval
Theater Ballistic Missile Defense, continuing those ef-
forts as Director, Theater Air Defense on the CNO’s
staff. More recently, he was Program Executive Officer,
Theater Air Defense, the first Deputy Assistant Secre-
tary of the Navy for Theater Combat Systems, the first
Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Missile Defense,
and Director, Surface Warfare (N76) on the CNO’s
staff. Rear Admiral Rempt assumed duties as the
forty-eighth President of the Naval War College on 22
August 2001.
He holds master’s degrees in systems analysis from
Stanford University and in national security and strate-
gic studies from the Naval War College.
8
Naval War College Review, Vol. 55 [2002], No. 4, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol55/iss4/1
PRESIDENT’S FORUM
As I have noted in the past, the Naval War College has two primary
missions: to educate future leaders and to define future forces.
IN A PREVIOUS ISSUE OF THE REVIEW, I discussed the efforts now
under way in Newport to help define future courses that our Navy
could follow to transform itself to meet more effectively the de-
mands of the new century. The strategic landscape has been
changed by many factors: political, economic, and technological.
How the service responds to these changes is critical to our continued contribu-
tion to national security.
The Navy Vision Project has engaged faculty, staff, and defense experts from
around the nation in a series of workshops and study groups. Collectively, these
visionaries have identified six major options in which additional investment
could be made. Each would define a different Navy than the one we have today.
However, a fundamental truth underpins all potential decisions: the Navy of to-
morrow will be derived largely from the Navy of today. Necessary changes will be
made incrementally over a number of years, and the amount of resources that
can be applied to “recapitalization” will, realistically, be on the order of 10 per-
cent to 15 percent of the Navy’s research and procurement budgets. By a huge
margin, the greatest portion of budget expenditures each year will go to main-
taining and operating ships, aircraft, and weapons systems now in inventory and
to recruiting, training, and retaining our great sailors. These expenditures are
essential to enable us to continue to meet the demands of the Terror War.
Our challenge as a maritime service is to apply skillfully the relatively small
discretionary portion of the budget so as to get maximum impact on future capa-
bilities. Just as in navigating aboard ship, when a few degrees of change in base
course can result in hundreds or thousands of miles of difference in the ultimate
destination, the Navy Vision Project is working to provide possible “midcourse
corrections” to the Navy’s future track, to move toward the most effective Navy
for our nation.
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SIX OPTIONS
For over two hundred years the Navy has provided America’s leaders a balanced
force capable of accomplishing a wide variety of missions across the entire spec-
trum of conflict, from such low-cost and low-risk activities as evacuation of
noncombatants from areas of potential conflict to the full-scale engagement of
an enemy with weapons of mass destruction. This high degree of flexibility will
be even more valuable in the future. Naval forces provide national freedom of
action for the application of military power in an increasingly uncertain and
complex world. To be most effective, our naval forces should be tailored and
focused to meet the most likely scenarios. The Navy could focus its investment
or change its strategic direction by taking the following courses:
Lead Revitalized Maritime Security. This option strengthens the nation’s mari-
time shield by revitalizing the full range of capabilities that provide “maritime
defense in depth.” The underlying assumption driving this option is that, unlike
many wars of the past century in
which conflict took place far from
U.S. shores, it is increasingly likely
that future battles could take place
near or on U.S. territory. A major
focus of the maritime security
emphasis would be on the screen-
ing and control of seaborne com-
merce. This includes merchant ships, containers, and superports, as well as
maritime companies and their finances. Success in this endeavor would require
a sophisticated and robust information collection and dissemination network
and the establishment of the ability to intercept and interdict incoming threats
from forward overseas and close to U.S. shores. Procurement of ships sized to
meet specific needs, between the capabilities of Coast Guard cutters and
multimission Navy destroyers, would be necessary. This capability would also
enable the United States and its allies to conduct preventive operations against
groups, states, and nonstate actors deemed to represent a threat to U.S.
security.
Expand Sea-Basing. The key to sustained combat operations has always been the
logistical support of the engaged forces. The Navy’s historical ability to operate
for extended periods at sea is well recognized, and this capability could be
expanded to provide joint and combined force commanders with the ability to
commence military operations from secure offshore “sea bases.” This option is
predicated on the assumption that for political and economic reasons, the
United States is less likely than ever before to use an extensive network of
6 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
The Navy would enhance its capabilities to
provide missile defense of the United States,
and of allies and forces around the world. This
option assumes that additional and substan-
tial attacks on targets within the United States
are likely, if not inevitable.
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overseas bases. Sea-basing would allow for the reception, staging, onward move-
ment, and integration of both Marine Corps and Army forces at sea. Key compo-
nents of this capability would include high-speed ships (thirty-five knots and
above), prepositioning at sea, and forward staging aboard ship. While existing
“large-deck” ships such as aircraft carriers and amphibious assault ships could
be reconfigured to support some “sea-basing” missions, entirely new (and very
large) ships may be needed to receive large intertheater airlift aircraft at sea. Use
of V-22 vertical-lift aircraft, new high-speed lighterage, and the enhanced capa-
bilities of the Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle would provide the capabil-
ity for forces ashore to be sustained for extended periods.
Continue Power Projection Focus. This option most closely resembles the Navy
of today. Its underlying assumption is that the primary battlefields of the future
will remain overseas. Investment in this area would focus on rapid application of
decisive force by augmenting the force with Tomahawk missile–armed cruisers
and long-range guided munitions aboard destroyers; dedicated platforms such
as high-speed vessels, cruise-missile-launching nuclear submarines, and nuclear-
powered aircraft carriers armed with Joint Strike Fighters and unmanned com-
bat air vehicles. Increased emphasis would be placed on supporting special
operations forces and Marine Corps expeditionary warfare forces. A power pro-
jection focus would provide decisive naval power to defeat adversaries anywhere
in the world.
Ensure Access for Other Forces. Additional investment in this area would focus
on increasing the ability of the Navy and Marine Corps to gain access to geo-
graphic areas of national interest, both in “permissive” environments when U.S.
forces are welcome and in “forced-entry” scenarios in which opposing combat
forces must be overcome. This option assumes that the Navy will remain “for-
ward deployed” in areas of potential conflict. Gaining and maintaining such
access, and providing the means for the sustainment of the force once ashore,
will require enhancements to the Navy’s capabilities in missile defense, mine
warfare, surface warfare, undersea warfare, air traffic control, ship routing, and
command and control. With this investment the Navy could ensure access to the
theater of conflict for our joint forces and allies. Fully capable multimission
ships teamed with capable littoral combat ships will be essential in this option.
Provide Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance for the Nation. Properly
configured, naval forces could provide the nation with forward-deployed forces
focused on winning the information “battle of the first salvo.” The underlying
assumption of this option is the recognition that technological development
will provide the means for long-term surveillance of the theater of operations,
thus providing commanders with a “real-time” picture of emerging events. The
P R E S I D E N T ’ S F O R U M 7
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sea-based portion of a larger theaterwide architecture would include conven-
tional radars, acoustic and electronic sensors, and a futuristic expeditionary
sensor grid. It would employ sea-bottom sensing arrays, unmanned vehicles (air,
surface, and subsurface), ground systems, and the necessary networking and
processing capability. Defensive forces would protect and monitor the sensor
network, and offensive capabilities would be collocated to exploit information
and rapidly respond to threats using naval forces, including missiles, special
operations forces, Marines, and tactical aircraft.
Refine Homeland Defense. With this emphasis, a future Navy would enhance its
capabilities to provide missile defense of the United States, as well as of allies and
forces around the world. This option assumes that additional and substantial at-
tacks on targets within the United States are likely, if not inevitable. The homeland-
defense option would continue strategic deterrence through the use of ballistic
missile submarines and offensive counter-missile forces to disrupt enemy ballistic
and cruise-missile operations through offensive strikes. Additionally, a responsive
maritime security force would operate with the Coast Guard deepwater “national
fleet” to prevent the movement of hostile elements and weapons of mass destruc-
tion by sea. A Navy configured to support this mission would include a number of
small yet capable surface ships that would complement the patrol capabilities of
the Coast Guard. Unmanned air vehicles also hold great promise for cost-effective
surveillance of maritime corridors.
This is only a cursory look at these various options, and there is considerable
work yet to be done to refine each of the concepts. Our efforts continue to be
focused on bringing clarity to each issue to assist decision makers who must
make the hard calls about where limited resources will be applied to generate the
greatest return on the nation’s investment.
As I have noted in the past, the Naval War College has two primary missions:
to educate future leaders and to define future forces. Efforts such as the Navy
Vision Project are one way in which we bring the intellectual energy of our faculty,
staff, and students to bear on key issues of the day. Decisions made today will
shape the Navy for decades to come. We are glad to help make these decisions the
best that can be made.
RODNEY P. REMPT
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, Naval War College
8 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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Plaque mounted on a fragment of the west façade of the Pentagon,
dedicated at the Naval War College on 9 September 2002
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”9/11” AND AFTER
A British View
Sir Michael Howard
It may seem rather unnecessary to call any assertion by an Englishman “a Brit-ish view.” The views that I am going to express are probably shared by many
Americans, continental Europeans, and Russians, to say nothing of Chinese, In-
dians, Brazilians, and the rest of the human race. I also suspect that quite a large
number of my fellow countrymen may not share them—mine is certainly not
the British view. But my views have inevitably been shaped, and probably preju-
diced, by my national background and personal experience.
The British experience of terrorism on our own soil—mainly, though not en-
tirely, at the hands of the Irish—goes back for well over a hundred years. I myself
lived for two decades in London when it was a target of terrorist attacks. The loss
of life was mercifully light, but those attacks did kill people, caused untold dam-
age to property, and inflicted immense inconvenience to millions of London
commuters. To take only one small but telling example: even today you will not
find, in any main-line railway station, either a trash can or a left-luggage locker.
They are far too convenient for the placement of Irish Republican Army bombs.
In Belfast, of course, the situation was far worse. Many more people were killed,
and much property was destroyed. There were times, I admit, seeing collectors
for NORAID (the Irish Northern Aid Committee) rattling their boxes in the bars
of Boston, when some of us thought that the United States might do just a little
more to help us with our own war against terrorism. I make this point not just to
have a dig at the Yanks (though this never does any harm) but to remind them
that terrorism, in one form or another, has been going on for quite a long time
and that the ethics involved are not always straightforward.
But the IRA attacks, of course, were pinpricks compared to the atrocities of 11
September 2001. This was an escalation of terrorist activity as great, and as
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threatening to mankind, as was the explosion of the first nuclear weapon in
comparison to the “conventional” campaigns that had preceded it. We under-
stood very well that “9/11” posed a threat to ourselves, not just to the United
States. By “ourselves” I mean not simply the British or even “the West” but every
country—irrespective of location, race, or creed—that was attempting to create
or maintain civil societies based on democratic consensus, human rights, and
the rule of law—all the principles for which we had fought two terrible world
wars. The attack on the Pentagon in Washington may have been aimed specifi-
cally at the United States, but those on the World Trade Center in New York, a su-
pranational institution housing a multinational population in the greatest
polyglot city in the world, was directed against the nerve centre of an interna-
tional community of which the United States is certainly the heart but that em-
braces the whole developed world. That was why the whole of that world—in
fact, the whole world, with the exception only of a few predictable rogue
states—immediately declared its support to the United States in its hour of need.
That is why I must admit to a twinge of annoyance whenever I hear the
phrase “America’s War against Terror.” It is not just “America’s War.” We are all in
it. Of course, Americans were the major victims, or at least have been up till now.
Of course, the Americans are able, with their immense military resources, to
make the major contribution in any military campaign that has to be fought. But
American citizens were not the only people who suffered on 11 September. The
United States is not the only nation with troops in Afghanistan—and if there are
not larger contributions from allies, it is because the U.S. high command made it
clear from the very beginning, for understandable reasons, that it did not want
them.
In any case, armed forces are not the only, or perhaps even the most impor-
tant, instruments in dealing with terrorism. Intelligence services, police forces,
immigration officials, financial managers, diplomats, even theologians, can play,
and indeed are playing, an equally important role in the struggle. So to call it
“America’s War,” and even more to wage it as if it were just “America’s War,” is to
miss its full significance. It is a profound and global confrontation between, on
the one hand, those who believe in all the civilized and civilizing values inherited
from the Enlightenment, and on the other those who detest those values and fear
them as a threat to their own core beliefs and traditional ways of life. In this con-
frontation armed force must inevitably play a part, but the struggle can never be
won by armed forces alone—not even those of the United States.
So is “war” the right word to describe the conflict? I do not think that it is pe-
dantic to ask this question. Journalists and politicians may have to reduce com-
plex issues to headlines or sound bites; professional students of war and of
international relations have to be more precise. The word “war” is dangerously
1 2 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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misleading. It suggests a conflict waged against a clearly defined political adver-
sary by armed forces to whose activities everything else is subsidiary; more im-
portant, it connotes a conflict that can end in a clear victory. This mind-set is
revealed whenever the press speculates about “the next phase” in “the war
against terror.” For the media it is a conflict conducted in a series of military
campaigns. After Afghanistan, where? Iraq? Somalia? Yemen?
But in fact there need be no “next phase.” The campaign is being waged the
whole time, twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, all over the world. So long
as there are no further outrages,
we can be said to be winning
it—winning through interna-
tional police work, diplomacy,
financial pressure, and propa-
ganda. Whether another military campaign will be needed remains an open
question. If we play our cards properly, we may succeed in rooting out al-Qa‘ida
and its associates without any further military action at all.
Still, it is perhaps inevitable that the word “war” should be used as an analogy,
in the same way that we speak of a war against disease, or against drugs, or
against crime—the mobilisation of all national resources to deal with a great so-
cial evil. But these are campaigns that cannot be “won” in any military sense.
Crime and disease as such cannot be “defeated.” We have to live with them. They
can, however, be reduced to acceptable levels. It is the same with terrorism. Ter-
rorism is a strategy, a means of making war, the classic instrument of the weak
against the strong. It is used by desperate and ruthless people who are deter-
mined to bring down apparently immoveable forces of authority by any meth-
ods that lie to hand. It was used long before al-Qa‘ida was ever thought of, and it
will continue to be used long after al-Qa‘ida has been forgotten. But if we are to
deal with terrorism effectively, we need to know precisely who our adversaries
are, how they are motivated, and where they come from.
First, even if a “war” against “terrorism” in general can no more be “won”
than a war against disease, particular diseases can nonetheless be controlled or
even eliminated. So can particular terrorist groups. Today we are dealing with an
exceptionally dangerous network of transnational conspirators using all the tra-
ditional instruments of terrorism. They strike at soft targets. Their object is to
gain publicity for their cause, to demoralise and discredit established authori-
ties, and to gain popular support by provoking them into overreaction. Govern-
ments should regard them as criminals—criminals of a particularly dangerous
kind. The appropriate instruments for dealing with them will be intelligence
services and police, backed where necessary by special warfare units. The use of
regular armed forces should be seen as a last resort, especially if one is dealing
H O W A R D 1 3
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with urban terrorists. It is one thing to conduct a campaign in the sparsely in-
habited mountains of Afghanistan or the jungles of Malaya. It is quite another to
do so in the streets of a modern city, whether Londonderry or Jenin. In such an
environment, armies, however hard they may try to exercise restraint, are bound
to cause collateral damage that plays into the hands of terrorist propaganda. In
plain English, a great many innocent people—small children, pregnant women,
the elderly, the helpless—will be killed. The British learned all about this in
Northern Ireland. The Israeli defence forces are experiencing this in dealing with
Palestinian terrorists today. Such a campaign gives the terrorists exactly the kind
of publicity, and belligerent status, that they need.
If terrorists can provoke the government to using regular armed forces
against them, they have already taken a very important trick. They have been
promoted to the status of “freedom fighters,” a “liberation army,” and may win
popular support from sympathisers all over the world. Even if they are defeated,
their glorious memory will inspire their successors. Pictures of Che Guevara
adorned the walls of student dormitories for a generation, and I am afraid that
images of Osama bin Laden will occupy the same place of honour in Islamic
equivalents for quite as long.
Nonetheless, there are times when one cannot avoid the use of military force.
It has to be used when the terrorists are able to operate on too large a scale to be
dealt with by normal policing methods, as was the case in Ireland and is now in
Israel. It has to be used when enemies establish themselves in territory that is vir-
tually “no-man’s-land.” Finally, it has to be used when they enjoy the protection
of another sovereign state.
For the flushing of terrorists or their equivalents out of no-man’s-land we
have plenty of historical precedent. The Caribbean was a nest of pirates until
cleaned up in the eighteenth century. The coasts of the Mediterranean were ter-
rorised by Barbary pirates until the U.S. Marine Corps landed on the shores of
Tripoli. Today “failed states” like Yemen and Somalia cannot prevent their terri-
tory being used as terrorist bases, and armed force must be used to flush such
foes out. Even states that in other respects may be achieving limited success in es-
tablishing the rule of law, such as Colombia, Indonesia, and the Philippines, may
need help in eliminating terrorist elements on their own territory. When a ter-
rorist organization enjoys the open protection and support of another sovereign
state, as was the case with al-Qa‘ida and the ruling government of Afghanistan,
there is a serious casus belli, and a regular war may be the only way to bring the
criminals to justice. (Whether it is always wise to do so is another matter. In 1914
the Austrian government took advantage of that excuse to declare war on Serbia
and thereby caused a world war. Also, it is not at all obvious that the best way of
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dealing with IRA supporters in the United States would have been for the British
to burn down the White House again.)
The struggle against a global terrorist network, then, though it may be mis-
leading to call it a war, may involve specific wars. When it does involve such a
war, if we are to retain our self-respect and the regard of the international com-
munity as a whole, we should conduct it in accordance with the obligations and
constraints that the civilized world has developed for armed conflicts over the
past three hundred years. The war should not be undertaken unless legitimized
by general international support. In conducting it, care should be taken to avoid
collateral damage. Enemy forces should be given the protection of the Geneva
Conventions that we expect for our own. The status of members of terrorist or-
ganizations that do not belong to the armed forces of the enemy should be de-
fined, and individuals suspected of criminal acts should be tried and judged
accordingly. Not least important, we should have a clear vision of the long-term
objective of the war; victory in the field must be converted into a stable peace.
War, in short, is a serious matter, not just a manhunt on a rather larger scale.
That is why there was so much hesitation in the international community as a
whole, not least in the United Kingdom, when the president of the United States
linked the campaign against the terrorist network responsible for the atrocities
of 11 September with a broader “axis of evil,”* consisting primarily of countries
hostile to the United States that are developing “weapons of mass destruc-
tion”—Iraq, Iran, and North Korea. These are all very different cases, and each
of them needs to be considered on its merits. There is some evidence linking
Saddam Hussein with al-Qa‘ida, but no more than points to Libya, or Syria, or
even Saudi Arabia. The real charge against Saddam is that he is continuing to de-
velop weapons of mass destruction in defiance of United Nations prohibition,
and he should certainly be stopped—but that is rather a different matter. In the
case of Iran there is a stronger connection with al-Qa‘ida, which enjoys the open
support of the mullahs; however, in that country modernising and Western-
leaning elements have made huge headway since the days of the Ayatollah
Ruholla Khomeini, and to condemn their entire nation as “evil” does little to
help them. As for North Korea, though it is a very rogue state indeed, linking it
with the Islamic fundamentalism that inspired the perpetrators of “9/11” has
caused general bewilderment.
Certainly, all three are problem states that pose dangers to global stability, but
opinions quite justifiably differ as to how urgent are the threats they respectively
H O W A R D 1 5
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pose and how they can best be dealt with. Their connection with the “9/11”
atrocity is at best remote, and “regime changes” in them could not prevent a new
such outrage. There is a real danger that in enlarging the objective of its cam-
paign from a war against a specific terrorist organization to a general and almost
indefinable “War against Terror,” the United States is not only losing the support
of many of its friends and necessary allies but becoming distracted from the real
long-term threat that emerged in Manhattan, the Pentagon, and rural Pennsyl-
vania on 11 September. That horrific event was like the sudden eruption of a
flame from a fire that had long been smouldering underground. It will continue
to smoulder whatever happens to Saddam Hussein.
Although terrorism, like war itself, is probably as old as mankind, there are two
particularly alarming features of the present situation. The first is the new vul-
nerability to terrorist attack of our fragile and interdependent societies. The de-
struction of the twin towers and the gouging of the Pentagon were horrific and
spectacular, but the actual damage caused was finite. The massacre of some three
thousand people was horrific and spectacular enough, but if nuclear or chemical
weapons had been used the death toll would have been at least ten times as great.
The disruption of world trade was traumatic, but it was temporary and minimal;
skilful infestation of global computer networks could have magnified and
prolonged that disruption indef-
initely. The terrorist attacks of 11
September constituted a single if
terrible act; a linked series of
such catastrophes could have
caused widespread panic, eco-
nomic crisis, and political turbulence on a scale that could make democratic
government almost impossible.
Dystopian scenarios of a kind hitherto confined to Hollywood have now be-
come real possibilities, if not yet probabilities. They could all be caused, like the
destruction of the twin towers, by conspiratorial networks that need no state
sponsorship to provide them with weapons, expertise, finance, or motivation.
These “nonstate actors” (to use political-science jargon) are nourished and sup-
ported by the very societies they are attempting to destroy. Their members have
been educated in Western universities, trained in Western laboratories and fly-
ing schools, and financed, however unwittingly, by global consortiums. They are
not tools of Saddam Hussein or anyone else. We have bred and educated them
ourselves. One can buy box-cutters and airway schedules nearer home than
Baghdad, Tehran, or Pyongyang.
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The second feature of this breed of terrorists is even more disquieting—their
motivation. Normally, terrorism has been a method used to achieve a specific
political objective. In nineteenth-century Russia, where the technique was in-
vented, the goal was the overthrow of the tsarist regime. In the Ireland of Sinn
Fein it was liberation from British rule. In British-ruled Palestine in the 1940s,
the terrorist tactics of Irgun and the Stern Gang were highly effective in securing
the establishment of a Jewish state. Once their objective is achieved, such terror-
ists—now transformed into “freedom fighters”—are welcomed into the com-
munity of nations and their leaders become respected heads of state, chatting
affably with American presidents on the lawn of the White House. The terrorist
activities of contemporary Islamic fundamentalists are certainly linked to one
particular political struggle—what they see as the attempt of the Palestinians to
achieve independent statehood and recognition, which is a struggle that, in spite
of the methods they use, enjoys a wide measure of support throughout the Is-
lamic world. But even if that attempt were successful and President Arafat were
once again received in the White House, this time as head of a fully fledged Pales-
tinian state, the campaign of the fundamentalists would not come to an end. The
roots of the campaign go far deeper, and the objectives of the terrorists are far
more ambitious. The fundamentalist campaign is rooted in a visceral hatred and
contempt for Western civilization as such and resentment at its global ascen-
dancy. The object of the extremists is to destroy it altogether.
Here this analysis becomes influenced not so much by a British as a European
background—or rather, by European history. This teaches that there is nothing
new about such hatred and that it is not peculiar to Islam. It originated in Eu-
rope two centuries ago in reaction to the whole process of what is loosely known
as the Enlightenment. It was a protest against the erosion of traditional values
and authorities by the rationalism, the secularism, and the freethinking that
both underlay and were empowered by the American and French Revolutions. It
gained further strength in the nineteenth century as industrialisation and mod-
ernisation transformed European society, creating general disorientation and
alienation that was to be exploited by extreme forces on both the Left and the
Right. By the beginning of the twentieth century it was reinforced by mounting
alarm at the development of a global economy that, in spite of the growth of de-
mocracy, seemed to place the destinies of millions in the hands of impersonal
and irresponsible forces beyond the control of national governments. It was, in
short, a cry of rage against the whole seemingly irresistible process that has re-
sulted from the dissolution of traditional constraints on thought and enterprise
and the release of the dynamic forces of industrial development collectively
known as “capitalism.” It was to provide the driving force behind both fascism
H O W A R D 1 7
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and communism, and it was to be one of the underlying causes of the Second, if
not indeed the First, World War.
The experience of Europe in the nineteenth century was to be repeated in the
twentieth and continues today throughout what is still, for want of a better label,
described as the “third world.” There also industrialisation has led to urbanisa-
tion, with the resulting breakdown of traditional authority and the destruction
of cultures rooted in tribal rule and land tenure. There also medical advances, by
reducing the death rate, have led to unprecedented increases in the population.
There also a surplus population has fled from the countryside to overcrowded
cities, and from the cities to, where possible, overseas. But there the similarity
ends. In the nineteenth century there was a New World prepared to accept immi-
grants on an unlimited scale. Today there is not. The third world has to absorb its
own surplus population, as best it can.
In nineteenth-century Europe the immiseration of the Industrial Revolution
was certainly eased by emigration, but it was eventually conquered by the very
economic development that had originally caused it. Market economies over-
came their teething troubles and converted their hungry masses into consumers
with money in their pockets. State
activities expanded to curb the
excesses of the market and to care
for its casualties. Today the gen-
eral assumption in the West is
that the problems of the third
world, with the help of Western capital and technology, will ultimately be
solved by the same process—the creation of thriving national economies that
will absorb surplus labour and transform the unemployed masses into prosper-
ous consumers, within a stable infrastructure provided by an efficient and
uncorrupt state.
The trouble is that this very goal—that of a prosperous materialist society
with religion as an optional extra—appalls Islamic fundamentalists, as well as
many Muslims who are not fundamentalists. They regard Western society not as
a model to be imitated but as an awful warning, a Sodom and Gomorrah, an ex-
ample of how mankind should not live. Instead they embrace a heroic anti-
culture, one that has much in common with the European ideologues who
protested against the decadence of Western materialism and preached redemp-
tion of mankind through war; they hold it, however, with a fanaticism possible
only to those who believe that they will receive their reward in an afterlife. Like
fascism and communism, their creed appeals to the idealistic young, especially
those who feel rejected by the society around them, as do all too many immi-
grants in the cities of Europe. Like fascism and communism, it attracts all who
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are disillusioned with the promises of liberal capitalism or are suffering from its
defects.
It is only natural that this appeal should be most effective among peoples for
whom the world of Western capitalism is not only profoundly alien and offen-
sive in itself—with its godlessness, its shamelessness, its materialism, and its bla-
tant vulgarity—but worse, seems to be winning, bulldozing away the world of
their ancestors and the values that held their societies together for aeons. For
them the enemy is not just Western capitalism as such but its powerhouse, the
United States, the Great Satan. More specifically, it is those elements within Is-
lamic societies that appear to be cooperating with it.
Nevertheless—and this cannot be too often or too strongly stressed—there is
as little sympathy in the Islamic world for the methods and objectives of the ter-
rorists as there is in the West. Whatever their self-appointed spokesmen may say,
the rising expectations of the Islamic peoples are almost certainly focused on
achieving the kind of material well-being that the West ultimately promises (and
the terrorists reject), so long as that goal remains compatible with their core cul-
tural beliefs. Al-Qa‘ida and its associates are exactly the kind of puritanical icon-
oclasts who emerge in all revolutionary situations and try to remould humanity
to fit their own ideal worlds. In unstable societies the ruthlessness and fanati-
cism of such people bring them to the fore and enable them, however briefly, to
seize power and do an untold amount of harm.
So the global reach of contemporary terrorists should not blind us to the fact
that their strength derives from the general instability of contemporary Islamic
societies and that therefore the problem, ultimately, is one for Islam itself. If
there is indeed “a war against terrorism,” it has to be fought and won within the
Islamic world. The role of the West must be to support and encourage those who
are fighting that war, and we must take care that we do nothing to make their
task more difficult.
This will not be easy. How can we support our friends in the Islamic world,
those who are seeking their own path to modernisation, without making them
look like Western stooges, betraying their own cultures? How should we treat
their leaders who are as hostile to—and as threatened by—Islamic fundamen-
talism as we are but who use what we regard as unacceptable methods to sup-
press it? How can we avoid being associated with the wealthy elements in Islamic
countries that are most resistant to the social changes that alone can make possi-
ble the spread and acceptance of Western ideas?
These are all problems for the long run. What about the short?
There are two paradigms for dealing with “international terrorism,” both
equally misleading. One is the liberal ideal, held by well-meaning Europeans and
H O W A R D 1 9
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perhaps a good many well-meaning Americans as well. According to this, inter-
national terrorists should be dealt with by police action under the auspices of
the United Nations. Any military action should be conducted by UN forces, and
suspected terrorists should be brought to trial before an international court. The
other is rather more popular in the United States—“America’s War,” a private
fight conducted by the armed forces of the United States against almost cosmic
forces of evil. In this conflict no holds are barred; America must do “whatever it
takes” to destroy those forces. The support of the outside world is welcomed, in-
deed expected—as President Bush put it, “Either you are with us, or you are with
the terrorists”*—but the war will be waged and won by Americans without any
interference by well-intentioned but wimpish allies, condemnation by woolly-
minded do-gooders, or constraints imposed by outmoded concepts of interna-
tional law.
The first of these paradigms, the liberal ideal, may be desirable, but is quite
unrealistic. Apart from anything else, in their present mood the American peo-
ple are simply not prepared to subject themselves to any international authority
or to hand over the perpetrators of the “9/11” massacre to any foreign jurisdic-
tion. In any case, the record shows that “the international community” as such is
quite unable to organize any serious military intervention unless the United
States not only supports it but plays a leading role. Whether the other nations in-
volved like it or not, the campaign against international terrorism must be con-
ducted on terms acceptable to, though not necessarily dictated by, the United
States, and in waging it American resources will be indispensable.
The other view, “America’s War,” may be realistic, but it is both undesirable
and likely to be counterproductive. By nationalising the war in this manner,
there is a real danger that the United States will antagonise the entire Moslem
world, lose the support of its natural allies in the West, and play into the hands of
its former opponents, at present quiescent but by no means eliminated, in Russia
and the People’s Republic of China. This would be a profound tragedy. In 1945
the United States was able to convert a wartime alliance into a framework for
world governance capable of embracing its former enemies and surviving the
tensions and trials of the Cold War. In 1990 its rapid liquidation of the Cold War
and generosity to its former adversaries held out genuine promise of a New
World Order. The impact of “9/11” seemed to provide just such another catalytic
moment. America’s traditional rivals and adversaries fell over one another in of-
fering support, which was eagerly accepted. It looked as if a genuine world com-
munity was being forged, one of entirely new range and strength. Out of the evil
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done on 11 September, it seemed, unprecedented good might come. It still might,
and it still should.
But it will only come if the United States abandons its unilateral approach to
the handling of international terrorism and recognises that the problem can ef-
fectively be dealt with only by the international community that America has
done so much to create—a community embracing the bulk of the Islamic
world—and that still needs American leadership if it is to function effectively.
There is considerable risk that otherwise, however effective America’s armed
forces may prove in the field and however many “regime changes” they may pre-
cipitate, the United States may end up not only alienating its traditional allies
but indefinitely facing a sullen and hostile Islamic world where terrorists con-
tinue to breed prolifically and the supporters of the West live in a state of perma-
nent siege. It would be a world in which, to my own perhaps parochial
perspective, countries like Britain with large Islamic minorities will live under a
perpetual shadow of race war. Is it too much to hope that I shall live to see a
world where it is safe to have trash cans in our railway stations?
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SOCIOECONOMIC ROOTS OF MIDDLE EAST RADICALISM
Alan Richards
On 11 September 2001 the United States was attacked by utopian fanatics,followers of a movement inspired by an exceptionally narrow interpreta-
tion of Islam. Although millions of Muslims deplored the attacks, millions of
others also expressed some degree of sympathy for the terrorists. Why do this
movement and other radical Islamic political movements resonate in the Middle
East and the wider Muslim world? The answer, of
course, is profoundly complex. Social, economic, po-
litical, and cultural factors, interacting over many de-
cades, have spawned this particular phenomenon.
Space here permits only a sketch of the social, eco-
nomic, and political issues.
To seek to understand why these murderous acts
took place in no way condones them. Historians who
study Nazism do not justify Auschwitz, and students
of Stalinism do not exonerate the perpetrators of the
Gulag. Understanding why something happens is
much better than incomprehension. If we fail to grasp
the reasons for the attacks on the United States, we
will fail to respond wisely.
A REGION IN CRISIS
Muslims worldwide confront a multidimensional cri-
sis. Like any important historical phenomenon, its
roots are profoundly complex and intertwined,
composed of economic, social, political, and cultural
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dimensions. However important the socioeconomic and political aspects of this
crisis, the cultural difficulties are equally, perhaps uniquely, important. While
these dimensions are conceptually distinct, they are also intimately linked, and
they interact in complex ways. For example, economic failure erodes regimes’ le-
gitimacy and fosters an ideological vacuum, as old ideologies (e.g., Arab nation-
alism) are perceived as failures. The often-noted fact that essentially all serious
political discourse in the region is now phrased in Islamic terms links the cul-
tural dimension to all the others.
This crisis is simultaneously internal and external. It is internal because of
population growth, failed economic policies, local authoritarianism, and cul-
tural issues. It is external because wider forces of globalization play a critical role
in stimulating the growth and spread of radicalism. Much of the region’s eco-
nomic stagnation derives from its weak and distorted integration into the global
economy. At the same time, the kinds of integration that have occurred—specif-
ically, international migration and the spread of global communications—have
themselves contributed to the spread of radicalism. Also, in large part, the failure
of local regimes stems from a failure to manage and engage successfully the
wider process of globalization.1
Today’s Middle East finds itself mired in the “modernization process.” The
transition from a society of illiterate farmers, ruled by a literate, urban elite, into
an urban, mass-educated society with an economy based on industry and ser-
vices has been deeply traumatic. Worse, such change has always and everywhere
spawned grotesque violence. The modern history of both Europe and East Asia,
the only places in the world where this transition has been more or less success-
fully accomplished, often reads like a horror novel: World Wars I and II, Stalin’s
Gulag, Hitler’s Holocaust, Japanese fascism, the Chinese revolution, the “Great
Leap Forward” and its attendant famine, and the Cultural Revolution. The
American experience has also been bloody: the extermination of Native Ameri-
cans, the racial violence of slavery and Jim Crow, and the more than half-million
casualties of its own Civil War. Why should we expect the people of the Middle
East to do better than anyone else?
Much of the violence during this transition has been perpetrated by utopian
fanatics, a category that includes fascists, Nazis, Leninists, and Maoists, and the
followers of al-Qa‘ida. Like their predecessors, today’s Islamic fanatics “imagine
a future” in the “restoration” of the (imagined) conditions of seventh-century
Arabia. Like all fanatics, they believe that they enjoy a monopoly on truth and
that those who disagree “are not merely mistaken, but wicked or mad.”2 They be-
lieve that there is only one goal for humanity, and to reach it they are ready to
wade “through an ocean of blood to the Kingdom of Love.”3 Fanatics have al-
ways built towers of skulls as monuments to their fantasies.
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These particularly virulent fanatics are part of a larger social phenomenon,
the transnational “Salafi movement.” This movement advocates a return to what
its proponents believe to be the strict practices of the earliest Muslims. Their po-
litical ideology asserts that such a return will solve the many difficult problems
facing most Muslim societies. Their slogan declares, “Islam huwwa al-hal”—“Is-
lam [the Salafi interpretation of Islam] is the solution.” Salafis include the fol-
lowers of al-Qa‘ida and the muwahhidiin (or “Unitarians,” as they call
themselves, or the Wahhabis, as others call them), partisans of the official ideol-
ogy of the kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Several analysts have recently called atten-
tion to the spectrum of opinions within this movement.4
Radical movements have their greatest appeal when the dislocations of the
transition to modernity are most acute. Only the slaughter of World War I and
its chaotic aftermath allowed the Bolsheviks to seize power in Russia. It is incon-
ceivable that Hitler would have come to power without the Treaty of Versailles
and the Great Depression. Famine, governmental collapse, and the horrors of
the Japanese invasion set the stage for China and Chairman Mao Tse-tung. The
siren song of fanatics becomes most seductive when economic, political, social,
and cultural crises combine and when people feel that they have been repeatedly
humiliated.
THE RAGE OF THE YOUNG
The utopian fanaticism of al-Qa‘ida and other groups is nourished by the deep
despair of huge numbers of young Middle Easterners, half of whom are younger
than twenty. The first major social element in the noxious cocktail of religious
radicalism in the region is the phenomenon of the “youth bulge.”
The key demographic facts of the region are that the population is still grow-
ing rapidly but that fertility rates have declined considerably during the past de-
cade. According to the World Bank, the population of the Middle East and
North Africa is now growing at about 2.1 percent per year. At this rate, the popu-
lation will double in about thirty-four years. On the other hand, population
growth rates have fallen sharply in the past ten years, from 3.2 percent in the
mid-1980s to 2.7 percent between 1990 and 1995. Sharp fertility declines caused
this change, and there is reason to expect further declines.
However, this generalization hides substantial variations across countries
and regions (table 1). Although population growth rates and total fertility rates
have fallen markedly in Egypt, Iran, and Tunisia, they have remained stubbornly
high in Gaza and Yemen. Indeed, the total fertility rates in Gaza (7.6 percent)
and Yemen (7.1 percent) are among the highest in the world. Gaza also has a very
high rate in relation to per capita income, a phenomenon also observable in the
Arab Gulf countries.
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Country
Population
(millions, 2000)
Population Growth
Ratea (percent)
TFRb
Afghanistan 26.8 2.5 6.0
Algeria 31.8 2.2 3.4
Bahrain 0.64 1.9 3.0
Egypt 68.5 1.9 3.4
Gaza 1.2 4.5 7.6
Iran 71.9 2.5 4.3
Iraq 24.7 3.6 6.1
Jordan 4.7 3.1 4.8
Kuwait 2.1 1.9 3.4
Lebanon 3.6 1.6 2.3
Libya 6.1 3.7 6.2
Morocco 30.2 2.0 3.4
Oman 2.5 3.3 6.1
Pakistan 141.2 2.4 4.9
Qatar 0.75 1.3 3.5
Saudi Arabia 22.2 3.3 6.4
Somalia 7.0 2.8 7.0
Sudan 33.5 2.9 5.7
Syria 17.8 3.2 5.6
Tunisia 9.6 1.5 2.4
Turkey 66.6 1.6 2.5
United Arab Emirates 2.4 1.6 3.6
West Bank 1.7 3.2 4.9
Yemen 17.5 3.3 7.1
a. Rate of natural increase, 2000.
b. Total fertility rate, 2000. The TFR measures the number of children that a “statistically average” woman
will have during her lifetime.
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, available at http://www.census.gov/ipc/prod/wp98/wp98.pdf
TABLE 1
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Populations will continue to grow despite falling fertility rates because fertil-
ity remains well above replacement levels and because, as a result of past popula-
tion growth, many women will soon enter childbearing years (“demographic
momentum”). Many countries in the region will experience a considerable rise
in their population during the next fifteen years (figure 1). The population may
reach roughly six hundred million by 2025, some six times greater than the
1950s. Such growth poses numerous economic challenges, from food and water
to jobs and housing.
Several implications follow from this demographic pattern. First, and most
important, is that the majority of those in the Middle East are young—half the
Arab population, 54 percent of Iranians, and 52 percent of Pakistanis are youn-
ger than twenty years old (table 2). (By contrast, only slightly more than
one-quarter of the populations of developed countries—the United States, Eu-
ropean Union, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan—are under twenty.)
Two-thirds of the people in the region are under thirty. It is not likely that this
picture will change markedly in the next generation. By 2025 the number of peo-
ple aged fourteen or younger will roughly double; in that year, about two out
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Percentage of Population That Is:
Country Under 15 years old Under 20 years old
Afghanistan 43 53
Algeria 38 50
Bahrain 31 38
Egypt 36 47
Gaza 52 62
Iran 43 54
Iraq 47 58
Jordan 43 54
Kuwait 32 42
Lebanon 30 41
Libya 48 58
Morocco 36 47
Oman 41 51
Pakistan 34 52
Qatar 27 35
Saudi Arabia 43 52
Somalia 44 54
Sudan 45 56
Syria 46 57
Tunisia 32 42
Turkey 31 41
United Arab Emirates 32 41
West Bank 45 56
Yemen 48 60
DCsa 19 26
LDCsb 34 43
a. Developed countries—European Union, Japan, United States, Canada, Australia/
New Zealand.
b. Less developed countries.
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, available at http://www.census.gov/ipc/prod/wp98/wp98.pdf
TABLE 2
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of five Near Easterners are projected to be younger than twenty.5 When one asks
such questions as “What is the impact of our policies on Arabs?” we are in fact
asking, “What is the impact of our policies on young people?”
Second, the rapid fall in fertility may lead to a rapid decrease in the
“dependency ratio” (the number of people under fifteen or over sixty-five com-
pared to the working-age population).6 When this has happened elsewhere, as in
East Asia in the 1970s and 1980s, dramatic increases in national savings rates
have ensued. Perhaps the demographic change caused the savings change. How-
ever, whether or not such savings find their way into productive and job-creat-
ing investment depends on many other factors as well. Nevertheless, in the sea of
“bad news” about the region’s political economy, it is well to be reminded that
not all is bleak.
For the first time in history, many of these youths have received some amount
of education. Although the region lags behind other parts of the developing
world, school enrollment and literacy have risen dramatically during the past
generation. Today most Arabs and Iranians can read and write; this is not yet the
case in Pakistan, where only two-fifths of adults are literate.
There is considerable variation in education among countries. More than
three-quarters of the adults in Iran and Kuwait are literate, while there is be-
tween one-half to two-thirds adult literacy in Algeria, Iraq, Libya, Tunisia, Saudi
Arabia, and Syria. Only about half or fewer of the adults are literate in Egypt,
Morocco, Sudan, and Yemen. But even in Egypt, a laggard in this respect, virtu-
ally all children attend school. School enrollment has exploded throughout the
region, though the pattern has been uneven and there is still a huge gap between
girls and boys. Most boys were in school long before their sisters. In Algeria,
Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Syria, and Tunisia, nearly all children attend pri-
mary school, and roughly 60 percent of all adolescents are enrolled in secondary
school. In Saudi Arabia, all boys are enrolled in primary school, but only 75 per-
cent of girls are in school. In the least developed countries, most girls do not at-
tend school. In Sudan and Yemen, for example, nearly all boys are enrolled in
primary school, whereas only 40 percent of girls attend. In Morocco over
one-third, and in Oman roughly one-fourth, of girls are not in primary school.
Despite the appalling waste of human resources such undereducating of women
represents, the past generation has seen an educational revolution throughout
the entire region.
Certain points should be noted. First, the gap in education between girls and
boys may be a factor in the current popularity of radical Islam.7 A rather hopeful
view argues that Islamic radicalism’s relentless focus on rigid gender segregation
is something that only the current generation will experience. In the past,
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neither men nor women were educated; in the future (and the future is now, in
Iran), everyone will be at least marginally educated.
Second, rapidly spreading education is part of the social background of what
has been called the “crisis of authority” in Islam.8 How is it that any engineer can
issue his own fatwa when in previous centuries such pronouncements were the
exclusive prerogative of a small, relatively privileged elite of traditionally edu-
cated Islamic scholars (the ’ulama)? The widespread diffusion of education, in
conjunction with the absence of hierarchical controls on religious edicts in Is-
lam (in contrast to, say, Roman Catholicism), is creating a “religious anarchy”
that provides the cultural space in which radicals can promulgate and advocate
their messages.
Third, the quality of education leaves much to be desired. Education in the re-
gion stresses rote memorization, with little emphasis on analytical thinking and
problem solving. Expectations have been raised, but the skills needed to meet
those expectations have not been imparted. Millions of young men now have
enough education to make the old, dirty jobs unsatisfying but have not acquired
the skills needed to perform successfully in the modern, hypercompetitive,
global economy.
Fourth, thanks to past birth rates, the Middle East has the most rapidly grow-
ing labor force in the world; between 1990 and 1998 it grew at 3.4 percent per
year. Algeria’s labor force is growing at 4.9 percent a year, Syria’s at 4.8 percent,
and Yemen’s at 5.6 percent. Compare this to the labor force growth in the Euro-
pean Union of 0.4 percent per year during the past decade, and the American la-
bor force at about 0.8 percent. In other words, the labor force in the Middle East
is growing four times faster than the American labor force and eight times faster
than the European Union’s. Although the rate of growth attributable to past
population growth will decelerate in some countries, such as Tunisia, during the
next ten to fifteen years, declines in fertility are always accompanied (plausibly,
largely caused) by an increase in female education, which enables women to en-
ter the labor market. It is highly unlikely that the growth of the supply of labor
will decelerate within the medium term.
At the same time, the demand for labor has grown sluggishly. Simple eco-
nomics tells us that given such a mismatch between the growth of demand and
of supply, either wages will fall, unemployment will rise, or (most likely) some
combination of both will occur, the precise mix varying with specific labor mar-
ket structures. Government policies have not only reduced the rate of growth of
demand for labor but also fostered inflexible labor markets. Decades of govern-
ment job guarantees for graduates have induced students to seek any degree, re-
gardless of its contribution to productivity. Governments cannot now provide
the necessary jobs, and statist policies impede private-sector job creation.
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Current levels of unemployment are high (table 3) and will probably worsen.
In some countries the level of unemployment has been similar to that in the
United States during the worst days of the Great Depression. Real wages have
stagnated for nearly a generation, and poverty levels have either remained about
the same or increased during the past decade. Unemployment and low wages
primarily affect young, uneducated urbanites, whose anger is fuel for political
unrest.
As usual, conflicting estimates of the “extent of poverty”—an inherently sub-
jective concept—exist. One rather sanguine view is that of the World Bank,
which holds that, compared with other regions of the developing world, the
Middle East and North Africa collectively have “relatively limited” poverty.9 The
number of poor persons—defined as those with yearly incomes of less than a
“purchasing power parity” figure of $365 per year—is given at 5 percent, and the
depth and severity of poverty is low. Many observers have objected to this analy-
sis on the grounds that it set the poverty line too low relative to per capita in-
comes.10 From a political perspective, what counts is the social definition of
poverty. Poverty is inevitably partly relative. Poor people in Egypt, Jordan, or Al-
geria do not compare themselves with the poor in Bangladesh or Madagascar;
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Country
Unemployment Rate
(percentage)
Remarks
Algeria 30 1999
Egypt 12a 2000
Iran 20–25 2001
Jordan 15
Official rate. CIA gives
25–30 (1999)
Lebanon 18 1998
Libya 29 2000
Morocco 15–22 2000
Saudi Arabia 14–18 Higher among graduates
Syria 12–15 1999
Tunisia 16 1999
Yemen 35 1999
a. Some estimates show 20.
Source: for Saudi Arabia, U.S. Embassy, Riyadh, New York Times, 26 August 2001; for Iran, Eric Rouleau, Le
Monde Diplomatique, www.en.monde-diplomatique.fr/2001/06/05iran; for all others, MEDEA Institute (Euro-
pean Institute for Research on Mediterranean and Euro-Arab Co-operation), and CIA World Factbook.
TABLE 3
UNEMPLOYMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST:
A COMPENDIUM OF ESTIMATES
34
Naval War College Review, Vol. 55 [2002], No. 4, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol55/iss4/1
they feel “poor” relative to their fellow Egyptians, Jordanians, or Algerians. It
follows that higher estimates of poverty are more politically relevant.
What are the political consequences of poverty? It provides a fertile recruiting
ground for opponents of regimes and therefore poses a challenge to governance,
in at least two ways. First, some of the poor, particularly the younger ones with
limited education, join violent opposition movements. Today’s basic profile for
a violent militant is a young man with some education who may also have
recently moved to the city. Such young people are often unemployed or have jobs
below their expectations. In North Africa they are colorfully known as the
hetistes, “those who lean against the wall.”11 Evidence from Egyptian arrest
records suggests that many of those arrested for violent activities against the
regime come from shantytowns surrounding large cities, usually the poorest
urban areas in the country. It has been argued that the rise of Islamic radicalism
in Central Asia is related to the problems of youth unemployment.12
The violent opposition toward the government in Upper Egypt during the
past two decades is also related to poverty. The Sa‘id (Middle and Upper Egypt)
is the poorest region in the country. As elsewhere in the country, poverty has
been rising there in the past ten years, thanks to the collapse of unskilled wages.
Whereas real wages rose over 350 percent in real terms from 1973 to 1985
(largely due to emigration for work in the Gulf states), the decrease in regional
oil production and the war with Iraq led to the return of many of these economic
migrants. Such forces have brought wages down by over 50 percent for unskilled
workers. As Sa‘idis began moving into the cities, the problem of Islamic radical-
ism appeared in more visible locations—Egypt’s major cities.
The creation of jobs is particularly difficult since the remedy in the long run
will likely worsen the problem in the short run. The demand for labor has grown
slowly because output growth has lagged and because of specific policy biases
against labor-intensive, job-creating growth. Statist policies not only retard
growth but raise the capital intensity—and reduce the job-creating impact—of
whatever growth does occur. Changing these policies would require laying off
workers in state-owned enterprises and the bureaucracy, a move that frightens
many government leaders.
NOT BY BREAD ALONE
The unemployment problem is the most politically volatile economic issue fac-
ing the Middle East. It encourages many relatively educated, young, urban resi-
dents to support radical Islamic political movements. Yet we must be cautious
here, for the “youth bulge” and rampant unemployment are at least as severe in
sub-Saharan Africa, but we hear little of Congolese international terrorism.
There are many complex cultural forces behind Islamic movements; no
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economic determinism is implied here. To understand how and why discontent
spawned by unemployment takes a specific political and ideological form, we
cannot rely alone on demography and economics. We must also look at political
structures and ideological environments.
The Ayatollah Khomeini is reported to have said, “The revolution is about Islam,
not the price of melons.” Deeper issues of identity and legitimacy are at stake.
For example, it should be remembered that although unemployed, frustrated
young men can turn to Islamism, they can also turn to drugs and crime, to apa-
thy, indifference, muddling through, dogged hard work, or any number of other
personal “coping” strategies. The decision to join a revolutionary movement is
an idiosyncratic and deeply personal one. Socioeconomic contexts may be im-
portant for understanding these movements, but they hardly provide a complete
explanation for them. Nevertheless, the huge numbers of discontented young
men and women are a major threat to the internal stability of the Middle East.
Youth politics always and everywhere focuses not merely on material goods
but also on questions of identity, justice, and morality. Consider, for example,
the politics of the American “baby boomers” of the 1960s. Impatience and
Manichean thinking are among the burdens of youth politics, whether in Berke-
ley or Cairo. Also, as criminologists point out, resort to violence is overwhelm-
ingly a phenomenon of youth. The millions of unemployed and underemployed
young men gathered in the specific political and cultural milieux of the region
constitute one of the tangled roots of radicalism.
THE JUNGLE OF THE CITIES
The discontent of these young people is exacerbated by the fact that most of
them now live in cities—cities that are crumbling. The number of Middle East
urban dwellers has increased by about a hundred million in thirty-five years.
Roughly half the population now live in cities, and the number is expected to
rise from 135 million to over 350 million by 2025. From 1985 to 1990 the great-
est growth was in secondary cities (6 percent), compared to that (3.8 percent) of
the nineteen largest cities with populations of over one million in 1990. This
trend continued throughout the 1990s. Public services and utilities are already
overwhelmed. In Jordan and Morocco, for example, one-third of the urban pop-
ulation lacks adequate sewerage, and water supplies are often erratic. Govern-
ments that attempt to provide these services through heavy subsidies only strain
their budgets and thwart the investments needed to extend and improve what
exists. As a result, regimes lose their legitimacy in the minds of those who spend
much of their time thinking about what they see.
Rapid urbanization erodes the government’s legitimacy in at least two ways.
First, it strains the infrastructure and budget. The government’s perceived
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inability to provide housing, sewerage, potable water, and garbage collection
raises doubts about its fundamental purpose. Second, the process of migration
to the cities is always disorienting. Whether in Ayacucho or Asyut, the mixture
of rural-urban migration with discontented provincial intellectuals proves to be
highly toxic (if not yet fatal) to existing governments. The newly arrived mi-
grants provide fertile fishing ground for Islamic militants, particularly when the
migrant cannot find work and the (allegedly) decadent mores of the cities shock
his sensibilities.
Consider Karachi, Pakistan. This city has grown from a population of one
million at the time of the nation’s independence to eleven million today, and it
may grow to twenty million by 2015. Its managers are overwhelmed, as are its
systems that provide water, electricity, transportation, health care, and educa-
tion. In the slums, there is only one place that is cool when outside it is hot, clean
when outside it is filthy, and calm when outside there is chaos—the mosque.
Government policy has played an important (if negative) role here. Government
incapacity and the resulting “abandonment of public space” to private Islamic
schools, clinics, hospitals, and welfare agencies have done much to advance the
fanatics’ cause.
Some may object that (as far as one can tell) most of those responsible for the
crimes of 11 September were privileged and educated. This, however, is entirely
to be expected. George Orwell once quipped that “revolutionaries can always
pronounce their aitches.” Revolutionaries are often, even typically, from rela-
tively privileged backgrounds. Lenin was no muzhik, and Mao Tse-tung was the
son of a rich peasant; yet the political and economic conditions of Russia and
China when they were young profoundly shaped their opinions and ideals. Peo-
ple who knew Mohammed Atta (one of the 11 September hijackers) in Germany
heard him speak of the “fat cats” running Egypt. It is no surprise that the “shock
troops” of a revolutionary movement are educated and privileged. It would be
quite ahistorical, however, to argue that their existence—or their appeal—is in-
dependent of the social conditions of their societies. Monocausal explanations
of complex historical phenomena are always foolish.
It is also worth remembering that radicalism reaches far wider than al-Qa‘ida.
Movements in Algeria, Egypt, Palestine, Pakistan, Yemen, Central Asia, and
Southeast Asia include many diverse actors.
A HISTORICAL ANALOGY
The fanatics of al-Qa‘ida display a close resemblance to the nihilists and other
terror-prone, would-be revolutionaries of nineteenth-century Russia, as
described by the Hungarian writer Tibor Szamuely: “The Russian intelligentsia
was a social stratum composed of those politically aroused, vociferous, and
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radical members of the educated classes who felt totally estranged from society. . . .
The alienation of the intelligentsia from society was to a great extent inherent in
the country’s rudimentary social structure. . . .[U]nlike the West, Russia had no
interest groups capable of giving strength, support, and substance to the intel-
lectuals’ protest. . . .The Russian intelligentsia had neither a place nor a stake in
the existing order of things.”13 Szamuely goes on to say that just as the educated
young men who piloted planes into the World Trade Center could easily have
found well-paying jobs, there were considerable opportunities within the tsarist
bureaucracy for men of talent. However, like the al-Qa‘ida mujahidiin, many
Russian intellectuals chose to spurn that path. “The intelligent . . . himself re-
jected the idea of serving a system founded on injustice, oppression and mis-
ery.”14 That is to say, ideas matter, and ideas are not formed in a socioeconomic
vacuum.
Further similarities emerge. For example, in nineteenth-century Russia, as in
the past generation of the Muslim world, there was a dramatic expansion of uni-
versities, whose doors opened for the first time to less privileged young men, of-
ten from rural backgrounds. “[After the Crimean War,] there was a marked shift
in the social composition of the student body in the universities. . . .[I]t came to
be made up more and more of so-called raznochintsy, ‘people of diverse rank’:
sons of clergymen, peasants, petty officials, army officers, artisans, and trades-
men who had become divorced by virtue of their education or inclination from
their fathers’ social station and could no longer fit into the official estate system.”15
In a manner that Szamuely finds “very understandable,” instead of feeling grati-
tude for the opportunity for upper mobility the “student-raznochinets brought
with him a deep sense of the injustices of Russian life . . . [that] rapidly turned
into hatred of the existing order.”16 Szamuely also notes that the intolerant
utopianism of the student revolutionaries was a mirror-image of the violence
of the tsarist state. Here too there are important parallels in many Muslim
countries.
THE FAILURE OF GOVERNMENTS
The incompetence and authoritarianism of many Middle East and Muslim gov-
ernments represent vital sources of the phenomenon of Islamic radicalism.
These governments are overwhelmingly unelected, unaccountable, and corrupt.
They provide no legitimate outlets for the discontentment of youth. Unsurpris-
ingly, the young despise them. The old ideologies of these governments, largely
varieties of nationalism, are perceived as failures. They have delivered neither
material goods nor a sense of dignity at home or abroad. The half-century-long
failure of Arab states to resolve the Palestinian situation and the inability of Pa-
kistan to ease the lot of Kashmiri Muslims have contributed to the evident
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corrosion of the regimes’ legitimacy. Nationalism has not disappeared; it has
been assimilated into the Islamists’ discourse.
Governments are rightly faulted for their dismal economic performance.
During the past twenty years, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (consisting of thirty countries) has seen its members’ per capita
incomes rise at about 1.4 percent per year. East Asia (excluding Japan) has, of
course, grown much faster, at 5.8 percent per year—a rate that doubled per ca-
pita incomes in twelve and one-half years. Even Latin America, with its notori-
ous “lost decade” of the debt-ridden 1980s, saw per capita incomes rise at just
under 1 percent per year during the past two decades. In contrast, per capita in-
comes in the Arab states today are little different from what they were in 1980;
some analysts would argue that their per capita movement has actually been
negative, which is clearly the case in Saudi Arabia. Real wages and labor produc-
tivity there are about the same as in 1970.17 This performance is worse than that
of any other major country in the world, except for the countries of the former
Soviet Union; even sub-Saharan Africa has done better.
The reasons for this woeful record are well understood. A combination of vast
economic rents, authoritarian and centralizing states, and the fashion for import
substitution in the third quarter of the twentieth century generated inward-
looking political economies dominated by the state. Dismantling such
structures has proved difficult, and the process of economic reform has often
been tentative, dilatory, and slow. It is for this reason that the demand for labor
has grown slowly while the supply has soared. Government economic failure is
the other “blade of the scissors,” producing unemployment, falling real wages,
and stagnant per capita incomes.
WHAT IS TO BE DONE?
How can the United States reduce the appeal of the utopian fanatics? It should
approach the problem with considerable humility. Take the economic crisis. A
strong case can be made that the economies of the Middle East have failed be-
cause of institutional and political deficiencies. Outsiders can do very little to
promote institutional change, as the United States learned to its dismay in Rus-
sia and elsewhere. The deep cultural crisis of contemporary Islam’s confronta-
tion with modernity can be resolved only by Muslims.
The Middle East has been slow to embrace the international consensus (the
“Washington consensus”) on what policies should be adopted to improve its
economic management. Washington’s view holds that only a private-sector,
export-oriented economic development strategy has a chance of coping with
the challenges facing the region. This view is best articulated by the World
Bank and the International Monetary Fund.18 However, there are many other
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adherents, particularly in the U.S. government and American academia and
think tanks.
No one has formulated a policy mix for the Middle East more persuasive
than that of the Washington consensus. The usual recommendation is to
push the regimes harder to “reform their economies.” Although the consen-
sus may be the best available strategy, it too is likely to fail. This may be es-
pecially true for the very poor nations and the relatively rich states of the
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).
For the poorest countries, on the consensus view, exports are highly un-
likely to provide either adequate food (this is an increasingly serious prob-
lem) or a sufficient number of jobs. The domestic productive capacity has
been (and is being) damaged by population growth and property-rights is-
sues (e.g., groundwater), and natural-resource degradation may have gone
so far as to be difficult to reverse. Further, because of the growth of the labor
force, the provision of jobs via the “private-sector-led export model” is not
credible; the infrastructure is too poor, and the labor force is overwhelmingly
illiterate. The grim facts are that, at best, economic development in such
countries is mainly a “holding action,” designed to prevent further deteriora-
tion and a consequent complete breakdown of order. The danger is that a
breakdown will lead to the anarchy of a Somalia or Afghanistan, with the
concomitant risk of the development of terrorist safe havens.
The Washington consensus does not easily fit the GCC states. The problems
there are largely fiscal. The relief that the last several years have afforded appears
unlikely to last; the “rent ceiling” of oil given by alternative energy production
costs is about twenty-five dollars per barrel. Even at this maximum price, reve-
nue would be short. The large numbers on the expenditure side arise from the
perceived need for governments to spend heavily on defense, consumer subsi-
dies, and public-sector job creation. The GCC states have local populations that
are thoroughly dependent upon, and expect to receive, a wide variety of con-
sumer subsidies. Their governments’ ability to meet their side of the social con-
tract is doubtful. Most importantly, the large majority of nationals (in
Kuwait the figure is 80 percent) are employed by the state. Consequently, short-
falls in government revenue translate quickly into difficulties with employment
creation. The private sector is too dependent on state largesse, and too small to
take up the slack. Most importantly, the countries of the Gulf have limited com-
parative advantages in non-oil goods or services. Wage rates, seriously inflated
by past oil rents and current consumer subsidies, are far too high to compete in
low-wage activities, but skills have not been developed to compete for more so-
phisticated work.
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The orthodox economic growth strategy also faces formidable obstacles else-
where, where it might plausibly work, such as in the “newly industrializing
countries” of North Africa, Egypt, Iran, and possibly Jordan. Here the needed
policy shifts may themselves be destabilizing, not only because the necessary
changes involve austerity but because challenges face special interests that are
major props of regime support and that occupy important, subsidized positions
within the bureaucracy. Examples range from East Bank Jordanians to Egyptian
workers in state-owned enterprises.
In the long run, the needed changes are also likely to destabilize in another
way. Attracting the necessary volume of investment will almost certainly require
greater governmental accountability and more transparent rules of the eco-
nomic game. This is not to say that democracy is needed for growth but only to
suggest that it is unlikely that regimes will attract the necessary private capital
from their own citizens, or foreigners, if they persist in arbitrary, authoritarian
practices. Since there is good reason to suppose that continued authoritarianism
is in itself one of the causes for radicalism, and since continued unaccountable
governance undermines economic growth, institutional change in the direction
of greater participation and enhanced governmental accountability may consti-
tute a key element of long-run stability.19 The problem is, of course, that the
transition from the current situation of authoritarian unaccountability is likely
to be a rocky road.
The truth is that outsiders are largely (but not entirely) irrelevant to the pro-
cess of deep institutional and cultural change that, alone, can ultimately over-
come the profound, multitiered crisis facing the Muslim world. The United
States can and must refrain from behavior that will provide fuel for fanatical ar-
guments and discourage those in the Middle East who would respond differ-
ently to their own societies’ crises. U.S. foreign policy can play a role here. It must
also continue to seek a settlement in the conflict between the Palestinians and Is-
raelis. Any resolution will be, to say the least, enormously difficult. However, the
United States will not have peace with the young Arabs until that situation is
resolved.
The United States also has an opportunity to contribute to change by modify-
ing its policies, especially toward Iran. U.S. energy policies have long been stun-
ningly myopic, and Americans continue to pay at the pump for many a Salafi
madraseh (school).
Regrettably, current indications are that U.S. policies will do little to amelio-
rate these problems. There is a tendency in current U.S. discourse to attribute the
entirety of the problem to cultural failings in the Muslim world and to imagine
that military power can tamp down if not resolve complex social, economic, po-
litical, and cultural struggles. This is unlikely.20 Sadly, it appears probable that
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both U.S. behavior and regional trends will continue to water the roots of Is-
lamic radicalism.
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THE ARAB “STREET” AND THE MIDDLE EAST’S
DEMOCRACY DEFICIT
Dale F. Eickelman
Even before the events of 11 September 2001, it was already becoming clearthat rapidly increasing levels of education, greater ease of travel, and the rise
of new communications media were developing a public sphere in Muslim-
majority societies in which large numbers of people—not just an educated, politi-
cal, and economic elite—expect a say in religion, governance, and public issues.
State authorities continue in many ways to be arbi-
trary and restrict what is said in the press, the broad-
cast media, and in public, but the methods of avoiding
such censorship and control have rapidly proliferated.
Today, silence in public no longer implies ignorance.
Silence, or apparent acquiescence, is often a
weapon of the weak. In some countries of the Arabian
Peninsula, a “politics of silence,” in which audiences
applaud tepidly rather than with enthusiasm, is one of
the few forms of public protest available, despite the
simulacra of democratic forms offered by repressive
and authoritarian governments.1 For instance, Tuni-
sia’s President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali was reelected
with 99 percent of cast ballots in 1994, but few Tuni-
sians would take at face value his response to a French
journalist’s question that such results, far from being
“a bit too good,” merely reflected “the profound re-
alities of the Arab-Muslim world” and that the vote
was “a massive adhesion to a project of national
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salvation.”2 Public silence in Tunisia in the face of such claims does not equal
agreement with them.
Washington policy makers recognized the implications of this new sense of
the public in the Arab world well before the 11 September terrorist attacks.
Among them, it is called the “Arab street,”
a new phenomenon of public accountability, which we have seldom had to factor
into our projections of Arab behavior in the past. The information revolution, and
particularly the daily dose of uncensored television coming out of local TV stations
like al-Jazira and international coverage by CNN and others, is shaping public opin-
ion, which, in turn, is pushing Arab governments to respond. We do not know, and
the leaders themselves do not know, how that pressure will impact on Arab policy in
the future.3
The use of the term “street,” rather than “public sphere” or “public,” imputes
passivity, or a propensity to easy manipulation, and implies a lack of formal or
informal leadership. Nonetheless, its use indicates that policy makers at least ac-
knowledge that even regional authoritarian and single-party states now have
“publics” to take into account.
BEING MUSLIM AND MODERN
The spread of higher education, greater mobility, and proliferating and accessi-
ble means of communication have contributed significantly to the fragmenta-
tion of religious and political authority, challenging authoritarianism in many
domains.4 This process could lead to more open societies, just as globalization
has been accompanied by such developments as Vatican II and secular human
rights movements. Many movements show the positive side of globalization, in
which small but determined transnational groups work toward goals that im-
prove the human condition. The leaders of such movements in the Arab and the
Muslim-majority worlds, including interpreters of religious matters, often lack
theological and philosophical sophistication. Some can, however, motivate mi-
norities and at least persuade wider publics of the justice of their causes, chang-
ing implicit, practical understandings of ethical issues in the process.
There is also a darker side to globalization. The fragmentation of authority
and the growing ability of large numbers of people to participate in wider
spheres of religious and political debate and practical action can also have highly
negative outcomes. This darker side is epitomized by Osama Bin Laden and the
al-Qa‘ida terrorist movement. This organization is not noted primarily for its
theological sophistication. In quality of thought, Bin Laden and his associates,
such as the Egyptian physician Ayman al-Zawahiri, are no match for Thomas
Hobbes, Martin Heidegger, Egypt’s (and Qatar’s) Yusuf al-Qaradawi, or Syria’s
Muhammad Shahrur. Al-Qa‘ida has, nonetheless, demonstrated a public
4 0 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
44
Naval War College Review, Vol. 55 [2002], No. 4, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol55/iss4/1
relations genius that—combined with massive and dramatic terrorist
acts—caught the world by surprise and reinforced its public declarations of
anti-Western sentiments.
The Bin Laden/al-Qa‘ida view of world politics gains its power and timeless-
ness by appealing to unity and faith regardless of the balance of power against
them, and by attributing the evils
of this world to Christians and
Jews, as well as to Muslims who
associate with them (and thus
subvert the goals of the umma, the worldwide community of true believers).
Does not the Qur’an say that polytheists should be fought until they cease to ex-
ist (Q. 9:5) and that those who do not rule by God’s law are unbelievers who, by
implication, should be resisted (Q. 5:44)?5
These interpretations of scripture are highly contestable and should not be
taken as harbingers of a coming “clash of civilizations” or as, in Gilles Kepel’s
(more ecumenical) phrase, the “revenge of God.”6 This “theology” does not go
back to ancient roots or to the Qur’an, although some extremists make such
claims, but is thoroughly modern; it is basically an update of the beliefs of Is-
lamic Jihad, an Egyptian group best known for its assassination of Anwar
al-Sadat in 1981. Only a tiny minority has been inspired to lethal action by such
interpretations. However, that minority builds on a hybrid social base that can
bring together the totally different worlds of “uneducated Pashtun villagers and
rich Arab city dwellers.”7 Some elements of the al-Qa‘ida message—especially
accounts of injustices perpetrated against Muslims in Palestine, Chechnya,
Kashmir, and elsewhere—capture the imagination of broad circles, although
their agreement does not translate into action.
Many voices and practices in the Muslim world call for or tend toward more
open societies and diverse religious interpretations.8 Even if ignored because
they are not heard in English or the major European languages, they are becom-
ing more significant. However, cautious autocracies are hesitant to contest di-
rectly the advocates of fanaticism and intolerance. There will always be ideas at
hand to justify intolerance and violence, and there will also always be ways for
terrorists to manipulate open societies for their nefarious ends; countering radi-
cal ideologies and theologies of violence is not easy. Yet the proliferation of
voices openly debating the role of Islam in contemporary society contributes
significantly to weakening the appeal of terrorists.
One Islamic thinker in the Gulf region, for example, argues that the principle
of equality as a foundational idea was firmly established in the U.S. Declaration
of Independence in 1776 but that the implementation of the principle took
nearly two centuries to achieve. The right for free men to vote on an equal basis
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was granted only in 1850, and African-American males got the right to vote in
1870. Women got the right to vote in 1920, and the poll tax was eliminated only
in 1964. He sees the Islamic principle of shura, or consultation, as identical to de-
mocracy and as an idea that can only be achieved incrementally and never fully
realized, as in the American case.9 In a similar manner, Syria’s Muhammad
Shahrur, in his many books and on satellite television, calls for a rethinking of
the Islamic tradition to break the hold of the ’ulama (“the body of learned
men”—that is, canonical religious authorities) and popular preachers on
Qur’anic interpretation.10
Thinkers and religious leaders like Turkey’s Fethullah Gülen and Indonesia’s
Nurcholish Madjid hold that democracy and Islam are fully compatible and that
Islam prescribes no particular form of governance, certainly not arbitrary rule.
They argue that the central Qur’anic message is that Muslims must take respon-
sibility for their own society. Even the headscarf is not essential, Gülen ar-
gues—taking up a theme as politically explosive in Turkey as it is in
France—only the requirement of modest dress and comportment. The views of
such thinkers (and there are many) are less well known outside the Arab and
Muslim-majority world than, for instance, once were the views of Solidarity ac-
tivists in Poland or the advocates of liberation theology. The courage of those in
the Islamic world who advocate toleration, even those who practice it in private
without articulating their views, is remarkable. These thinkers recognize that
there are many religious differences between Islam and the West, but they also
acknowledge many important points in common.
MODERN TRANSNATIONAL VIDEOS
In the years ahead, open communication and public diplomacy will be increas-
ingly significant in countering the image that the likes of the al-Qa‘ida terrorist
network and Osama Bin Laden assert for themselves as “guardians of Islamic
values.” Al-Qa‘ida itself may fade from prominence, but the views it advocates
resonate within the Muslim-majority world and have parallels outside it. In the
fight against terrorism, of which Bin Laden is the photogenic icon, the first step
is to recognize that he is as thoroughly a part of the modern world as was Cam-
bodia’s French-educated Pol Pot. Bin Laden presents himself as a traditional Is-
lamic warrior brought up to date (though the “tradition” is an invented one).
The language and content of his videotaped appeals assert his modernity even
more strongly, although less obviously, than do his camouflage jacket,
Kalashnikov, and Timex watch.
Consider a two-hour al-Qa‘ida recruitment videotape in Arabic that has
made its way since May 2000 to many Middle Eastern video shops and Western
news media.11 It is a skillful production, as fast-paced and gripping as any Hindu
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fundamentalist video justifying the destruction in 1992 of the Ayodhya mosque
in India, or the political “attack videos” used in American presidential cam-
paigning.12 The 1988 “Willie Horton” campaign video—which showed a mug
shot of a convicted rapist who had committed a second rape during a weekend
furlough from a Massachusetts prison, while a voice-over portrayed Democratic
presidential candidate Michael Dukakis as “soft” on crime—was a marketing
masterpiece that combined a conventional, if explicit, message with another
menacing, underlying one intended to galvanize undecided voters. The
al-Qa‘ida video, although it was directed at a different audience—presumably
Arab youth who are alienated, unemployed, and often living in desperate condi-
tions—shows an equal mastery of modern propaganda.
The recruitment video begins with the attack on the USS Cole (DDG 67) in
Yemen, then cuts to a montage implying coordinated worldwide aggression
against Muslims in Palestine, Jerusalem, Lebanon, Chechnya, Kashmir, and In-
donesia. Images follow of U.S. generals being received by Saudi princes, intimat-
ing collusion with the infidel West by leaders of oppressive Muslim regimes,
thereby undermining their legitimacy. The tape continues by attributing the suf-
ferings of the Iraqi people to American brutality against Muslims. Many of the
images are taken from daily Western video news; the BBC and CNN logos add to
their authenticity, just as the rebroadcast by CNN and the BBC of Qatar’s
al-Jazeera satellite television logo has added authenticity to Western coverage of
Bin Laden.
Alternating with these scenes of devastation and oppression are images of
Osama Bin Laden—posing in front of bookshelves or seated on the ground like
an Islamic religious scholar, holding in his hand the Qur’an. Radiating charis-
matic authority, he recounts the Prophet Muhammad’s flight from Mecca to
Medina when the early Islamic movement was threatened by idolaters, and his
triumphant return; the analogy is repeatedly drawn. Bin Laden also stresses the
need for a jihad, or struggle, for the cause of Islam against the “crusaders” and
“Zionists.” Later images show military training in Afghanistan (including target
practice at a video of Bill Clinton projected against a wall). A final sequence por-
trays—as the word “solution” flashes across the screen and a voice-over recites
from the Qur’an—an Israeli soldier in full riot gear retreating from a Palestinian
boy throwing stones.
A THOROUGHLY MODERN FANATIC
Osama Bin Laden, like many of his associates, is imbued with not only the tech-
niques but the values of the modern world, even if only to reject them. A 1971
photograph shows him at age fourteen on a family holiday in Oxford, in the
United Kingdom, posing with two half-brothers and some Spanish girls their
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own age. English would have been their common language. Bin Laden had stud-
ied English at a private school in Jidda, and English was later useful for his civil
engineering courses at King Abdul Aziz University. Unlike many of his now-es-
tranged half-brothers, who were educated in Europe and the United States as
well as in Saudi Arabia, Osama studied only in Saudi Arabia; nonetheless, he was
familiar with European society.
Organizational skills he learned in the university came into play when he
joined the mujahidin (“strugglers,” or holy warriors) against the 1979 Soviet in-
vasion of Afghanistan. Whether or not he actually met American intelligence of-
ficers in the field, they, like their Saudi and Pakistani counterparts, were pleased
at his participation and his willingness to recruit fighters from throughout the
Arab world. Likewise, Bin Laden’s many business enterprises flourished, even
under highly adverse conditions. In both settings, he skillfully sustained a flexi-
ble multinational organization in the face of opposition, moving cash, people,
and supplies almost undetected across international frontiers.
If Western policy makers and intelligence professionals never underestimated
the organizational effectiveness of Bin Laden and his associates, neither should
they underestimate their ability to convey a message that appeals to at least some
Muslims. One need not have credentials as an established Islamic scholar in or-
der to have one’s ideas taken seriously. As Sudan’s former attorney general and
speaker of the parliament, the Sorbonne-educated Hasan al-Turabi (also leader
of his country’s Muslim Brotherhood), asserted two decades ago, “Because all
knowledge is divine and religious, a chemist, an engineer, an economist, or a ju-
rist” are all men of learning.13 Bin Laden, a civil engineer, exemplifies Turabi’s
point. Some in his audience do not look for ability to cite authoritative texts; in-
stead, they respond to his apparent skill in applying generally accepted religious
tenets to current political and social issues.
THE MESSAGE ON THE ARAB STREET
Bin Laden’s lectures circulate in book form in the Arab world, but video is the
main vehicle of communication. Mass education and new communications
technologies enable large numbers of Arabs to hear—and see—al-Qa‘ida’s mes-
sage directly. The use of CNN-like “zippers”—the ribbons of words streamed
beneath images—shows that al-Qa‘ida takes for granted rising levels of educa-
tion. Increasingly, its audience has access to both conventional and new media,
such as the Internet.14 The entry of the Middle East into an era of mass commu-
nication has established standard Arabic (as opposed to its widely differing and
often mutually incomprehensible regional dialects) as a lingua franca. In Mo-
rocco in the early 1970s, for instance, rural people might ask speakers of
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standard Arabic to “translate” newscasts in the transnational speech of the state
radio into local, colloquial Arabic. Today this is no longer required.
Bin Laden’s message does not depend on religious themes alone. Like that of
the Ayatollah Ruholla Khomeini, his message contains many secular elements.
Khomeini often alluded to the “wretched of the earth” and drew on images ap-
pealing to third-world militants in general. At least for a time, his language ap-
pealed equally to Iran’s religiously minded sector and its secular Left. For Bin
Laden, the equivalent themes are the oppression and corruption of many Arab
governments, for which he lays the blame—as he does for violence and oppres-
sion in Palestine, Kashmir, Chechnya, and elsewhere—on the West. One need
not be religious to rally to such themes. A poll taken in Morocco in late Septem-
ber 2001 showed that, though a majority of Moroccans condemned the 11 Sep-
tember bombings, 41 percent sympathized with Bin Laden’s message.15 An early
November 2001 poll of 11,500 Muslims in Britain showed that only 21 percent
thought that the United States was justified in blaming al-Qa‘ida for the attacks
in America on 11 September and that 57 percent disagreed with Prime Minister
Tony Blair when he claimed that the U.S. and British military action in Afghani-
stan was not an attack on Islam.16
Osama Bin Laden and the al-Qa‘ida terrorist movement are thus reaching at
least part of the Arab “street.” The U.S. director of central intelligence, George J.
Tenet, testified before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in February
2001 that “the right catalyst—such as the outbreak of Israeli-Palestinian vio-
lence—can move people to act. Through access to the Internet and other means
of communication, a restive [Arab] public is increasingly capable of taking ac-
tion without any identifiable leadership or organizational structure.”17
COUNTERING THE DEMOCRACY DEFICIT
The Middle East in general has a democracy deficit, in which “unauthorized”
leaders or critics such as Saad Eddin Ibrahim—founder and director of Cairo’s
Ibn Khaldoun Center for Development Studies, a nongovernmental organiza-
tion that promotes democracy in Egypt—suffer harassment or prison terms. It
is because many governments in the Middle East are deeply suspicious of an
open press, nongovernmental organizations, and unrestricted expression that
the “restive” public, increasingly educated and influenced by hard-to-censor
new media, can take action. By “without any identifiable leadership or organiza-
tional structure” George Tenet meant an absence not of leadership altogether
but of leadership detectable by governments that have lost the confidence of so-
cial elements. An emerging Palestinian leader, say, would be foolhardy to allow
him or herself to become identifiable to Israeli or other intelligence services.
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One consequence of this democracy deficit is to magnify the power of the
“street” in the Arab world. Bin Laden, speaking in the vivid language of popular
Islamic preachers, builds on a deep and widespread resentment of the West and
the local ruling elites associated with it. The lack of formal outlets for opinion on
public concerns makes it easier for zealots, claiming the authority of religion, to
hijack the Arab street.
One immediate response possible for the West is to acknowledge the exis-
tence of the Arab street and to learn to speak directly to it. This task has already
begun, and an available point of access is al-Jazeera, which was obscure to all ex-
cept specialists until 11 September 2001. This Qatari satellite television network
is a premier source in the Arab world of uncensored news and opinion. It is
more, however, than the Arab equivalent of CNN. Uncensored news and opin-
ions increasingly shape public opinion even in places like Damascus and Algiers.
Public opinion, in turn, pushes Arab governments to be more responsive to their
citizens, or at least to say that they are.
Far from seeking to censor al-Jazeera, limit al-Qa‘ida’s access to the Western
media, or create a de facto Office of Disinformation within the Pentagon—an
unfortunate early proposal of the U.S. government after the September terror at-
tacks—the United States should specifically avoid censorship. Al-Qa‘ida state-
ments should be treated with the same caution as those of any other news
source.
Ironically, at almost the same moment that national security adviser
Condoleezza Rice asked the American television networks not to air al-Qa‘ida
videos unedited, a former senior CIA officer, Graham Fuller, was explaining in
Arabic on al-Jazeera how American policy making works. His appearance on
al-Jazeera made a significant impact, as did Secretary of State Colin Powell’s
presence on a later program and that of former U.S. ambassador Christopher
Ross, who speaks fluent Arabic. Likewise, the timing and content of the response
of Prime Minister Tony Blair of Britain to an earlier Bin Laden tape suggests how
to take the emerging Arab public seriously. The day after al-Jazeera broadcast the
Bin Laden tape, Blair asked for and received an opportunity to respond. In his
reply, Blair—in a first for a Western leader—directly addressed the Arab public
through the Arab media, explaining coalition goals in attacking al-Qa‘ida and
the Taliban, and challenging Bin Laden’s claim to speak in the name of Islam.
Such appearances enhance the West’s ability to communicate its primary mes-
sage—that the war against terrorism is a struggle not of one civilization against
another but against terrorism and fanaticism in all societies. Western policies and
actions are subject to public scrutiny and are quite likely to be misunderstood,
especially by people living under closed regimes or faced with apparent contradic-
tory emphases in foreign policy and actions. U.S. government statements about
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the evil of the Iraqi regime are hard to explain to the Arab street when the Ameri-
can leadership appears unable or even unwilling to restrain Israeli incursions into
the West Bank and Gaza. Public diplomacy can significantly diminish some mis-
apprehensions, but it may also require some uncomfortable policy decisions.
For instance, America may be forced to exert more diplomatic pressure on Israel
to alter its methods of dealing with Palestinians.
Western public diplomacy in the Middle East also entails great care in un-
charted waters. As an Oxford University social linguist, Clive Holes, has pointed
out, the linguistic genius who thought up the original name for the campaign to
oust the Taliban, “Operation INFINITE JUSTICE,” did a major disservice to the
Western goal. The expression was literally and accurately translated into Arabic
as ‘adala ghayr mutanahiya, connoting an earthly power arrogating to itself the
task of divine retribution. Likewise, President George W. Bush’s inadvertent and
unscripted use of the word “crusade” gave al-Qa‘ida spokesmen—and many
others—an opportunity to attack the intentions of Bush and the West.
Mistakes will be made, but information and arguments that reach the Arab
public sphere, including on al-Jazeera, will eventually have an impact for good
or for ill. Some Westerners might condemn al-Jazeera as biased, and it may well
be, in terms of the assumptions it makes about its audience. However, al-Jazeera
has already broken a taboo by regularly inviting official Israeli spokespersons to
comment live on current issues. Muslim religious scholars, both in the Middle
East and in the West, have already spoken out on the network against al-Qa‘ida’s
claim to act in the name of Islam. Other courageous voices, such as Egyptian
playwright Ali Salem, have even employed humor for that purpose.18
The United States must recognize that the best way to mitigate the continuing
threat of terrorism is to encourage Middle Eastern states to be much more responsive
to longings for real participation in governance and to aid local nongovernmental
organizations working toward this goal. As occurred in Egypt in the case of Saad
Eddin Ibrahim, some countries may see such activities as subversive. Nonetheless,
and whether Arab ruling elites like it or not, the Arab street is turning into a public
sphere that will expect to be heard on public issues and matters of governance.
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GIVE PEACE A CHANCE
First, Try Coercive Diplomacy
Captain William S. Langenheim, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve
Since the 11 September terrorist attacks, the Bush administration has made itabundantly clear that it is not willing to accept the status quo in Iraq. It has
vigorously asserted that Saddam Hussein’s continued pursuit of weapons of
mass destruction and his past links to terrorism could make his regime the next
target in the “war on terrorism.”1 At the same time, virtually all Nato allies and
every one of America’s regional strategic partners have disagreed with the use of
military force either to compel Iraqi compliance with Security Council resolu-
tions or to topple Saddam’s regime.2 The result is a growing divergence between
the United States and its European allies and Middle Eastern partners at a time
when, more than ever, the willing assistance of these states is needed if
counterterrorism against al-Qa‘ida is to succeed.
Unfortunately, as the rhetoric has grown more heated, pundits on each side
have emphasized the dangers of their rivals’ preferred strategy while whitewash-
ing the shortcomings of their own. Hence Americans have increasingly been led
to view the Europeans as “free-riders” and to pay little heed to the concerns of
Arab states for regional stability.3 Europeans in turn
complain of American unilateralism and hegemonic
ambitions, ignoring in the case of Iraq how their own
policies have shaped the growing tendency of the
United States toward self-reliance. Meanwhile, the
Arab governments, whose support for military action
against Iraq has been less than enthusiastic since the
end of the Gulf War, find their own national agendas
increasingly co-opted by popular outrage over the
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Israeli-Palestinian conflict, fueled by a perception that the United States deliber-
ately chooses not to restrain its Israeli “puppet.”
There is a way, however, to break the impasse between the United States and a
number of key states whose cooperation is critical not only for potential military
operations against Iraq but also for the broader war on terrorism. It would in-
volve delinking the Iraqi question from the war on terrorism and undertaking a
new diplomatic offensive to compel Iraqi compliance with existing Security
Council resolutions. This approach would avoid reducing Washington’s choice
to the two unsatisfactory extremes of unilateral action against Saddam or an
outright abandonment of the leverage gained by the Gulf War coalition.
Such an approach would not be the first time the United States used coercive
diplomacy as a means of bringing about allied consensus on Iraq: “Although the
strategy of coercive diplomacy had little chance of success [in 1990–91], the at-
tempt to employ it in the hope of avoiding war was necessary for building and
maintaining international and domestic support for the objective of liberating
Kuwait. Ironically, the failure of coercive diplomacy was necessary to gain sup-
port for war when war became the last resort.”4
Coercive diplomacy against Iraq in late 2002 represents an opportunity to
change the rules of the game. There are reasons to hope that the approach would
succeed; yet even if it is doomed to failure, by making the attempt the United
States would demonstrate that the Iraqi regime’s belligerent and intransigent at-
titude, not American warmongering, is the root of the conflict. Nothing is likely
to make American military action, if that is ultimately required, popular, but
giving diplomacy a final chance might make it possible for key allies and re-
gional partners to support it.
The first section below addresses the strategic objectives of the United States
concerning Iraq and identifies a number of specific reasons why Washington
cannot indefinitely accept the status quo. The argument then turns to why coer-
cive diplomacy should be the principal means for pursuing American strategic
priorities in Iraq, laying out the case for postponing unilateral use of force and
assessing coercive diplomacy’s strengths and weaknesses as a tool for accom-
plishing U.S. objectives. The third section tackles the central issue—can
Saddam’s regime be coerced?—by studying several cases in which the United
States used coercive diplomacy against Iraq during the 1990s. The fourth section
derives a framework that might make success possible or, failing that, from
which Iraq would derive no significant benefits should coercive diplomacy fail
and war become a necessity.
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THE STATUS QUO IS NO LONGER ACCEPTABLE
There is strong international agreement that the present state of affairs in Iraq is
not acceptable, but when the discussion turns to alternatives this consensus
quickly breaks down. On the one hand, the United States argues that so long as
Saddam Hussein or his designated heirs remain in power, Iraq will be a source of
regional instability and a danger to not only its neighbors but the American peo-
ple as well. On the other hand, virtually all European allies of the United States,
as well as Iraq’s Arab neighbors, maintain that Saddam’s regime has been con-
tained and weakened to the point that it no longer threatens security. Far greater
concerns, from their perspectives, are flawed American policy making and mili-
tary heavy-handedness, which increase the chance that moderate regimes, like
Saudi Arabia, will fall victim to popular discontent.
Nevertheless, in the “post-9/11” era, with the vulnerability of the American
homeland more clearly perceived, the Iraqi threat can no longer be defined
solely by Saddam’s ability to challenge the regional order. Instead, the union of
Iraq’s continued pursuit of weapons of mass destruction, past links to terrorism
(including an assassination attempt on a former American president), and a de-
cade’s worth of belligerence toward the United States has made Saddam’s regime
a direct threat to the American people.5 For this reason the long-term American
objective in Iraq must be regime change.
Yet as desirable as toppling Saddam’s regime is, it remains easier said than
done. There are three options for removing the Ba’thists from power—a military
coup, an American-backed insurgency, or an American invasion—and each has
its drawbacks. While there is no quick or easy way to topple Saddam’s regime,
there are compelling reasons for not delaying action longer than is absolutely
necessary. As daunting as the task of regime change may seem, however, it is cer-
tainly not as bad as the eventual probable alternative, a nuclear-armed Saddam
Hussein.
Deterring Saddam poses particular challenges, largely because he cares so lit-
tle about the suffering of the Iraqi people. Combined with Saddam’s history of
reckless foreign policy behavior when he perceives an advantage over his rivals,
this creates the potential for a dangerous game of brinkmanship involving Iraq,
Israel, and the United States. Given an atomic arsenal, it is a virtual certainty that
Saddam would sooner or later brandish such weapons in an attempt to reassert
Iraqi regional hegemony. As in the past, he would almost certainly misread his
adversaries, underestimate the risks involved, and once more sweep the entire
region into a bloody war—this time between nuclear powers.
Another reason for bringing about a regime change is the cost of maintaining
the current policy of containment. It can be measured in three ways. First, the
Cato Institute estimates that over eighty billion dollars are being spent annually
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to make the southern Gulf states de facto protectorates.6 In view of the fact that
the United States receives less than a quarter of its oil from the region, these ex-
penses go largely toward safeguarding its allies’ access to Gulf oil. Some of those
allies helped finance DESERT STORM but have made little or no effort to share the
burden of containing Saddam since that time.
Second, containment continues to cost Iraqi lives, due to the deprivations im-
posed upon that country by economic sanctions, but more so by Saddam’s
misallocation of Iraq’s income. The UN estimates that during the early and
mid-1990s, hundreds of thousands of Iraqis died from malnutrition and dis-
ease. After Saddam’s 1996 acceptance of Security Council Resolution (SCR) 986,
the “oil for food” program, the mortality rate should have decreased signifi-
cantly; notwithstanding, an August 1999 UNICEF report estimated that some
ninety thousand Iraqis, mostly infants and the elderly, had died during the pre-
ceding year from malnutrition.7 By 1999, Iraq’s income from oil exports had re-
turned to pre-1990 levels, demonstrating that Saddam continues to play upon
the civilized world’s compassion for the helpless Iraqi people in a callous effort
to get the sanctions removed.8
The third, and least tangible, cost of containment is measured in the spread of
anti-Americanism throughout the Middle East, including moderate Arab states
that have historically been the closest regional partners of the United States. The
roots of this anti-American sentiment are difficult to trace, but in general it
stems from the perception that the United States is hypocritical and greedy. Not
surprisingly, anti-Americanism has been further fueled by the dramatic escala-
tion in fighting in 2002 between the Israelis and Palestinians. The net result is
that, even if the Bush administration wanted to maintain indefinitely the policy
of containing Iraq, it appears increasingly doubtful that key Arab states will con-
tinue to provide the necessary host-nation support.
To date, the Bush administration has vigorously threatened military action,
unilaterally if necessary, in hopes of motivating elements within Saddam’s re-
gime to revolt and bring an end to Iraq’s isolation and suffering. Unfortunately,
Saddam appears none the weaker for this ominous rhetoric; instead, the U.S. po-
sition vis-à-vis its allies and regional partners has suffered.
WHY ATTEMPT COERCIVE DIPLOMACY?
An argument can be made for postponing unilateral action in favor of attempt-
ing to accomplish the U.S. objectives in Iraq, on grounds of the geopolitical real-
ities presently confronting the United States and of the advantages of the
coercive-diplomacy approach itself.
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The Right Cause but the Wrong Time
There are several strong reasons to forgo unilateral action against Saddam’s re-
gime at present. These include the status of operations against al-Qa‘ida and the
Taliban, the effects upon regional stability of the dramatic escalation in violence
between the Israelis and Palestinians, the nature of the Pentagon’s preferred
strategy for removing Saddam’s regime, and the limits upon the Pentagon’s abil-
ity to conduct operations against Iraq in the short term. Individually, none of
these factors precludes immediate action. However, in combination they build a
strong case for alternatives to the unilateral use of force until more favorable
conditions arise.
“Remember 9/11.” The United States is currently committed to the task of de-
stroying al-Qa‘ida and the remnants of the Taliban. While by no means a major
theater war, Operation ENDURING FREEDOM remains a significant military
commitment.9 To date American forces have made good progress in their efforts
to prevent the Taliban from challenging Afghanistan’s new government, but as
the commander of Central Command, General Tommy Franks, points out, the
Taliban is far from destroyed.10 Still, Operation ENDURING FREEDOM has made
promising strides toward its principal objective—hindering al-Qa‘ida’s ability
to recruit and train would-be terrorists in its former Afghan sanctuary. Simulta-
neously, a host of smaller military and law enforcement operations at the local
level around the globe appear to have degraded al-Qa‘ida’s ability to carry out
terrorist attacks, at least temporarily, by forcing its members into “survival
mode.” Recent arrests in Pakistan and efforts against the Abu Sayyaf group in the
Philippines are examples of this cooperation.11
Despite these successes, a year after the “9/11” attacks the United States is just
beginning to penetrate al-Qa‘ida’s shadowy underworld, and there is still a long
way to go. The utility of U.S. military ventures must therefore be weighed against
their impact upon the global war on terrorism. This is not to say that the war on
terrorism should in all cases prevail; clearly there are potentialities that could
dictate temporarily setting it aside. Evidence of Iraq’s imminent acquisition of
an atomic bomb would certainly be one, but an Iraqi nuclear capability does not
appear to be an immediate danger.
Given the extent to which the worldwide struggle against al-Qa‘ida depends
upon the cooperation of allied governments, now is not the time to undertake a
campaign in Iraq, if doing so would likely jeopardize relations with key allies and
strategic partners. Hence it would seem that unilateral action in Iraq should be
the last resort, not the first.
Jerusalem before Baghdad. The vigor with which Arab nations have urged the
United States to mediate the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has enormously
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constrained American freedom of action. The Arab League’s adoption in March
2002 of a Saudi peace plan, and subsequent overtures by Egypt’s President Hosni
Mubarak, demonstrate that the Arab states want desperately to end the violence
in Israel and the occupied territories.12 They are motivated partly by fear of their
own populations’ growing discontent and, in some cases, by a need to deflect at-
tention from their own links to terrorism and Islamic extremism.13 Nevertheless,
the unanimous declarations on the final day of the Arab League summit signal-
ing support for Iraqi attempts to mend fences with Saudi Arabia and Kuwait,
and firm opposition to any American use of force against Saddam’s regime, indi-
cate that the U.S. position on Iraq has lost a great deal of ground within the Arab
world.
Those in favor of unilateral U.S. action question the relevance of such ges-
tures, pointing out that, historically, pan-Arab rhetoric has not been backed up
by action. Additionally, they cite Vice President Richard Cheney’s claims that
there is no rift between the United States and its Arab partners; in March he
warned viewers of NBC’s Meet the Press not to believe everything they read in the
newspaper.14 However, Bush administration claims of satisfaction with the level
of support received from Arab states have met with considerable skepticism. The
vice president may indeed have found a sympathetic ear in several Arab capitals,
but there is little visible evidence of it. In any case, private admissions of sympa-
thy are a long way from the public expressions of support needed for the United
States to pursue the destruction of Saddam’s regime.
Now is not the best time to declare, in effect, that the Arab states are either
with the United States or against it in the war on terrorism by making Iraq the
next target in that struggle. Their support is essential to prosecuting operations
against al-Qa‘ida and other terrorist organizations. Furthermore, with the right
motivation Iraq’s neighbors could turn against Saddam for their own reasons, as
they have in the past. Arab governments have no love for Saddam; their recent
pro-Iraqi rhetoric is just that—pro-Iraqi, not pro-Saddam. Their overarching
concerns in this connection are for regional stability and for the welfare of the
Iraqi people; it is still possible to gain the genuine support of moderate Arab
states if the United States demonstrates that it shares these concerns. Coercive
diplomacy is more likely to do so than unilateral action.
The real challenge for the United States remains convincing its Arab partners
that there is no link between the Iraqi and Palestinian questions.15 The United
States needs to disconnect the war against terrorism, the Israeli-Palestinian con-
flict, and the Iraqi question. A key step would be recognition that the issue with
Iraq is not state sponsorship of terrorism (recent evidence of which has proven
difficult to find) but the regime’s aggressive strategic agenda and its noncompli-
ance with Security Council demands.16
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No Margin for Error. Presumably, if force is used against Iraq, an invasion to oc-
cupy the entire country would be the last resort. Theoretically, the primary ob-
jective of regime change can be achieved short of major war. Nevertheless, the
Pentagon is likely to err on the side of caution, advocating a punishing air cam-
paign followed by a vigorous ground offensive designed to overthrow swiftly the
Ba’thist regime while simultaneously denying Saddam the opportunity to put
into play a “doomsday” scenario.17 Clearly this would be a daunting task.
Truly unilateral American military action does not seem feasible at this time,
for reasons stemming from the nature of a large military campaign in Iraq. The
support of key regional partners and European allies would be critical; a conven-
tional military campaign, even if overwhelmingly carried out by American
forces (as during Operation DESERT STORM), would require access to bases and
facilities around the globe. Yet, the future of American military forces in Saudi
Arabia remains in doubt, and even staunch allies like Kuwait have balked at the
notion of a DESERT STORM II.
Predictably, the growing preference for a conventional strategy has come at
the expense of pro-opposition sectors of the administration. The balance has
tipped in favor of the conventional option because of wariness among senior
State Department officials and the Joint Chiefs of Staff about relying upon the
weak and fractured Iraqi opposition.18 As analysts point out, the Iraqi National
Congress (INC) and its constituent organizations bear little resemblance to the
Afghan Northern Alliance, just as Saddam’s regime shares few similarities with
the Taliban.19 Because of these disparities, any American military operation in
Iraq will have to be on a much larger scale than the war in Afghanistan.20 If the
Bush administration ultimately chooses to employ military force to remove
Saddam from power, it will first need to build up its forces in the region signifi-
cantly. During the harsh Persian Gulf summer, with no major buildup of Ameri-
can forces initiated, the Bush administration effectively accepted postponement
of major military action until November 2002 at the earliest, after which the
weather would be more favorable.
To succeed, the Pentagon’s strategy must meet three conditions. First, the
likelihood of various Iraqi preemptive actions must be provided for. Saddam is
unlikely to repeat his error of 1990 and idly permit an American military
buildup for invasion, particularly when such an invasion’s stated purpose is the
destruction of his regime. The inability of the Iraqi armed forces to challenge
American forces lends credence to fears that such preemption will be asymmet-
ric in nature, possibly taking the form of state-sponsored terrorism employing
chemical or biological weapons. Because of the danger of preemption, the sec-
ond condition for success demands that the United States be able to assemble its
forces quickly; a five-month preparation like Operation DESERT SHIELD is not
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an option. Most experts estimate an invasion would require roughly
250,000 personnel, possibly organized into an Army heavy armored corps, a
reinforced Marine expeditionary force, and a mix of Air Force expeditionary
forces and aircraft carrier battle groups, depending upon basing options.21
Third, the United States must have the willpower to target elements of the Iraqi
regime that enable Saddam to remain in power. Because such forces and facili-
ties are likely to have been placed in residential areas, this means accepting the
possibility of significant collateral damage and civilian casualties.
Such a campaign cannot be hastily thrown together. Detailed planning, par-
ticularly in the phasing of force deployments, must be conducted with host na-
tions, and well in advance if a shortened operational time line is to be achieved.22
Similarly, host-nation support is essential for protection against Iraqi preemp-
tive action or local discontent. Furthermore, both the American people and the
governments of allies and regional partners must be steeled for the challenges
that lie ahead—the former in terms of American servicemen killed in action, the
latter in terms of Iraqi civilians caught in the crossfire.23
IN THE MEANTIME: THE CASE FOR COERCIVE DIPLOMACY
Because of common misperceptions, let us make clear what coercive diplomacy
is not. It is neither a “silver bullet” that will solve “on the cheap” all U.S. problems
with Iraq nor an ill-conceived gimmick that implicitly rewards Saddam’s regime
for its recalcitrance. Coercive diplomacy of necessity relies heavily upon the
credible threat of punishment, but it does not compromise military operations.
Furthermore, the target of coercive diplomacy is not necessarily Saddam
Hussein, who may be personally immune to coercion at this point. Rather, the
target is the regime as a whole—the aim being to demoralize the political elite so
as to make it likely to overthrow Saddam or compel his accession to American
demands.
What Is Coercive Diplomacy?
Coercive diplomacy seeks to “back one’s demand on an adversary with a threat
of punishment for noncompliance that he will consider credible enough to per-
suade him to comply with the demand.”24 A shortcoming of this definition is the
tendency to confuse it with the broader concept of “compellance.”25 Because
force can be used to achieve either offensive (aggressive) or defensive (status
quo) agendas, it is important to distinguish between the two. Coercive diplo-
macy is defensive in nature; it is an effort “to persuade an opponent to stop and/
or undo an action he has already embarked upon.” Equivalent methods for of-
fensive purposes are better described as “blackmail strategies.”26
5 6 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
60
Naval War College Review, Vol. 55 [2002], No. 4, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol55/iss4/1
Policy makers attempting to pursue coercive diplomacy must make four basic
choices, according to the particular circumstances: what demands to make of
the adversary; whether or not to instill a sense of urgency in the adversary, and if
so, how best to do it; whether to threaten overtly some form of punishment for
noncompliance, and if so, how best to convey that threat; and whether to rely
solely upon the threat of punishment to induce compliance or to offer positive
incentives as well.27 The answers selected define the shape the strategy will
assume.
Broadly speaking, there are four variants of coercive diplomacy. First, there is
the ultimatum—a specific demand, a time limit for compliance, and a credible
threat of punishment in the event of noncompliance.28 A state may choose to
make the ultimatum “tacit,” by omitting either the time limit or the threat
of punishment (but not both).
This method relies upon ambigu-
ity to instill fear in its adversary
(although this can backfire due to
misunderstanding of the adver-
sary’s perceptions).29 There are a
variety of dangers in making an
ultimatum, and most of them apply to Iraq. A poorly timed ultimatum can
cause significant political backlash or provoke preemptive military action. An
ultimatum that is a bluff might be called, forcing the “coercing” state either to
initiate military action or back down. Finally, an adversary may respond with
conditional or partial acceptance, prompting calls for negotiations or
third-party mediation.30 For all these reasons, ultimatums are not to be issued
lightly, but some form of ultimatum is likely to be part of any effort to apply co-
ercive diplomacy against Iraq.
The second variant of coercive diplomacy is the try and see approach—a spe-
cific demand is made with neither a time limit nor a stated threat. Instead, the
coercing state engages in some form of demonstration in hopes that this alone
will persuade compliance.31 Because Saddam habitually ignores demands not
backed by imminent and credible force, this method seems infeasible with Iraq.
The third variant of coercive diplomacy has been called a gradual turning of
the screw. The coercing state sets forth specific demands but does not define a
time limit for compliance. The coercing power hints that if its demands are not
met, it will step up the pressure incrementally until they are.32 The key to this ap-
proach is the concept of “escalation dominance,” the ability to increase the costs
of noncompliance while rendering impotent the opponent’s ability either to
sidestep those costs or counterescalate.33 The turning-of-the-screw approach
may be suitable against Iraq, provided that the United States is willing to take the
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steps necessary to achieve escalation dominance and, if compliance does not oc-
cur by a certain point, issue an ultimatum.
The fourth variant of coercive diplomacy is the carrot and stick approach.
Whereas the three variants above rely solely upon threats, this method requires
receptivity to alternative methods. Not surprisingly, coercive diplomacy based
solely upon threats requires a formidable stick, and it is often difficult to convey
to an adversary the severity of possible consequences. Hence positive incentives
for compliance may reduce the natural reluctance on the part of the adversary to
comply. However, positive inducements and reassurances must be credible and
truly attractive. In addition, because the target state could renege, it is essential
that any inducements offered be either revocable or limited. “Carrots” would
almost certainly play a role in coercive diplomacy against Iraq. The form they
might take and whom within the Iraqi regime they would be intended to en-
courage will be discussed below.
Further, coercive diplomacy depends greatly upon context. Eight contextual
dynamics that have an effect upon the application of coercive diplomacy in
given scenarios have been outlined in the literature. These include the nature of
the adversary’s provocation and the difficulties inherent in any attempt to stop
or undo that provocation; the magnitude of asymmetries in motivation between
the two sides; the images of the consequences of war on each side; the level of
need (on the part of the coercing power) to resolve the issue by some specific
date; the unilateral or coalition character of the effort; the presence or absence of
strong political leadership on each side; the degree to which the adversary is isolated;
and the coercing power’s preferred postcrisis relationship with the adversary.34
Advantages and Disadvantages
One of the fundamental objectives of any American attempt to employ coercive
diplomacy against Iraq would be to tilt global public relations back in its favor
by demonstrating that its immediate objective is the unconditional implemen-
tation of SCR 687, which defined the terms of the Gulf War cease-fire in 1991
but has not yet been fully implemented.35 This tactic would place the burden of
shame for noncompliance back where it belongs, on Saddam’s regime. However,
there are costs involved. For example, implementing SCR 687 would not neces-
sarily achieve the overarching U.S. strategic objective in Iraq, the end of that
state’s aggressive agenda. It would temporarily constrain Iraq’s capacity for ag-
gression, but the root cause of the Iraqi state’s expansionism—Saddam Hussein
himself—might remain. By the terms of SCR 687, once declared in compliance
with the cease-fire obligations, Iraq would no longer be subject to UN monitor-
ing; Saddam might then rebuild his capacity for aggression, unchallenged legally
by the international community.
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In addition, if the United States is to cloak itself in international legitimacy,
the administration would do best to limit its demands to those mandated by the
Security Council.36 This means that it would be limited to enforcing existing res-
olutions, perhaps with modifications to strengthen the international commu-
nity’s ability to constrain future Iraqi aggression. Within these narrow confines
it would be very difficult to pursue a regime change in Iraq, and the prospect of
being forced to live with Saddam indefinitely is unappealing, given his propen-
sity to treachery and deceit. However, there is a silver lining—the chances that he
would agree to Security Council demands are low, and the likelihood of his actu-
ally making good on such an agreement is even lower. If the United States could
obtain an indefinite mandate for immediate recourse to military force in the
event of Iraqi noncompliance, the sacrifices necessary for international legiti-
macy would become more acceptable. Securing an open-ended mandate would
be challenging but not impossible.
A further advantage of coercive diplomacy is its tendency to bolster the indi-
vidual and collective resolve of policy makers by attaching their reputations to
success. With their prestige on the line, leaders and governments are likely to be
less ready to accept noncompliance or consider disengagement than generally
was the case in the latter half of the 1990s. There is little reason to question the
resolve of the Bush administration or of its British allies, but the behavior of
other key states toward Iraq does not inspire similar confidence.
A final difficulty of applying coercive diplomacy is that the adversary’s per-
ception is important to success or failure. In general, three notions must domi-
nate an adversary’s thinking if coercive diplomacy is to be successful. First, the
opponent must be convinced that a significant asymmetry of motivation in fa-
vor of the coercing power exists. Second, the adversary must be persuaded that
there is little time in which to comply with the demands upon it. Third, the ad-
versary must be in no doubt that the coercing power would follow through on its
threats and that the consequences would be unacceptably severe.37
CAN SADDAM’S REGIME BE COERCED?
To a certain degree, Saddam’s regime, like any other, can be coerced. However,
recent history shows that it is far from easy to influence Saddam Hussein’s men-
tal calculus in such a manner.
Inside the Republic of Fear
A single, overarching consideration drives Iraqi foreign policy—Saddam’s quest
to remain in power, with his dignity (at least in his own eyes) intact. Any distinc-
tion between his personal will and that of the Iraqi state is an exercise in
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semantics. Therefore, if one seeks to coerce Saddam’s regime, it is important to
understand his psychological profile and the system it has led him to create.
Saddam Hussein is not irrational. Rather, as a psychologist argued in 1990,
his record “reveals a judicious political calculator[,] . . . by no means irrational . . .
but dangerous to the extreme.” His outlook is dominated by a messianic vision
of himself as “the great struggler” pursuing Iraq’s “revolutionary destiny.” In
pursuit of this dream he is not constrained by conscience; “his only loyalty is to
Saddam Hussein.” Thus, “commitments and loyalty are matters of circum-
stance, and circumstances change.” His willingness to use whatever force he
deems necessary, including extreme brutality, even weapons of mass destruc-
tion, is part of an elaborate facade, the psychologist believed, masking a deep
underlying insecurity driven by “a strong paranoid orientation.” This conspira-
torial mindset enables Saddam to believe himself surrounded by enemies and to
overlook the extent to which he
created them. “It is this political
personality constellation—messi-
anic ambition for unlimited
power, absence of conscience,
unconstrained aggression, and a paranoid outlook—that makes Saddam so
dangerous. Conceptualized as malignant narcissism, this is the personality con-
figuration of the destructive charismatic who unifies and rallies his downtrod-
den supporters by blaming outside enemies.”38
Though “psychologically in touch with reality,” Saddam is often out of touch
with it politically. His “narrow and distorted” outlook stems from his slight un-
derstanding of the world beyond Iraq and his tendency to surround himself with
sycophants. Despite a propensity for shrouding his actions in religious rhetoric,
the psychologist concluded, Saddam has no desire to be a martyr.39
The system Saddam Hussein has created is dominated by a single, precarious
social premise—the preferential treatment of certain Sunni Arab tribes at the
expense of the larger Shi’ite and Kurdish populations.40 Because these Sunni
tribes could do his regime great harm, Saddam goes to tremendous lengths to
satisfy them. Prior to the Gulf War, this was not difficult, given Iraq’s affluence.41
In its aftermath, supporting living standards of the elite proved increasingly
challenging until Saddam agreed to the UN “oil for food” program.
Saddam employs a variety of tactics to ward off potential competitors. First,
he relies heavily upon nepotism. Second, he has created one of the most sinister
and repressive police states in the world, with a multiplicity of security organs so
as to ensure no single individual or organization becomes a threat to his pri-
macy.42 Third, the state-run media has generated a cult of personality around
Saddam, portraying him as the savior of the Iraqi people. Fourth, echoing
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Saddam’s own conspiracy theories, the regime vigorously vilifies America and
Israel, branding them as the true sources of the country’s suffering.43 This pro-
paganda has arguably been more successful among non-Iraqis than with the
Iraqi people themselves, as evidenced by Saddam’s growing stature among the
broader Arab and Palestinian publics.
The Successes and Failures of the 1990s
Since Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990, the United States has been al-
most continuously obliged to induce Saddam to stop or undo one form of unde-
sirable behavior or another.
The Occupation of Kuwait (1990–91). War with Iraq was by no means inevitable
in August 1990. The international community’s pressure upon Saddam to with-
draw from Kuwait evolved gradually: on 2 August, SCR 660 demanded Iraq’s im-
mediate and unconditional withdrawal; four days later SCR 661 froze Iraqi
assets and put in place comprehensive economic sanctions until such time as
Iraq withdrew; finally, SCR 678 of 29 November issued an ultimatum, demand-
ing that Iraq withdraw no later than 15 January 1991 and authorizing after that
date “all means necessary” to compel compliance.44 Nearly every variation of co-
ercive diplomacy was attempted, starting with the try-and-see method, then the
gradual turning of the screw, and finally an ultimatum. Only the carrot-
and-stick approach was never tried, largely because of an international consen-
sus that, as President George Bush declared, there should be “no reward for
aggression” and “appeasement does not work.”45
Saddam’s refusal to withdraw his forces before the 15 January deadline came
as a surprise to many. A rational leader, it seemed, should have realized the pre-
cariousness of the situation and the risks of war, and bowed before the weight of
international opinion. Yet Saddam was convinced that he should stand up to the
United States and that Iraqi victory was by no means impossible.
Saddam’s beliefs were not inherently irrational. First, he did not perceive U.S.
motivation for liberating Kuwait as greater than his own for keeping it. If there
was a differential in motivation, he believed, it worked in Iraq’s favor. This per-
ception was in part rooted in his messianic self-image, which told him that Ku-
wait was Iraq’s just reward for defending the Arab world against Ayatollah
Khomeini’s militant Shi’ites during the 1980s. At the same time, Saddam
doubted U.S. resolve; he believed that America would not risk a major war to re-
store Kuwait’s independence.46
In any case, Saddam did not envision war with the United States as un-
winnable. He was confident his forces could turn the Saudi-Kuwaiti border into
a modern-day Flanders field, where American soldiers and Marines would die
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by the thousands, and with them the will to fight of the supposedly irresolute
American public.47
A third reason why Saddam failed to withdraw was his sense of pride, in-
formed by cultural factors unique to the Arab world. “In the Arab world, having
the courage to fight a superior foe can bring political victory, even through a
military defeat.” Hence, “intoxicated by the elixir of power and the acclaim of the
Palestinians and the radical Arab masses, Saddam may well have been on a eu-
phoric high and optimistically overestimated his chances for success.”48 Addi-
tionally, the dispute became highly personal to Saddam, a zero-sum struggle
against an international conspiracy led by his hated rival, George Bush. These
perceptions rendered ineffective what might have been thought a credible
five-month attempt at coercive diplomacy.
UN Weapons Inspectors and the Southern No-Fly Zone (1993). In the weeks after
the Gulf War, SCR 687 and 688 were adopted. The former spelled out the condi-
tions imposed upon Iraq as a defeated power, while the latter demanded that
Saddam’s regime stop its brutal repression of Iraqi civilians. Baghdad at first ac-
quiesced to UN weapons inspections; Iraqi weakness prevented defiance, and
Saddam believed that token admissions and declarations would lead the inspec-
tors to declare Iraq in compliance.49 However, the inspectors remained in Iraq
long beyond the time period originally envisioned, and the regime systemati-
cally changed its tactics from passive noncooperation to outright interference.
In early January 1993 the situation came to a head. Iraq refused to permit the
inspectors access to two suspected nuclear facilities; additionally, Iraqi radar be-
gan tracking aircraft enforcing the southern no-fly zone. In response, on 13 Jan-
uary French, British, and American aircraft struck military targets in southern
Iraq. The strikes brought a swift end to Iraq’s interference with the no-fly zone,
but the impasse over inspections continued. In an effort to convince Saddam
that it meant business, on 17 January the Bush administration launched cruise
missile attacks against the facilities the inspectors had been prevented from
reaching. Two days later Iraq agreed to cooperate with the inspectors, and the
crisis came to an end. The Iraqis had been successfully, if temporarily, coerced
into adhering to their obligations under SCR 687.
Nonetheless, there was widespread condemnation of the cruise missile attack,
which had caused the deaths of several Iraqi civilians. The French and Russians
accused the United States of exceeding the scope of Security Council resolu-
tions. Middle Eastern governments criticized the U.S. “policy of military escala-
tion” and asked Washington to refrain from such attacks in the future, in order
to forestall “erosion of favorable Arab public opinion.”50 Iraq had failed in its
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attempt to defy the Security Council, but it had uncovered fragility within the
once-strong anti-Iraq coalition.
Saber Rattling on the Kuwaiti Border (1994). On 5 October 1994, Iraq deployed
two Republican Guard divisions along the Kuwaiti border, apparently to test the
U.S. reaction. The United States threatened preemptive strikes unless the Iraqi
forces withdrew. To convey a sense of urgency and increase already-substantial
American combat power within the region, an aircraft carrier battle group and a
Marine expeditionary unit were ordered into the Persian Gulf, and an Army
mechanized brigade was deployed to Kuwait. Saddam withdrew his forces on 10
October. Five days later, Security Council Resolution 949 was adopted, establish-
ing a “no-drive” zone along the Iraqi-Kuwaiti border in order to prevent Saddam
from threatening Kuwait in the future.51
Saddam’s motivation for the buildup had been twofold. First, at a time when
his popularity in his Sunni power base was shrinking due to the privations
caused by UN-imposed sanctions, he sought to demonstrate that his capacity to
defy the United States was undiminished. Second, he wanted to test American
resolve; had it been found wanting, he would, according to reports later ob-
tained from high-ranking Iraqi defectors, have invaded again.52 The speed and
size of the American buildup apparently impressed Saddam, and his rapid
back-down dealt his prestige a significant blow.
However, this was not a clear-cut victory for the United States, which, as in
1993, was again roundly berated by its regional partners for having “overre-
acted.” Domestically, the Clinton administration was at least mildly criticized
for incurring the cost of transporting thousands of American personnel to the
region on short notice and then not inflicting any punishment on Saddam’s re-
gime for its provocative behavior. In fact, the administration had considered
strikes against Iraqi forces but, remembering the outcry of January 1993, had
concluded that the political costs would have been too high.53
The Invasion of the Kurdish Safe Haven (1996). Immediately after the Persian
Gulf War, Iraqi Kurds rose in rebellion, taking advantage of the presumed weak-
ness of the security forces to establish a Kurdish state in the northern part of the
country. It was a miscalculation; the Iraqi army promptly crushed the uprising,
reportedly killing thousands of Kurds. In April 1991 the United Nations estab-
lished a protected Kurdish area north of the thirty-sixth parallel. On 29 August
1996 Iraqi forces invaded that haven to root out an umbrella group serving as
the international voice of the Iraqi opposition. The move was not as daring as it
appeared; Saddam had received evidence of American indifference to events in
the Kurds’ territory. The Clinton administration had decided in March 1995 to
withdraw promised support for a planned Iraqi opposition offensive, and it had
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displayed indifference to escalations of Kurdish infighting. Saddam, for his part,
had been emboldened by weathering a series of internal crises during 1995 and
early 1996.54 Sensing an opportunity to enhance further his now-burgeoning
domestic prestige by invading what was widely perceived as an American protec-
torate, Saddam quickly seized upon it.
Confronted with what amounted to a fait accompli and enjoying no support
from its allies, the United States had few options. Because Turkey—engaged in
its own struggle against Kurdish separatism—was unwilling to allow its bases to
be used in support of the Iraqi Kurds, the ability of the U.S. military to attack
Saddam’s forces in the safe haven was severely constrained. A similar rejection of
force by several key Arab partners, including the Saudis, who forbade the use of
their bases, further restricted the options available. In the end, the American re-
sponse to the Iraqi incursion was limited to extending the southern no-fly zone
northward from the thirty-second to the thirty-third parallel, and to delivering
another series of cruise missile attacks. Fear of collateral damage drove target se-
lection, which settled on air defense sites, the loss of which was of little conse-
quence to the regime.
Nonetheless, Saddam withdrew his forces from the Kurdish haven, and with a
speed that remains puzzling. Perhaps he believed that he had accomplished his
principal objectives of neutralizing the opposition and bolstering his prestige at
home, with the added achievement of driving a wedge between the United States
and its European allies and Arab partners. Indeed, Saddam’s 1996 invasion of
the Kurdish safe haven has been called his “official comeback.”55 If it accom-
plished nothing else, it convinced the already vacillating Arab and European
states that Saddam was not going away any time soon.
Accordingly, they faced a choice—to make amends with Saddam and work
with him, or continue to back what they increasingly saw as a flawed strategy,
managed by a now-preoccupied Clinton administration. Not surprisingly, given
the economic stakes involved, the majority chose the former option. In the Secu-
rity Council, understandings worked out with Saddam’s regime by Russia,
France, and China threatened to undermine the UN weapons inspection pro-
cess. Seeing profits to be made if the sanctions were lifted, these countries lob-
bied for an end to inspections, despite convincing evidence of continued Iraqi
deceit.
Termination of UN Weapons Inspections (1997–98). This collapse of the con-
sensus in support of inspections encouraged the Iraqi regime to risk further de-
fiance of the inspectors.56 Refusals and obstructions escalated significantly in
October 1997, when Iraq declared that seven American inspectors would be ex-
pelled and threatened to shoot down U-2 reconnaissance aircraft. An American
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military buildup and a threat of preemptive strikes caused Saddam to back
down, but two months later he precipitated another crisis by declaring his nu-
merous presidential palaces off limits to inspections. The UN secretary-general
stepped in at the eleventh hour
to avert American air strikes,
brokering a compromise that so
relaxed the rules for inspections
that the independence and integ-
rity of the disarmament process were severely undermined. In August 1998 Iraq
announced its intention to prohibit inspections altogether, a threat it made good
two months later. In November, confronted by the imminent prospect of major
American and British air strikes with the unanimous support of the Security
Council, Saddam again backed down. Again the inspectors returned to Iraq,
only to be thwarted and obliged to leave once more.
Stung by domestic criticism of its Iraq policy, the Clinton administration re-
sponded in December 1998 with Operation DESERT FOX, an intense four-day
bombing campaign against the Iraqi regime’s intelligence and security forces, air
defense systems, command and control sites, and selected production sites of
weapons of mass destruction. Gratifying as the campaign may have been, it was
too little, too late; the damage to the inspections program had already been
done, and the strikes gave Saddam no new reason to cooperate. The inspectors
have not at this writing returned to Iraq.
Certain positive developments did, however, result from the strikes. They
seem to have caused turmoil within the regime, including a series of uprisings
and possibly a coup attempt. This development, though it amounted to little at
the time, may represent hope for the future—that even a failed U.S. attempt to
coerce Saddam might convince internal elements to put an end to the suffering
caused by his regime.57
Saddam’s Pressure Points: The Lessons of the 1990s
American policy makers in the 1990s understood the location of Saddam
Hussein’s “center of gravity” but found no effective way to attack it.58 Doing so
would have required the prior accomplishment of two intermediate objectives:
creating the incentive within Saddam’s power base to end his rule, and threaten-
ing Saddam’s ability to maintain his hold. The sanctions were intended to ac-
complish the first of these objectives, by creating discontent, but Saddam’s
willingness to maintain the preferential treatment of the elites, at whatever ex-
pense to the rest of the population, undermined their effectiveness. The second
objective could be accomplished only by either destroying the regime’s security
forces militarily or conspiring with high-ranking figures to accomplish the
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overthrow of Saddam. Both methods were attempted: the former proved diffi-
cult because Saddam habitually based his security forces in residential areas, to
discourage strikes; the latter ended in utter failure when Iraqi intelligence un-
covered a CIA-sponsored plot in 1996. Nonetheless, during DESERT FOX the
United States accepted a risk of collateral damage and targeted the regime’s se-
curity forces, with favorable results—albeit modest and short-lived.
Though American policy countered reasonably well Saddam’s heavier-
handed efforts to thwart containment, it had a difficult time “containing” the
divergent goals of certain allies and strategic partners. That difficulty points to a
U.S. center of gravity—the need for coalition—which Saddam should be ex-
pected to target. Not surprisingly, it has proven easier for him to lure coalition
members away (with promises of financial gain) than it has for the United States
to drive a wedge between Saddam and his domestic power base. The perspectives
of the United States and its allies have differed from the outset. During the 1990
Gulf crisis and the ensuing war, for instance, there was little enthusiasm among
the Arab states for deposing Saddam. Thus, these same states now disdain an
American strategy designed to isolate Iraq indefinitely until the regime col-
lapses, particularly when it punishes the helpless Iraqi populace for the sins of its
dictator.
Finally, beginning with the George H. W. Bush administration, American
policy makers have been unable to reconcile policy with objectives over the long
term. Simply put, since the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the overarching U.S. objec-
tive has been to rid the region of the threat of Iraqi aggression. The liberation of
Kuwait and the imposition of SCR 687 contributed to this objective in only a
single instance; nothing has yet removed the source of the problem, Saddam
Hussein.59 Consequently, the United States has found itself forced to adopt
short-term instruments, like weapons inspections, sanctions, a large American
military presence, and support of dissident elements in hopes of inhibiting the
Iraqi regime until the arrival of the post-Saddam era.
A FRAMEWORK FOR SUCCESS
According to a Canadian diplomat, there is broad agreement within the UN that
“Saddam may have played his cards wrong. Overall, patience with Iraq has pretty
much run out.”60 This is particularly true in the Security Council, where during
the last year the Chinese and French delegations reportedly have joined the
United States and Britain to press for unconditional Iraqi compliance with SCR
687. Only Russia remains undecided, largely due to its financial ties to Baghdad,
which involves over eight billion dollars in unpaid loans; a senior Iraqi official
has warned that if sanctions continue, “Russian businessmen will be the first to
be affected.”61 However, rather than intimidating the Russian government, this
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imprudent Iraqi threat appears to have augmented Moscow’s growing “post-9/11”
ties with the United States. At the end of March 2002 Russian and American dip-
lomats resolved a year-long standoff over “smart sanctions”—sanctions designed
to have more impact upon the regime and less on the general Iraqi population—by
permitting the passage of SCR 1409 in May.62 Though at first glance SCR 1409’s
adoption of smart sanctions might appear a victory for Saddam, in truth it is at
best a Pyhrric one; for, with its passage, the United States has shifted the bur-
den for the Iraqi people’s suffering away from the UN and onto Saddam, thus
effectively depriving Baghdad of its favorite ploy for rallying international
support.
With this development, it is now possible for the United States to employ co-
ercive diplomacy to once and for all bring about Iraqi compliance with SCR 687.
For such an effort, the gradual turning-of-the-screw approach is most appropri-
ate, with smart sanctions serving as a form of carrot (to engender not only allied
cooperation, but also possibly the support of opposition within the Iraqi re-
gime). To this end the United States must clearly convey to the Security Coun-
cil’s permanent members, its European allies, and regional partners that it
cannot accept the possibility of an Iraqi atomic bomb, the likelihood of which
grows as time passes; that it will not see the provisions of SCR 687 watered
down; and that Iraqi compliance with all existing Security Council resolutions
must be full and unconditional. Simultaneously, the United States must stress
that this effort is not part of the broader war on terrorism but is entirely an at-
tempt to prevent Saddam Hussein from further destabilizing an already precari-
ous regional situation.
With its objectives established, a strategy based upon coercive diplomacy
would then turn to creating a sense of urgency; vigorous pursuit of a four-to-
six-month window (expiring no later than 1 March 2003) for restarting UN
weapon inspections would serve that purpose. Such a time line is not unrealistic;
the first UN inspection mission, in 1991, was on site within three months.63 The
next judgment would be whether the threat of punishment for noncompliance
should be made explicit or left ambiguous. Clearly the United States need not in-
definitely restrain itself should Iraq continue to refuse to cooperate. The point of
coercive diplomacy would be to keep escalation in tension gradual and mea-
sured, so as to maintain international support and forestall situations requiring
a large and inopportune military commitment. With the pattern established by
the Security Council in the months preceding Operation DESERT STORM serving
as a model, host-nation support for land-based forces is likely to be forthcoming
if Iraq disregards a determined international consensus.
Of course, as the United States pressed a coercive-diplomacy strategy,
Saddam Hussein would vigorously attempt to counter it. He would presumably
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try to tie up proceedings in endless negotiations over trivial matters. Failing that,
Saddam would likely promise cooperation with some form of inspec-
tion—promises that would be as disingenuous as the promises made through-
out the 1990s. Saddam also might decide to take some form of preemptive
action; the counter to this prospect is not only a rapid buildup of forces suffi-
cient to respond quickly if Iraqi preemption occurs or preparations for it are dis-
covered, but also an increased emphasis upon homeland security geared toward
thwarting a potential wave of Iraqi state-sponsored terrorism.
Essentially, coercive diplomacy would offer Saddam one final chance, failing
which the United States would be free to pursue its primary objective of regime
change, with the authorization of the Security Council. If by postponing unilat-
eral action and attempting coercive diplomacy a regional consensus can be re-
stored, the moral burden can finally be shifted away from America and its allies
and partners and back to where it belongs—on Saddam’s regime. The United
States would reap substantial benefit, for if coercive diplomacy fails to produce
an international consensus, the administration can always return to a unilater-
alist approach in time to conduct an invasion sometime after 1 March 2003,
while the weather is still favorable for sustained military operations. Thus the
United States has a great deal to win and nothing to lose by attempting coercive
diplomacy.
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MILITARY ACTION AGAINST IRAQ IS JUSTIFIED
Robert F. Turner
Acontroversial issue now in the news is whether under international law, itwould be lawful for the United States, either alone or as a member of an in-
ternational coalition, to use lethal force against Saddam Hussein personally or
against Iraq.
Under international law lethal force can never be used unless it is necessary
and proportional. If nonviolent remedies are available that can protect a nation’s
rights, they must be pursued. Force cannot be used to
resolve traditional political or economic grievances. It
is permitted only when necessary to protect against
the threat or use of unlawful force. Thus the key issue
here is whether Iraq’s current regime constitutes a
threat to the peace against the United States or other
countries.
Saddam Hussein is truly unique. He is the only liv-
ing head of state who has been denounced as an ag-
gressor by the United Nations Security Council, for
his attacks on Iran and Kuwait. He is the only head of
state who has clearly used illegal weapons of mass de-
struction against his neighbors, and even against his
own citizens. He is one of the few national leaders
to have provided widespread support for interna-
tional terrorism, including plots to murder a former
president of the United States. In further violation
of Security Council resolutions, Saddam has never
Robert F. Turner holds both professional and academic
doctorates from the University of Virginia School of
Law. Dr. Turner is co-founder and associate director of
the Center for National Security Law except for two
periods of government service in the 1980s and 1994–95
when he occupied the Charles H. Stockton Chair of
International Law at the U.S. Naval War College. A
veteran of two Army tours in Vietnam, he served as a
research associate and public affairs fellow at Stanford
University’s Hoover Institution on War, Revolution,
and Peace. He has served as a security advisor to
Senator Robert P. Griffin, a member of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee; in the Pentagon as
special assistant to the under secretary of defense for
policy; in the White House as counsel to the President’s
Intelligence Oversight Board; at the State Department
as principal deputy assistant secretary for legislative
affairs, and as the first president of the congressionally
established United States Institute of Peace. Dr. Turner
is the author or editor of a dozen books and mono-
graphs, and numerous articles in law reviews and
professional journals.
Naval War College Review, Autumn 2002, Vol. LV, No. 4
76
Naval War College Review, Vol. 55 [2002], No. 4, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol55/iss4/1
even pretended to denounce terrorism as a tool of international intercourse.
He continues to encourage, incite, and support terrorism against Israel to this
day.
Now that the Taliban has been removed from the political scene, at this writ-
ing Saddam stands alone in his long-standing refusal to comply with numerous
UN Security Council resolutions, which demand that he allow international in-
spections of Iraq to determine if he is continuing to develop weapons of mass
destruction. These resolutions are the result of Saddam’s documented efforts to
acquire such weapons, his unlawful use of these weapons, his history as a major
international aggressor, and his frequent threats to use such weapons against
other states. The purpose of the United Nations, set forth in Article 1 of its char-
ter, is “to maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take ef-
fective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the
peace.” The Security Council has made it clear that Saddam is a major threat to
international peace and security.
At the San Francisco Conference of 1945, which produced the UN Charter,
the committee that drafted Article 2 expressly stated that “the use of arms in le-
gitimate self-defense remains admitted and unimpaired” by the charter. Indeed,
the right of individual and collective self-defense was viewed by many as among
the most important provisions of the charter. Senator Arthur Vandenberg,
chairman of the committee that drafted Article 51,* governing self-defense, later
told the Senate, “If the omission [of the right of collective self-defense] had not
been rectified there would have been no Charter. It was rectified, finally, after in-
finite travail, by agreement upon Article 51 of the Charter. Nothing in the Char-
ter is of greater immediate importance and nothing in the Charter is of equal
potential importance.”
In a 1949 speech to the Inter-American Bar Association, Senator Vandenberg
emphasized that the fact that Security Council action could be blocked by a veto
was a major factor in the decision to adopt Article 51. “If the Security Council
fails to act—or is stopped from acting, for example, by a veto—Article 51 con-
tinues to confound aggression. The United Nations is thus saved from final im-
potence. So is righteous peace.”
Historically, the United States has taken the view that the right of self-defense
is implicit in every treaty and cannot be taken away. Thus when the international
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ported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the
Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in
order to maintain or restore international peace and security.”
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community sought, in the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Treaty, to outlaw the use of force as
an instrument of policy, several states expressed an intention to include a reser-
vation preserving their right to use force in self-defense. The United States re-
sponded by sending a diplomatic note to foreign offices around the world
stating that it “believes that the right of self-defense is inherent in every sover-
eign State and implicit in every treaty. No specific reference to that inalienable
attribute of sovereignty is therefore necessary or desirable.” Early on in the
Kellogg-Briand negotiations, the United States also argued, “Every nation is free
at all times and regardless of treaty provisions to defend its territory from attack
or invasion and it alone is competent to decide whether circumstances require
recourse to war in self-defense.”
There was a time when the “better view” thought it preferable that the aggres-
sor actually strike the first blow. Only when a neighbor’s first platoon crossed the
border and attacked could a state defend itself. There is a controversial doctrine
in international law called “anticipatory self-defense,” holding that a state clearly
about to be attacked need not willingly suffer the first blow when the evidence of
attack is overwhelming. A classic example of this doctrine was Israel’s decision
to strike first when the armies of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria massed on its borders
in June 1967. I share the view that Israel was lawfully defending itself against an
imminent attack.
What, however, if international law permitted countries to attack first on alle-
gations alone? Would that not provide a legal loophole to mask aggression? It is
an understandable concern, but one I believe to be no greater than what we face
with false allegations of grounds for traditional self-defense. When Adolf Hitler
invaded Poland, he alleged that Germany was attacked first. In 1950, Kim Il Sung
alleged that South Korea had invaded the North and that he was acting in
self-defense. The world saw through both lies.
Tyrants are still likely to lie, but the world can still pass judgment. Kuwait is
neither going to invade Iraq nor mass its forces on its borders in preparation for
invasion. The legal presumption must be strongly against anticipatory self-
defense. However, in a setting like that of the Middle East in 1967, a victim of im-
minent aggression should not be forced to absorb the first blow. I submit the
same holds true when a “repeat offender” like Saddam flagrantly rebels against
Security Council resolutions in preparation for aggression.
This is all the more important in an age when the first attack could involve the
slaughter of literally millions of innocent people. There is not the slightest rea-
son why Saddam Hussein should be permitted a “free kick” with weapons of
mass destruction against the United States or any other peace-loving country.
He faces no present military threat that is not directly tied to his violation of Se-
curity Council resolutions, a fact that supports the conclusion that he intends to
7 4 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
78
Naval War College Review, Vol. 55 [2002], No. 4, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol55/iss4/1
use such weapons again. Article 25 of the UN Charter requires that all members
“accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council.” What Saddam is
doing is illegal and threatens the security of the United States and the world
community.
Following Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait, the Security Council passed Reso-
lution 660, demanding Iraq’s immediate withdrawal. Saddam ignored the reso-
lution and continued to rape and pillage Kuwait. Resolution 678, which the
Security Council has repeatedly emphasized has never been repealed, authorizes
the use of lethal force against Iraq if Saddam’s forces were not withdrawn by 15
January 1991. Saddam finally agreed to the conditions of Security Council Reso-
lution 678, which included permitting UN weapons inspectors to monitor the
termination of his weapons of mass destruction programs, but then he reneged
on his promise. In my view, until Saddam fulfills the terms of the cease-fire
agreement, Resolution 678 remains in force and Iraq remains a serious threat to
international peace and to the security of all states. Since 1990 the Security
Council has passed no fewer than sixty resolutions dealing with Iraq. If the Secu-
rity Council lacks the courage to uphold the Charter, enforce its edicts, and pro-
tect international peace and security after recognizing the existing threat that
Saddam poses to the world community, the states that are threatened by his un-
lawful behavior have a right to protect themselves.
Twenty-five hundred years ago, the great Chinese military strategist Sun Tzu
wrote in the Art of War, “To win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is
not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill.”
I share Sun Tzu’s view.
I hope that Saddam Hussein has seen what has happened to his friends in
al-Qa‘ida and will now find it in his best interest to comply. However, if he does
not, and the Security Council proves to be impotent, I believe it will be both legal
and in the interest of world peace for the United States to work with other na-
tions to remove Saddam from power.
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IT IS TIME TO TEMPER OUR EXCESSIVE
INTERVENTIONISM
Doug Bandow
Now, a year after the defining moment of the terrorist attacks of 11 Septem-ber, is an appropriate time to think critically about strategy. One reason is
that strategy is critically important. Strategy ultimately determines force struc-
ture, deployments, and commitments around the world. It ultimately deter-
mines the entire military posture.
Up until about 1914, the United States was a fairly aggressive power, inter-
nally and in the Pacific, for trade reasons. It was not terribly interested, however,
in the struggles in the Old World, particularly Europe. That changed in World
War I, but after that conflict the United States went back to the pattern of a cen-
tury before, until 1941. After 1941, through World War II and the Cold War, the
United States successively fought three hegemonic powers—Nazi Germany, Ja-
pan, and the Soviet Union. By the end of the Cold War the United States had
eliminated all countervailing hegemons; it is necessary to go back not just to the
British Empire but to the Roman Empire to find another time when one power
so dominated the globe.
At a conference at West Point a number of years
ago, a member of the audience stood up and said, “I’m
tired of this talk about a post–Cold War world. It is
still a very dangerous place.” Yes, but dangerous to
whom? It is dangerous to many countries, but not to
the United States. That fact is the most important rea-
son why this country should rethink its strategy. The
U.S. military accounts for roughly a third of military
outlay around the globe; adding the spending of
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friends and allies makes the figure 70 to 80 percent. The United States spends as
much on defense as the next six or seven countries together, most of whom are
friends and allies. Its force is the most technologically advanced, the most effec-
tive. The Europeans were rather embarrassed about this in the aftermath of the
Kosovo War; the common estimate was that they had 10 to 15 percent of the ef-
fective combat capability of the United States.
The threats, however, are very different from what they once were. There re-
mains a nuclear threat from the Russians—steadily diminishing in light of the
improving relationship with Moscow and recent arms control agreements. Other-
wise, the most obvious potential future threats come from China and India—if
India decides to develop an intercontinental capability—and from third-world
states. The United States certainly can deter the Russians, the Chinese, and the
Indians. National missile defense is very useful against rogue states or inadver-
tent launches by more responsible powers. As for serious conventional threats to
the United States—as serious as a Nato–Warsaw Pact conflagration would have
been—they are much harder to find. Such threats as exist are primarily to Amer-
ican allies, and not in Europe; the most important involve the Republic of Korea
and Taiwan. Further, these potential conflicts are not tied to a hegemonic oppo-
nent, as they once were. Threats to allies in the Cold War were related to the So-
viet Union and had very different international implications than those of today.
The world is full of civil conflict, guerrilla warfare, and disorder of all sorts.
But most of it has very little impact on American security. Most of these em-
broilments, to the extent they bother anyone, affect not the United States but its
allies—and these allies are generally capable of handling the consequences, be it
Indonesia and Australia, or the Balkans and Europe. Finally, the United States
faces the threat of terrorism made so evident in the attacks of 11 September
2001, but terrorism is not something that is easily dealt with by conventional or
nuclear forces. It may grow in the future, but it is a different kind of problem, one
that will require different forces and responses.
Today’s world, then, marked by American dominance and asymmetric
threats, is not the same as that of the Cold War. Yet the United States persists in
its Cold War posture, the costs of which dramatically exceed its benefits. One ex-
pense is budgetary, the price of an expansive foreign policy. There is also a
broader economic burden—the country spends a far larger share of its gross do-
mestic product on the military than do its allies and competitors. Further, the
posture brings with it a substantial risk of conflict. American security guaran-
tees can make any particular war less likely, but they ensure that the United
States will be involved in any that does break out. In a world without an antago-
nistic hegemon, such conflicts rarely warrant American intervention. Another
price is paid by those in uniform. They carry the burden of constant
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deployments on behalf of dubious causes, a prospect that has hurt recruiting
and retention. Moreover, there is the risk to life. In the next conflict, the United
States might not be as lucky as it was in the Persian Gulf and Kosovo, and as it has
been so far in Afghanistan.
Finally, the American homeland itself is at risk. States and groups that cannot
confront a superpower in traditional ways resort to terrorism as a form of asym-
metrical warfare. The attorney general has repeatedly warned that more terror-
ist incidents are likely, and the secretary of defense predicts that terrorists will
eventually acquire biological, chemical, and perhaps nuclear weapons. If both
are right, the result will be too
horrific to contemplate.
Today’s changed world, then,
calls for fairly significant changes
in America’s strategy. For exam-
ple, the United States should not
treat, as did the so-called Nye Report, a hundred thousand troops in Asia as a
“down payment” on a permanent American commitment. It is also not neces-
sary for the United States to remain a dominant member of Nato, with forces on
the ground in Europe. With a more appropriate strategy the United States would
remain the primary power, the strongest country, but it would not require the
vast advantage that it has today, or military involvement around the world.
The underpinnings of a more restrained and unilateral approach would be
twofold. One is a philosophical notion regarding the primary responsibility of
the U.S. government and, by extension, its role in the world. The principal duty
of the U.S. government is to protect the lives, liberties, property, constitutional
system, and freedom of the American people—including service members that
it commits abroad. The lives of the peoples of other nations, whether of allies or
of states in need of help, are important, but the U.S. government does not bear
the same responsibility for them. Second, there is a practical concern that should
underlie U.S. foreign policy—humility. There is a danger of falling into a
hubristic notion that the United States can and should reorder the globe. It is a
fatal conceit that one can sit in Washington and decide which faction should win
a civil war in the Balkans, what kind of government should emerge in Afghani-
stan, which groups should live together, and where national borders should run.
It is not at all obvious what is right in such cases. It is also becoming increas-
ingly clear that Washington cannot lastingly enforce its will even when it thinks
it does know. Unintended consequences are often deep and long lasting. In the
Balkans and Middle East can be seen problems caused at least in part by past U.S.
actions, and further complications are likely to result in the future. In addition,
incentives are important. If populous and prosperous allies are defended by
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others, they probably will not devote as much effort to defend themselves. The
effect can be seen in Europe, where a serious debate has emerged between those
who argue for a stronger defense capability and others who do not want to spend
the money that would be necessary. The same phenomenon is evident also in the
Philippines and South Korea.
The policy of defending countries having adversarial relations with their
neighbors may affect their behavior in dangerous ways. It may encourage them
to adopt riskier strategies. Pakistan may well be emboldened in its running dis-
pute with India by its close relationship with the United States in the campaign
against al-Qa‘ida and Taliban terrorists on its northern border. By issuing a de-
fense guarantee to Taiwan, Washington may influence Taiwanese decisions
about declaring independence over the long term. When the United States backs
ethnic separatists, as in Kosovo, with airpower, it should not be surprised if the
guerrillas expand their activities. Similarly, the Philippines government has
clearly seen its visiting-forces agreement with Washington as a factor in its
struggle with China over the Spratly Islands. Such guarantees, or perceived guar-
antees, may have very important and counterproductive effects; they may draw
the United States in where it otherwise would not be involved.
Finally, policies that are perceived as aggressively interventionist may catalyze
an opposing coalition. For example, the William Clinton administration was
correct in trying to better its relations with India; there had been a debate in In-
dia on nuclear weapons policy, in which the hawks wanted an arsenal of several
hundred weapons—with an intercontinental capability. The intent was not ag-
gressive, though the implied target was obvious; the idea reflected a reaction to
what is perceived as American arrogance. Indeed, the lesson that the chief of
staff of the Indian army reportedly drew from the Persian Gulf War was that no
nation should go to war with the United States without nuclear weapons. Even
the French complain about the United States as a “hyperpower.” Such reactions
should be taken into account in developing foreign policy.
What strategy would reflect the reality of America’s dominant global presence as
well as these two principles, philosophical and practical?
One of the realities is that the United States has the largest, most productive,
most technologically advanced economy on earth. That will not change. Amer-
ica is the center of global culture. That is not always beneficial, but it certainly
gives the United States enormous influence. People in some of the most remote
places on the planet can be found wearing baseball caps, T-shirts, and
shorts—all with logos of American companies. The reach of American “soft
power” is extraordinary. Further, the United States has an attractive ideology, an
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asset that clearly played a role in undermining communism in Eastern Europe
and elsewhere.
Having amassed such enormous advantages—quite aside from military pre-
dominance—the United States could afford a less overwhelming primacy than it
has today. Such a policy would be less expensive and less likely to incur risks that,
as the events of 11 September demonstrated, can reach the U.S. homeland. Un-
der a less interventionist policy, Washington would treat world events with a cer-
tain distance and detachment, asking not only “What?” but “So what?” The
answer may very well be nothing. A State Department spokesperson comment-
ing upon a dire event in a distant country—for example, a coup d’état—need
simply acknowledge, “It is very sad, but there is nothing we can do about it,
nothing that we need to do about it.” The United States should be prepared to ig-
nore, or give only limited attention to, the largely irrelevant conflicts and insta-
bility of which the globe is full. It should accept the fact that the world will
always have instability—guerrilla warfare, civil conflict, ethnic insurgency, and
state failure—and that the United States does not have to try to deal with it all.
The media must not be allowed to direct national policy. Other countries
know that CNN, for instance, plays a role in high-level decision making. In 1998,
one of the aides to Ibrahim Rugova, the top ethnic Albanian leader, told the au-
thor, “We want Nato to get involved. That means we have got to bring the war
into the homes of Americans. That means we have got to get on CNN.” Sub-
mitting to such manipulation is a very poor way to make policy. Many of these
local conflicts are tragic, but they do not implicate vital American interests. It
may be advisable to provide logistical support to countries or organizations that
do want to get involved—the British in Sierra Leone, France and some of the
Francophone countries in Africa, the African Union (replacing the Organiza-
tion of African Unity), the United Nations. But beyond such narrow involve-
ment, a superpower has, frankly, bigger fish to fry. It was one thing to try to stop
bloodshed in Bosnia, for instance; it was quite another to create an artificial state
and try to induce three warring parties to live together. The latter was an exam-
ple of overreach that made no sense from an American standpoint.
The United States should also—and this is very fundamental—expect allies
to protect allied interests. Since the Cold War, threats have receded to a level
commensurate with the capabilities of allies to deal with them, especially if
friendly states felt the slightest pressure to do more on their own behalf. As
noted, most of the potential conventional threats around the world are against
allies, not the United States; they should take the lead in protecting themselves.
If, for example, the Baltic states are to be defended, the European Union should
do it. Indeed, at a time when the European Union has a population greater than,
and an economy equal to, those of the United States, and when France, Great
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Britain, and Germany each spend about as much as the Russians spend on their
militaries, there is no need for the United States to continue defending the Euro-
peans. The guarantees given during the Cold War made sense then, but they are
not necessary today.
The same calculus applies in Asia. It was correct for the United States to de-
cline to involve itself in a major way in East Timor; that was Australia’s problem.
The Republic of Korea, with a gross domestic product forty times that of its
northern neighbor and twice the population, should expect to defend itself, in-
stead of relying on American backup, fifty years after the initial U.S. deploy-
ment. Japan too, despite the disquiet of its neighbors, can do far more to defend
itself and its region. Where allies are capable of defending themselves, U.S. com-
mitments to them can be changed.
Perhaps the most likely future threat facing the United States is China, which
is the only potential peer competitor. The approach there should be, first, to en-
courage allies to take the steps
necessary to defend themselves.
Allies should be encouraged to
work together; cooperation be-
tween countries like Japan and the
Republic of Korea, for instance,
needs to improve. Countries like the Philippines need naval and air forces capa-
ble of dealing with issues in the South China Sea. Also, countervailing powers
should be cultivated. India, for example, is a potential counterweight to China. It
is already fulfilling that role in Southeast Asia, in Burma, and in other countries.
That is very useful. Third, the United States should trade with the Chinese but
control trade in strategic commodities. The relationship with Beijing will not be
an easy one; nonetheless, it does not require maintenance of the kind of expensive
dominance that the United States has today.
The United States, then, should remain in the background, acting not as an
instant meddler but as the ultimate balancer. The long-term goal is to see that
immediate threats are handled by allies in the region, that Americans are not
called in to deal with local instabilities that are likely to stay in the region. The
United States should focus on the big issues—defending the United States, espe-
cially its homeland, and preventing the rise of another hegemonic power that
would dominate Europe or Asia, as well as confronting the ongoing danger of
terrorism.
When it is necessary to act, the United States should be creative. There may
well be steps available short of military action. Consider North Korea. Dealing
with the North Koreans is difficult; they should certainly be discouraged from
becoming a nuclear power. But the ultimate disposition of the peninsula should
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be viewed as a chess endgame—one in which the United States has already
gained a winning advantage. There is no need for a dramatic, dangerous con-
frontation. It is necessary only to let the game play out—even, if necessary, with
bribes (such as the nuclear-framework accord), which are cheaper than the
alternative.
If strategy is adjusted in such ways, it will ultimately be necessary to adjust force
structure and deployments as well, especially overseas. Commitments to defend
other countries should be replaced with looser cooperative arrangements. There
should be fewer deployments, and none in places like the Balkans. Over the long
term it will also be necessary to look at transformational issues: informational
and asymmetrical warfare, the likely parameters of future conflicts, and how to
deal with attempts to exploit American vulnerabilities.
The world is a messy place. It is always going to be messy. Not all of its messes
can be cleaned up, and the United States should not try. The United States can
and should remain the strongest power on earth, but no longer with the kind of
overwhelming power and ubiquitous international involvement that it has to-
day. There are obviously risks in such a course, but there are also risks in trying
to impose its will everywhere. There are risks in trying to settle civil wars. There
are risks in becoming a party to other countries’ disputes. One set of risks has to
be balanced against the other. A less interventionist strategy would build on the
existing advantages of the United States and offer the nation a better and safer
future. It would ultimately give the American people, who fought and won the
Cold War, the benefits of victory that they deserve.
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THINKING OUT OF THE BOX
Reading Military Texts from a Different Perspective
Lieutenant Colonel Phillip J. Ridderhof, U.S. Marine Corps
Persuasive in peace, decisive in war, preeminent in any form of combat—withthese goals in mind, and constantly using such terms as “full-dimensional,”
“full spectrum,” “dominant,” and “dominance,” the Joint Staff white paper Joint Vi-
sion 2010 and its extension Joint Vision 2020 paint a picture of where U.S. military
forces should head as they move into the twenty-first century.1 “Vision” papers of
individual services, such as Marine Corps Strategy 21, follow the lead of the joint
documents in their proclamations of capabilities within specific competencies. The
claims are bold indeed; these vision documents declare that the U.S. military will be
able to go everywhere and do everything. Realistically, that is not possible, but a
reader is hard pressed to discern from the language of the texts that hard choices
have been made, significant alternatives rejected. There seems to be a sentence or
phrase to cover every eventuality of future conflict. This, of course, gives the sense
that the vision statements are pablum, saying nothing by saying everything.
That, however, is an unfortunate and inaccurate impression. The vision doc-
uments are in fact more nuanced than they appear. But how can we get at their
full meaning? One way to explicate vision documents is to adapt “deconstruc-
tion,” a technique of reading that arose as a postmodernist philosophical school.
To “deconstruct” a text is to use perspectives, and viewpoints that are, ideally,
useful for understanding. Through this approach, at-
tentive readers can examine even U.S. military “vision
documents,” clarify their content, and develop im-
plicit alternatives to their central themes. After briefly
outlining the technique, we will apply it to two current
case studies.
Lieutenant Colonel Ridderhof is currently assigned to
Headquarters Marine Corps. An infantry officer, he is a
graduate of the Marine Corps Command and Staff Col-
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DECONSTRUCTION AND THE VISION TEXT
Broadly defined, deconstruction is a postmodern philosophy that denies the exis-
tence of objectively true meaning of texts. A “text” in this connection is anything
that can be intellectually analyzed—a book, a film, even an activity.
Deconstructionists argue that a given text has no single, independent “true”
meaning established by the author but a variety of meanings that are totally de-
pendent on the reader’s perspective and that continually interact in different ways.
To “deconstruct” a text is to analyze it so as to discern not its putative central
themes but those that are marginalized and left unsaid. A philosophical, literary,
or academic deconstructionist goes farther, declaring these marginal and un-
spoken themes to be in fact the text’s central meanings. By thus turning the text
on its head, this method, taken to its logical conclusion, destroys the distinction
between central and marginal meanings; for a deconstructionist there are
merely different meanings, with arbitrary prioritization.2 While useful analysis
of military vision documents by this method requires a retreat from deconstruc-
tion’s nihilistic extremes, much can be learned through this form of “thinking
out of the box.”
To get at marginal and “unsaid” themes, the first step is to identify clearly the
central ones. In this connection, how something is said is as important as what is
said. Military vision documents are written in the active voice, with strong verbs
and modifiers. Central ideas can be identified by the repetition of words or
phrases, especially as section titles, displayed quotations, graphics, or topic sen-
tences of paragraphs. The organization of the text also points to central ideas.
Vision documents tend to be put together in two ways: addressing the main
point first and following with supporting material, and building up the support-
ing material into an argument that climaxes with the main point. Both patterns
can be used simultaneously at different levels. For example, the overall structure
of the text may be that of an argument building to a conclusion, while individual
subsections are structured as main ideas followed by discussion. The central
themes can be picked out fairly easily, by noting the repetition of certain phrases,
examining the patterns of the writing, and discerning the placement of ideas
within the patterns.
The central ideas of military vision texts can be divided into three conceptual
parts: foundation, end state, and method. A foundation, the starting point for a
vision statement, has two parts. One is an articulation of assumptions about the
future security environment. These assumptions can have inwardly focused as-
pects (such as future U.S. national goals, interests, and policies) and outwardly
oriented ones (directions of technological development, potential adversaries of
the future). The second part of the foundation is a depiction of the present state
of the organization. This description can consist of capabilities or current
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employment concepts, but it usually focuses on character traits—the heritage
and “enduring values” that represent the spirit of the organization. The end state
sets forth the ultimate goal—in a sense, the “vision” itself. The end-state discus-
sion describes the specific organizations, capabilities, and operational concepts
that the military will need in order to cope with the future that has been por-
trayed. The end state, usually somewhat vague, focuses on concepts and capabil-
ities rather than actual unit structures or hardware systems. The method is the
“how” portion of the document—the path the service will take to proceed from
the present force (described in the foundation) to that envisioned by the end
state. The method is usually couched in terms of attitudes toward change and
the relative importance of various aspects of expected change.
Central ideas may be repeated throughout the foundation, end-state, and
method sections of the text. For instance, certain portions of the foundation dis-
cussion might be reiterated in the end-state portion in order to highlight the end
state’s logic by reconnecting it to its premises. Likewise, the end state will proba-
bly be addressed in the method portion in order to emphasize the linkage be-
tween the two. This repetition makes the central ideas mutually supportive and
readily identifiable.
Marginal ideas are secondary to the central ones, but they appear in the text
and may even be repeated. Sometimes the only noticeable differences between
main and subsidiary points are slight shades of meaning or emphasis. Close ex-
amination of the structure of the text and alertness to the use of certain gram-
matical devices are crucial in determining which themes are subsidiary. For
instance, secondary points are usually referred to in caveats, or qualifiers, to cen-
tral points; phrases such as “While X can never be discounted” and “Also impor-
tant is X” are clues that X is a marginal idea. The sequence in which ideas are
discussed and the relative strength of the modifiers (adjectives or adverbs) ap-
plied to them are also indicative of what is primary and what is not. Points re-
ferred to in a long list of disparate items, seemingly “tacked on” at the end of a
section of text, are likely to be of lesser priority.
If marginal ideas are those that the author considered barely important
enough to mention, the “unsaid” points, the “possibilities left out,” are those ei-
ther thought not important enough to mention, or important not to mention, or
not even thought of by the author. In any case—that which “goes without say-
ing,” that which is “better left unsaid,” or that which was not recognized—this is
an awkward concept to explain. Two techniques will help discern the possibili-
ties that are implicit but left out: inferring the opposite of certain central ideas
(especially in the foundation section) and elevating marginal ideas to central
importance. The development of possibilities left out, however, is inevitably
fraught with risk. For example, a discussion of central ideas dependent on new
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technology is likely to omit mention of the possibility that technological prog-
ress may stop; to identify it (simply because it is theoretically possible) as an un-
said idea, however, is not realistic or analytically very useful. Nonetheless, this
deconstruction technique can reveal possibilities that, if not probable or conge-
nial, are worth consideration.
The last step of deconstruction is synthesis. A text has by now been broken
into three categories: the central, marginal, and unsaid themes. While the central
themes embody the main thrust of what the text actually said, a study of the
marginal and omitted ideas may be more fruitful and enlightening. All three cat-
egories, however, should be examined together, to see what synthesis they in-
spire—ideas that will represent the payoff from the labor of deconstruction.
JV 2010 AND JV 2020
Of the U.S. military vision documents now published, Joint Vision 2010 and
2020 are the most appropriate for a first demonstration of deconstruction-based
analysis, because they address U.S. military power as a whole. Service-level vi-
sions, in contrast, intentionally marginalize and leave out important possibili-
ties in order to observe the boundaries of service roles. Further, service visions
should also fit under the conceptual umbrella of JV 2010 and JV 2020; decons-
tructing the joint texts first should lay the necessary groundwork for examina-
tion of the service visions.
Joint Vision 2010 and 2020 must be considered not as two documents but as
one, divided into two parts. JV 2020 is the more current, but it is an addendum
or extension of JV 2010 rather than a stand-alone document. It relies on JV
2010’s foundation; in fact, the end-state section of JV 2010—a vision of the force
in 2010—is part of the foundation of JV 2020. Analyzing the two texts as a single
whole allows a more complete listing of marginal ideas and left-out possibilities.
As will be seen, though, some of the more interesting points to be gleaned arise
from the doctrinal changes that appear in JV 2020.
The foundation of Joint Vision 2010 postulates a future of evolutionary
change, wherein U.S. interests and strategy do not significantly change. Military
technology will be decisive and will continue to advance along its present lines,
producing more precision and mobility, and also, most importantly, a vast in-
crease in information available to forces, about both themselves and the enemy.
The international environment also will present, in the JV 2010 vision, a contin-
uation of current trends; there will accordingly be uncertainty, and the United
States will have to be prepared to deal simultaneously with a wide range of state
and nonstate adversaries. Joint Vision 2010 assumes that the United States will
hold to its present policies of ensuring security for its people and possessions
and of promoting domestic prosperity and worldwide democracy. The U.S.
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military will continue to be primarily a warfighting organization, characterized
by highly professional personnel and technological superiority; it will not, how-
ever, see a large increase in resources made available to it (JV 2010, pages 1–34).3
The JV 2020 foundation is the same, with one important exception—that due
to the rapid pace of worldwide change, U.S. forces cannot assume that they will
enjoy technological superiority in all conflicts. In particular, asymmetrical op-
tions may be available to foes that could neutralize technological advantages (JV
2020, pages 1–45).
The end states envisaged by JV 2010 and JV 2020 are basically the same. In
both documents the U.S. military of the future will be a warfighting force that is
small, protected, mobile, sustainable, and lethal. It will be able to react rapidly
and throughout the world. It will
mass its effects (that is, its “fires,”
the collective impact of its long-
range attacks) and deliver them
precisely, rather than massing phys-
ically the weapons themselves. JV 2020 differs from JV 2010 only by increasing
the “degree” of its adjectives: smaller, more protected, more mobile, etc. The
overarching concept of both JV 2010 and JV 2020 forces is to manifest “full spec-
trum dominance”—the ability to fight anywhere with sufficient superiority to
defeat any foe with minimal loss to themselves (JV 2010, pages 1–34; JV 2020,
pages 1–45).
The method sections of JV 2010 and JV 2020 are different, but they share two
themes—the progress of technology and the development of the human ele-
ment (organization, tactics, leadership). JV 2010’s method is to exploit the
American combined advantage of technology and highly professional personnel
(JV 2010, pages 1–34). For its part, JV 2020, in line with its shift in foundation,
emphasizes innovations in human factors in order to offset the potential loss of
technological superiority. This shift in method is subtle but continuously re-
peated throughout JV 2020. In fact, the emphasis given this point in the text sug-
gests that it may be the primary reason that JV 2020 was published (JV 2020,
pages 1–45).
With the central themes thus developed, our next step is to identify the mar-
ginal themes. There are three significant marginal themes in JV 2010: the impact
of the “fog” (uncertainty, imperfectness of information) and “friction” (delay,
interference, inertia) of war on operations; the role of massed forces; and the
conduct of “military operations other than war” (MOOTW).
Joint Vision 2010 mentions fog and friction only to deprecate them, to predict
that their effects will be minimized by anticipated advances in technology:
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While friction and fog of war can never be eliminated, new technology promises to
mitigate their impact [JV 2010, page 16; emphasis supplied, here and throughout].
Although this will not eliminate the fog of war, dominant battlespace awareness will
improve situational awareness, decrease response time and make the battlespace con-
siderably more transparent to those who achieve it [JV 2010, page 13].
JV 2020, however, refutes the idea that fog and friction can be marginalized:
Information Superiority neither equates to perfect information nor does it mean the
elimination of the fog of war [JV 2020, page 12].
Joint Vision 2020’s recognition of the inevitability of fog and friction—de-
clared positively, without the qualifications used in JV 2010—is representative
of the shift in emphasis of the later document from technology to the human el-
ement in conflict.
Joint Vision 2010 always refers to the secondary concept of the physical
assembling of large forces (as opposed to the concentration of their effects) only
in the context of exceptions to the expected norm of future operations:
In the past, our capabilities often required us to physically mass forces to neutralize
enemy power [JV 2010, page 17].
Extensive physical presence may later be necessary to accomplish the assigned mis-
sion [JV 2010, page 27].
Joint Vision 2020 does not mention massing of actual forces even as a second-
ary concern, but neither does it refute Joint Vision 2010 on this point. The clear
implication is that for the smaller, mobile military foreseen by JV 2010 the ability
to mass large forces for a campaign is not of primary importance.
The third secondary concept of JV 2010 is that of military operations other
than war. Although MOOTW considerations are mentioned throughout the
text, they are always presented as subsidiary to warfighting:
In addition we should expect to participate in a broad range of deterrent, conflict
prevention and peacetime activities [JV 2010, page 4].
Other operations, from humanitarian assistance in peacetime through peace opera-
tions in a near hostile environment, have proved to be possible using forces optimized
for wartime effectiveness [JV 2010, page 17].
Joint Vision 2020 follows the lead of its predecessor in treating military opera-
tions other than war as of less than vital importance:
It also includes those ambiguous situations presiding between peace and war [JV
2020, page 8].
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Achieving full-spectrum dominance means that the joint force will fulfill its primary
purpose—victory in war, as well as achieving success across the range of operations
[JV 2020, page 9].
Joint Vision 2020 adds three new marginal ideas, points that are not present at
all in Joint Vision 2010: technological innovation, information superiority, and
multinational and interagency operations. The marginalization of technology
in JV 2020 (though the white paper assumes that the technological improve-
ments foreseen by the earlier document will occur) is in line with the paper’s
central idea, expressed in its foundation section, that the United States cannot
assume it will enjoy technological superiority in the future. Joint Vision 2020
seeks to redress the imbalance in favor of technology of JV 2010:
Realization of the full potential of these changes requires not only technological im-
provement, but the continued evolution of organizations and doctrine [JV 2020,
page 12].
Although technical interoperability is essential, it is not sufficient to ensure effective
operations [JV 2020, page 21].
Our thinking about command and control must be conceptually based, rather than
focused on technology and material [JV 2020, page 40].
JV 2020’s marginalization of information superiority goes hand in hand with
its treatment of technology. Where Joint Vision 2010 held up information supe-
riority as an essential force multiplier, Joint Vision 2020 subsumes it within the
concept of “decision dominance”—an overarching concept that includes
nontechnology based elements. Information superiority is only one part, and
not the most important, of “decision dominance.”
The creation of information superiority is not an end in itself [JV 2020, page 11].
While changes in the information environment have led some to focus solely [JV 2010]
on the contribution of information superiority to command and control, it is equally
necessary to understand the complete realm of command and control decision mak-
ing, the nature of organizational collaboration, and especially, the human in the loop
[JV 2020, page 38].
The last marginal concept of JV 2020 is that of multinational and interagency
operations. Joint Vision 2010 treats multinational operations as insignificant
and barely mentions interagency operations. Joint Vision 2020 discusses both
concepts at length, but always as secondary to the central idea of unilateral joint
military action. There is no expectation that either will be routine.
To coordinate military operations, as necessary, with government agencies and inter-
national organizations [JV 2020, page 5].
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The joint force of 2020 will integrate protective capabilities from multinational and
interagency partners when available and will respond to their requirements when pos-
sible [JV 2020, page 33].
What has been left out of the doctrinal papers? With one exception, the same
major possibilities are absent from both Joint Vision 2010 and 2020: that of a ma-
jor change in U.S. national goals and interests, that of the emergence of a single
“peer competitor,” and that of the primary focus of the military shifting from
warfighting to operations other than war. The exception is the idea of human
considerations, such as doctrine and organization, driving technology in the de-
velopment of future forces. Joint Vision 2010 does not mention the possibility,
but JV 2020 makes it a central theme. The “absences” of a change to national in-
terests and of a new peer competitor are perceived by reversing central ideas of
the joint visions—the continuity of U.S. national interests, and a multiplicity of
state and nonstate adversaries. That any shift to operations other than war has
been omitted is revealed by considering the implications of converting
MOOTW, actually a marginal concept, into a primary one.
Are any of these three “left-out” possibilities of analytical value? A change to
U.S. national interests, as defined by the joint vision documents, is very unlikely.
JV 2010 defines U.S. national interests so broadly—ensuring security of the na-
tion’s people and possessions, ensuring domestic prosperity, and promoting
worldwide democracy—that it is hard to imagine other interests that would take
their place (JV 2010, page 3). Different emphases might arise, but there are no
reasonable opposites. However, the prospects of a peer competitor emerging or
of military operations other than war becoming primary are less improbable;
neither is out of the realm of possibility. Inclusion of these ideas would substan-
tially change the central themes of both joint vision papers.
Does deconstruction of Joint Vision 2010 and 2020 produce any insights worth
pondering? There seem to be three. First, there is a shift in emphasis—from tech-
nology over human factors in JV 2010, to the reverse in JV 2020. Joint Vision 2020
otherwise binds itself so closely to JV 2010 that this difference is obscured. It is
not true, however, as many might assume, that neither text says anything very
different from the other. This shift in philosophy, whether intended or not, is an
important one that should be clearly acknowledged.
Both joint visions make military operations other than war a secondary prior-
ity to warfighting—although, aside from Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, at
least, U.S. forces currently spend most of their time executing them. As a conse-
quence, large formations are not envisioned in the small, mobile force of the fu-
ture, yet they are required for many of the “human intensive” other-than-war
9 0 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
94
Naval War College Review, Vol. 55 [2002], No. 4, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol55/iss4/1
missions, such as peacekeeping. Perhaps this implies the idea of creating within
the services a force specialized for operations other than war, with proportion-
ately more personnel but fewer assets for agility and precision strike.
Joint Visions 2010 and 2020 forecast a force able to go anywhere and fight any-
one, as opposed to a specific foe in a particular theater. For practical purposes,
there are problems with such an all-encompassing approach. Deconstruction
suggests there might be value in competing joint visions, each focused on a dif-
ferent potential adversary. These visions would be more than operational plans,
based on forces already in place; rather, they would redesign the entire joint
force as necessary to meet and defeat most effectively the given foe. These
“hedge” visions would still be secondary to JV 2020 or its successors, but they
could be wellsprings of ideas.
“THE VISION STATEMENT OF THE U.S. MARINE CORPS” AND
MARINE CORPS STRATEGY 21
The current Marine Corps “vision” documents are “The Vision Statement of the
U.S. Marine Corps” (for short, the “USMC Vision Statement”), originally re-
leased as a naval message, and Marine Corps Strategy 21 (or MC Strategy 21). The
Marine documents explicitly claim to support Joint Vision 2010 and 2020.4 The
USMC Vision Statement is incorporated verbatim in MC Strategy 21, on the first
page; nonetheless, it should be treated as a separate text, because its explanatory
notes shed significant light on both documents.
What can deconstruction of the Marine visions tell us with respect to the
joint texts? We begin as before, examining each of the three main parts of the
two documents. The foundation is the single largest section of MC Strategy 21
(four of nine pages). The emphasis there points to the central idea in the Marine
texts: that the Marine Corps already embodies the correct model for the future.
The [General Officers Futures Group] concluded that the Corps requires only mar-
ginal adjustments to successfully adapt [for the future]. We do, in fact, have it right.5
The Marine texts’ foundation reflects a national security environment that
interestingly contrasts with that of the joint visions, an environment in which
the United States is likely to face both state and nonstate actors in conflicts
across the spectrum. In a chaotic setting, large-scale conventional warfare will
be the exception, and a variety of lesser contingencies the rule (MC Strategy 21,
pages 4–5). Although the point is not explicitly made, it is safe to assume that the
Marines would recognize the same national interests as does Joint Vision 2010:
ensuring domestic security and prosperity, and promoting worldwide democ-
racy. The USMC Vision Statement, however, adds a more detailed assumption:
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Opportunities and challenges in the world’s littoral regions will increase America’s
reliance on the continuous forward presence and sustainable maritime power projec-
tion of naval expeditionary forces [USMC Vision Statement].
While this statement is not at odds with anything in Joint Vision 2010 and
2020, neither is it supported by any passages in the joint texts. The declaration
reflects a predictable maritime bias, but also a distinct political and strategic
assumption.
The current status of the Marine Corps, in the view of the documents, is that,
with its highly trained personnel, it can provide combatant commanders with
mission-tailored Marine air-ground task forces (MAGTFs). These task forces
are able to deal with a large range of crises and contingencies across the spec-
trum of conflict, including forward presence and quick strategic response (MC
Strategy 21, pages 2, 3, 5).
The end state outlined in the foundations of the Marine vision texts is, signif-
icantly, strikingly similar to their current-status statements:
The Marine Corps will enhance its strategic agility, operational reach, and tactical
flexibility to enable joint, allied, and coalition operations and interagency coordina-
tion. These capabilities will provide combatant commanders with scalable, inter-
operable, combined-arms Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs) to shape the
international environment, respond quickly to the complex spectrum of crises and
conflicts, and gain access or prosecute forcible entry operations [USMC Vision State-
ment; MC Strategy 21, page 1].
This envisioned end state is further confirmation that the Marine Corps’ cen-
tral idea is improvement of the current force, not transformation to a new type
of force. The Marine end-state force is simply an amphibious version of the joint
end-state force. The Joint Vision 2010 and 2020 end state was to be a smaller
force, protected, mobile, and sustainable, able to react rapidly throughout the
globe and to mass the effects of its precise, lethal strikes without physically mass-
ing its own elements. The Marine vision documents do not directly address pre-
cise lethality or the massing of effects, but the passages related to improving
operational reach and tactical flexibility can be interpreted as covering those two
joint concepts. The Marine papers support no views that would be contrary to
any stated joint concept; the Marine texts may not match the joint texts adjective
for adjective, but the improved Marine air-ground task forces fit well within the
Joint Vision 2010 and 2020 parameters.
The method espoused in the Marine vision texts is one of evolution and im-
provement; the most frequently used verbs in the Marine vision texts are “en-
hance,” “evolve,” and “expand” (MC Strategy 21, pages 6–8). This approach
emphasizes the recruitment and retention of high-quality personnel by
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promoting traditional core values and a “warrior ethic,” as well as the improve-
ment of operational capabilities by “optimizing” current structure and “capital-
izing” on innovation (MC Strategy 21, pages 6–8). Joint Vision 2010 and 2020
revolve around the concepts of technology and “human elements” (such as doc-
trine and organization); the Marine vision texts are not explicit in this area but
seem to match more closely Joint Vision 2020, with its emphasis on concepts and
organizations rather than the impact of new technologies (MC Strategy 21,
pages 6–8).6
Having established the central ideas of the Marine texts, the decon-
structionist reader can pull out from them the significant marginal points.
There is only one—that sustained conventional combat operations are second-
ary in likelihood, and thus importance, to other deterrence and contingency op-
erations at the lower end of the conflict spectrum. The technique of the Marine
texts is to arrange potential employment options and capabilities in lists; the
fighting of battles always appears at the end of these lists, sometimes with a qual-
ifier, sometimes without.
These forces will promote national interests, influence vital regions, and fight and
win the nation’s battles [USMC Vision Statement; MC Strategy 21, page 1].
Every Marine and Marine unit is ready to rapidly task organize, deploy, and employ
from [the continental United States] or while forward deployed to respond and con-
tain crises or, if necessary, to immediately engage in sustained combat operations
[MC Strategy 21, page 2].
Throughout our Nation’s history, Marines have responded to national and interna-
tional brushfires and crises and, when necessary, war [MC Strategy 21, page 3].
As an expeditionary, task-organized, combined arms force with superb small-unit
leaders, we are prepared to promote peace and stability or, if required, defeat our Na-
tion’s adversaries [MC Strategy 21, page 5].
Multiple belligerents and a blurring of distinctions and national affiliations among
terrorist groups, subnational factions, insurgent groups, and international criminals
will complicate an environment where a direct attack is often the least likely course of
action [MC Strategy 21, page 5].
The Marine vision texts do not exclude the possibility of major combat oper-
ations; their marginalization concerns only their likelihood. Nonetheless, in this
respect the Marine documents diverge significantly from Joint Vision 2010 and
Joint Vision 2020. Both joint texts presume the opposite, emphasizing
warfighting over other operations.
The Marine texts do not directly address the “fog and friction” of combat or
the role of large physical-presence forces, which were mentioned in the joint
documents as secondary issues. The Marine warfighting doctrine of maneuver
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warfare, which is restated in MC Strategy 21, agrees with JV 2020 that fog and
friction are inherent parts of conflict and cannot be marginalized.7 The Marine
emphasis on maritime forces could be understood as discounting the need for
large physical-presence ground forces, but it begs the question of the size of the
maritime forces required instead. The relative marginalization of major theater
war in favor of operations other than war and such lesser crises is the only dis-
tinct secondary idea.
Three “possibilities left out” suggest themselves. The first would be a reversal
of the marginalization of major combat operations. Such a shift would empha-
size the Marine Corps role in warfighting at the possible expense of its ability to
maintain forward presence or respond to small-scale contingencies. The second
major possibility left out of the Marine vision texts is that of an end-state force
radically different from the present Marine air-ground task force concept. Such
a reversal would go against the grain of the Marine texts, which postulate that
evolution, not revolution, is the appropriate path. The last possibility left out of
the Marine texts mirrors one from Joint Vision 2010 and 2020: that of designing
the Marine Corps to meet the threat of a specific future peer competitor.
This deconstruction of the two recent Marine Corps vision documents offers
three ideas for consideration. First, the U.S. military might want to develop a
“hedge” capability to address operations other than war. The Marine Corps seems
to be offering itself as that capability and may want to commit to develop itself
further in this direction. Such a choice could reduce the Marines’ contribution to
major-theater-warfare situations, but it would increase their utility in what is ap-
parently going to be the most prevalent form of military employment.8
Second, the Marine Corps should look to doctrinal revolution as well as evo-
lution. The present direction may be correct, but that assumption should not
stifle development and experimentation of concepts that do not involve the Ma-
rine air-ground task force as now known. Such concepts could involve the elimi-
nation or severe curtailment of various elements of the task force in order to
allocate more resources to the others. The Marine air-ground task force should
not be dogma.
Finally, the Marine Corps may want to develop along lines devised to fight a
specific adversary.9 Such visions, if carried far enough, may lead to the develop-
ment of new ideas and capabilities that could also be useful in a broader sense.
None of the considerations arising from these two case studies are fully devel-
oped and usable as they stand; perhaps they are not feasible at all. What is im-
portant for present purposes, however, is that they were not self-evident at the
outset. They emerged from the process of deconstruction; this demonstrates the
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usefulness of that method for closely analyzing texts and generating ideas for
further study.
Military officers are continually encouraged to “think out of the box.” It is diffi-
cult, however, to break out of established and habitual perspectives. Deconstruction
helps a reader do this by offering a method to perform a new kind of analysis.
With some adaptation, the deconstruction technique can also be used on other
military texts, such as more concrete doctrinal publications. Although doctrine
manuals are not organized like “white papers” and vision documents, their cen-
tral ideas can still be made to reveal themselves in unfamiliar and unexpected
lights. Their secondary points can be extracted and explored in useful critiques;
like vision statements, doctrine is sometimes expressed in weak and vague
terms. In those and other kinds of texts, deconstruction reveals ideas and themes
that are present or implicit but do not become apparent in a conventional read-
ing. This analytical technique can be helpful to military readers, as well as the
scholars for whom it was developed, in forcing them to see beyond what a text
seems to say, to apply critical and creative thought to understanding what it
means.
NOTE S
1. U.S. Joint Staff, Joint Vision 2010 [hereafter
JV 2010 ] (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govt.
Print. Office [hereafter GPO], July 1996), pp.
2–34; and U.S. Joint Staff, Joint Vision 2020
[hereafter JV 2020] (Washington, D.C.: GPO,
June 2000), pp. 2–45.
2. Glenn Ward, Teach Yourself Postmodernism
(Chicago: NTC/Contemporary Publishing,
1997), pp. 94–101. Deconstruction is credited
to the French philosopher, Jacques Derrida.
The primary texts on deconstruction are dif-
ficult reading. For our purposes an introduc-
tory text is suitable.
3. The textual sources for the summarized cen-
tral themes are indicated throughout each of
the texts.
4. U.S. Navy Dept., Marine Corps Strategy 21
[hereafter MC Strategy 21] (Washington
D.C.: Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps,
2001), p. 5.
5. Commandant of the Marine Corps Message
to All Marines [hereafter CMC ALMAR] 42/
00, “The Vision Statement of the United
States Marine Corps,” message date-time
group 152000Z November [15 November,
8 P.M. Greenwich time] 2000.
6. Of the thirty “aims” deployed, ten could be
considered primarily human based, seven are
technology based, and thirteen are a combi-
nation of technology and human elements.
7. U.S. Navy Dept., Warfighting, Marine Corps
Doctrinal Publication 1 (Washington, D.C.:
Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, June 1997),
pp. 5–9; and MC Strategy 21, p. 9.
8. This “MTW/MOOTW” argument bears
some similarities to the Marine Corps strug-
gle in the 1920s and 1930s whether amphibi-
ous warfare should replace its traditional role
as colonial infantry.
9. Marine Corps development of amphibious
warfare owed much to planning for a war
with Japan.
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NATIONAL INTERESTS
Grand Purposes or Catchphrases?
James F. Miskel
It has become virtually a matter of faith among statesmen and academics thatforeign policy is best made when national interests are clearly defined and ar-
ticulated.1 How best to define and prioritize national interests can, of course, be
a matter of considerable dispute. Thus the controversies that swirled around
U.S. policy toward Bosnia and Kosovo, for example, have been sometimes un-
derstood as reflections of fundamental disagreement about how U.S. national
interests in the Balkans should be defined and prioritized relative to other na-
tional interests in the region and other parts of the world. Implicit in these and
similar debates about national interests and foreign policy are two assumptions.
One is that national interests can be defined precisely. This assumption is obvi-
ously true, although actually defining and prioritizing specific interests may be
rather difficult in the contemporary era, with growing interdependence among
nations and no superpower competition. The second assumption is that states-
men actually attempt to define national interests with
precision. Judging from recent history, this assump-
tion warrants challenge.
At least in recent years, statesmen have been reluc-
tant to define national interests with anything other
than Delphic ambiguity. Like the ancient Greek ora-
cle, famous for its double-entendre predictions and
deliberately obscure advice, today’s statesmen rou-
tinely offer “definitions” of the national interest so
broad that they can be, and in fact are, interpreted in
more than one way and in any case reveal little about
the actual long-range goals of the nation.
Dr. Miskel is the director of the Policy Making and Im-
plementation Division of the Naval War College’s Na-
tional Security Decision Making Department and the
College’s acting dean of academics. Earning his doctor-
ate at the State University of New York at Binghamton
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1987–89, thereafter returning to FEMA as assistant as-
sociate director. He is the author of Buying Trouble?
National Security and Reliance on Foreign Industry
(1993) and of articles in numerous journals.
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Very generally speaking, there are two basic schools of thought about how na-
tional interests should be defined. One school, the avatars of which might be re-
alist statesmen like Otto von Bismarck in the nineteenth century and Richard
Nixon in the twentieth, holds that national interests should be defined in terms
of a state’s tangible power and sphere of influence relative to those of other
states. The single most important form of tangible power for this realist school is
military (cannons and rifles in Bismarck’s era, nuclear missiles and bombers in
Nixon’s); the statesman’s ultimate challenge is to maintain a balance of military
power that is favorable to his or her state. Hence, realists tend to believe that the
United States has no important national interests at stake in places like Bosnia
and Kosovo, because events there have only a marginal effect on the global dis-
tribution of military power.
The other school holds that national interests should be defined more
broadly to encompass intangible, but nevertheless highly prized, values like hu-
man rights, freedom from economic deprivation, and freedom from disease. In
their vastly different ways, Woodrow Wilson and V. I. Lenin might be thought of
as exemplars of this school. Both leaders employed the military power of their
states to promote, respectively, the values of national self-determination and
economic egalitarianism. Advocates of American military action in Bosnia and
Kosovo, for instance, tended to argue that events in the Balkans are direct af-
fronts to important intangible values and thus must be confronted. They further
argued, perhaps as a sop to realists, that if Washington had ignored them, the
ability of the United States to wield “soft power” in other areas would have grad-
ually eroded.
For the last century, the foreign policies of the United States and many other
countries have been largely shaped by the decisions of statesmen who have
charted courses in the middle ground between the two national-interest
schools. This hundred-year database suggests that there has been a collective, al-
beit unexpressed, judgment by practitioners that neither school has it exactly
right. It also suggests that whatever they say in public, practitioners have realized
that attempts to define national interests in enough detail to serve as actual
guides for foreign policy are, all too often, frustrating and ultimately sterile
exercises.
Why, then, are Delphic bows toward the altar of national interest virtually de
rigueur in public policy and academic circles? The reason, to the cynic’s mind, is
that justifying decisions on the basis of supposed relationships to national inter-
ests—even vaguely defined national interests—is both intellectually and senti-
mentally gratifying. Obligatory tips of the hat to the national interest have
intellectual appeal in that they appear to validate the expectation of scholars,
legislators, and voters that statesmen will base their decisions on reasoned
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evaluations of the connection between ends and means. After all, without a clear
picture of the ends—national interests—objective comparisons of alternative
courses of action would be (and, as importantly, would be perceived by voters as
being) little more than guesswork.
Allusions to the national interests are sentimentally attractive because they
reaffirm the presumption that the expenditures and exertions that result from
strategic decisions are made for worthy purposes. Even in nondemocratic
regimes, creating the sense that
worthwhile ends are being served
is often vital to the mobilization
of national effort. Domestic polit-
ical support from key interest
groups, if not from the popula-
tion as a whole, is often the sine
qua non of successful policy im-
plementation, regardless of the nature of the regime. After all, even Joseph Stalin
and Adolf Hitler, the most ruthless of twentieth-century dictators, felt com-
pelled to justify the sacrifices they demanded of their people by connecting
those sacrifices to the grand purposes of “socialism in one country” and German
territorial expansion, respectively.
Recent policy documents from Washington illustrate a proclivity toward de-
fining national interests with studied imprecision and away from definitions
that are specific enough actually to guide policy or to engage the public in a
meaningful dialogue about the grand purposes that foreign policy might, and
perhaps should, serve. The national security strategy statements issued by presi-
dents more or less annually since the late 1980s are prime examples. These strat-
egy publications were legislatively mandated in 1986 by the Goldwater-Nichols
Department of Defense Reorganization Act. Thus it is technically accurate to char-
acterize the annual strategy reports as something that the executive branch pub-
lishes without enthusiasm and only because its collective arm has been twisted.
The 1986 legislation specified that the reports were to identify national inter-
ests and the strategies being pursued to achieve them, and that both classified
and unclassified reports were to be published.2 In other words, the legislation
makes explicit the congressional assumption that foreign policy is best made
and best overseen when national interests are clearly defined. The act required
unclassified reports in order to inform Congress as a whole and the public at
large. While an unclassified strategy report must be considerably less detailed than
its classified sibling, the unclassified documents that have been issued since 1986
have defined national interests so broadly as to raise doubts about whether the
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reports serve any constructive purpose in terms of educating or even informing the
public.
The December 2000 national security strategy report, which President Wil-
liam Clinton issued only a month before the inauguration of President George
W. Bush, is typical. A parting shot, a laundry list of bromides and unfulfilled
wishes, the 2000 report nevertheless resembles national security strategy state-
ments from the Clinton and earlier administrations in terms of how those state-
ments defined national interests.3 “Vital interests,” the 2000 report declared, “are
those directly connected to the survival, safety, and vitality of our nation.
Among these are the physical security of our territory. . . . We will do what we
must to defend these interests. This may involve the use of military force, includ-
ing unilateral action, where deemed necessary or appropriate.”4
At one level, this “definition” simply restates the obvious. There can hardly be
any need to explain to the American public, to any other national government
on the planet, or even to any terrorist organization, that the U.S. government
considers military attacks on or within its sovereign borders injurious to vital
American interests. There may be no harm in restating the obvious, but neither
is any grand purpose served.
Furthermore, the excerpt above makes clear that this definition of “vital na-
tional interest” is intended to cover more than “merely” military attack by a hos-
tile state on the land occupied by the United States or expansion by another state
into territory over which the United States claims sovereignty. Plainly, if these
were the exclusive foci of the definition, there would hardly be any reason to say
that response “may involve the use of military force.” Neither would it be neces-
sary to indicate that threats to vital national interests can be envisioned in re-
sponse to which unilateral military action would be neither necessary nor
appropriate. Yet, as to what those situations might be, the report provides no in-
sight. In other words, this definition of a “vital national interest” provides clarity
where the point is obvious but is otherwise vacuous.
The protection of sovereign territory is only one of the national interests that
have been defined in overly general terms. Others include “the safety of our citi-
zens both at home and abroad,” “the economic well-being of our society,” and
“the protection of our critical infrastructure—including . . . vital human ser-
vices and government services—from disruption intended to cripple their oper-
ation.”5 These national interests are so broadly defined as to be the functional
equivalent of platitudes. They are catchphrases that no statesman or politician
would ever publicly reject—what would be the point?—but that nevertheless
play absolutely no meaningful role in the policy formulation process.
No policy maker in Washington would ever declare his or her indifference to
the safety of American citizens, to the protection of critical infrastructure, or to
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the nation’s economic well-being. Simply stating, however, that all three are de-
sirable says nothing about the directions that policy makers intend to take. Nor
do such statements do anything to inform or educate the public. Thus, on sev-
eral counts, the ways in which American national interests are being defined ap-
pear to defeat the purpose of Congress in requiring unclassified reports about
the goals and directions of the nation’s security strategy.
Admittedly, from the perspective of the statesman-navigator charting a par-
ticular foreign policy course, there may be practical reasons for preferring the
ambiguity of Delphi over the precision of science when it comes to publicly ex-
plaining the relationship between the national interests and the nation’s foreign
and defense policies. Policy formulation and implementation usually require
some level of agreement, compro-
mise, or political consensus—in
effect, marriages of convenience
between the executive branch of
government and other elements
of society. Such marriages are
considerably easier to arrange when the terms are defined only generally than
when they are set out in detail. Marriages of convenience between Congress and
the executive branch and between the Republican and Democratic parties, how-
ever temporary, can be essential to the foreign and defense policy-making pro-
cesses. They are, indeed, the basis of the shibboleth that politics should end at
the water’s edge.
A complicating factor in the era of globalization is that nongovernmental en-
tities—such as multinational corporations, humanitarian relief organizations,
vested interest groups, and coalitions of concerned citizens, each with its per-
spectives and issues—have proven that they can influence policy formulation by
lobbying and generating pressure through the media. If only through bitter ex-
perience, statesmen have come to understand that to express national interests
in detailed, specific terms is often to invite political challenge from entities
whose special interests are adversely affected by some nuance.
Another reason for the practitioner’s preference for general descriptions of
national interest is that specific formulations can have unintended conse-
quences. The most infamous example is North Korea’s attack on South Korea in
1950 after Washington had indicated that the latter was outside the geographic
zone of vital U.S. national interests. Such instances can be cited as proof that am-
biguity serves a strategically useful purpose; nonetheless, it is not always the wis-
est course. Indeed, ambiguity appears as likely as specificity to send the kind of
inadvertent signals that creates crises. It is, for example, conceivable that until
the air war on Serbia in 2000, Slobodan Milosevic and the other perpetrators of
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human rights abuses in the Balkans were emboldened by the apparent uncer-
tainty of the United States as to its national interests in the former Yugoslavia.
Further, it seems quite likely that the platitudinous expressions by Washington
and other governments in the mid-1990s about the importance of human rights
were actually interpreted in Rwanda as signals of indifference toward genocide
in sub-Saharan Africa.
A negative consequence of another order is the shallowness of the political al-
liances negotiated among Congress, the White House, Democratic and Republi-
can activists, and special-interest groups on the basis of vaguely defined and
ambiguously prioritized national interests. Marriages of convenience can very
quickly mutate into separations of convenience—perhaps a minor problem when
the issues themselves merit only modest and brief bursts of energy from the body
politic, but potentially of great significance for matters that are serious and lasting.
Over the long term, ambiguity imposes a heavy opportunity cost in terms of
forfeited occasions in which the public might have been educated about grand
purposes—enduring issues and long-term objectives being addressed by the
foreign policy establishment. The American public is famously uninterested in
foreign affairs, and this indifference presumably contributes to its passive accep-
tance of deliberately vague definitions of national interests. Whether such ambi-
guity is the “chicken” or the “egg” of the public’s unconcern, democracy suffers
when leaders continually defer serious dialogue about how national interests
should be defined and prioritized.
The foreign policy establishment has periodically, although not recently, en-
gaged the public and Congress in serious discourse about the national interest;
and when it has, enduring public and legislative support for specific grand strat-
egies has resulted. This occurred, for example, during the early 1980s, at the end
of the Jimmy Carter administration and the beginning of the Ronald Reagan ad-
ministration, when there was a broad public debate about the level of U.S. de-
fense spending needed in light of the threat posed by the Soviet Union and its
bloc. The result was public support for a multiyear, across-the-board increase in
defense spending and for a more assertive foreign policy. Earlier in the Cold War
there had been a similar dialogue involving the public and Congress; in the end,
the policies of containment and nuclear deterrence were formulated and the
Nato treaty was approved. Each of these strategies required and was to receive
decades-long political support by the public and financial support by the pub-
lic’s representatives in Congress.
Another example occurred during the years after World War I, when Presi-
dent Wilson tried to convince the public and Congress that membership in the
League of Nations was in the national interest of the United States. Wilson failed,
but the public debate had lasting effects. For almost two decades the public and
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its elected representatives supported a foreign policy that minimized defense
spending and commitments outside the hemisphere, particularly commitments
with military implications. Indeed, the fact that the outcome of the debate was
different than Wilson intended demonstrates the value of serious public dis-
course in the first place. Had the president been able to attach the nation to the
League by executive fiat, its membership would have been futile. The mood of
Congress and the public would have denied Wilson support for the expansive
foreign and defense strategies that he envisioned as part and parcel of the League
of Nations ideal.
A public debate about national interests after the terrorist attacks on the World
Trade Center and the Pentagon was, of course, unnecessary, at least with respect
to mobilizing public support for homeland security programs and the war
against the perpetrators of the attacks and their supporters. There are, however,
other aspects of the war on terrorism for which public and congressional sup-
port is less certain, because their relationships to the 11 September attacks are
indirect.
For example, the direction that the war on terrorism will take after Afghani-
stan is by no means clear—beyond the fact that it will be a long-term effort. One
need not agree that Iran, Iraq, and North Korea are part of an “axis of evil” to
recognize that President Bush’s
critics have failed to acknowledge
that publicly labeling rogue states
is a positive step in terms of debat-
ing and defining more rigorously
than usual national interests with
respect to each. In the process of
engaging Congress, and through
it the public, in a substantive dialogue about the nation’s interests in preventing
terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction developed by rogue
states, the “axis of evil” epithet is preferable to platitudes about the survival and
vitality of the United States.
Other issues with indirect but important relationships to homeland security
and to the future direction of the war on terrorism are the Arab-Israeli peace
process and the concept of “nation building,” assistance in the restoration of col-
lapsed states to viability on the basis of democratic institutions. With respect to
the latter, judgments will be required over the next several years about the role
the United States should play in nation building in order to prevent future ter-
rorists from finding platforms in the no-man’s-lands of ineffective or failing
states. Nation building is not a science. It is an art that takes effort and invest-
ment over extended periods of time. In Bosnia, for example, nation building has
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century dictators felt compelled to justify the
sacrifices they demanded of their people by
connecting them to grand purposes.
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been under way since 1996, but the end of the project is not in sight. Should the
role of the United States be direct or indirect? Should the work be led by the
United Nations or by some multilateral organization, perhaps built for the pur-
pose? The answers to these and other questions would seem to depend at least in
part on how U.S. national interests are defined and prioritized. Further, public
and congressional support for this complex and expensive task may depend
heavily on the depth of the American people’s understanding of and commit-
ment to those interests.
The Arab-Israeli conflict is related to the war on terrorism and homeland se-
curity because Islamic extremists, and many Muslims generally, condemn the
United States for enabling Israel to defend itself and maintain its hold over occu-
pied territory. Since at least 1973, when Secretary of State Henry Kissinger shut-
tled between Arab and Israeli capitals to negotiate a cease-fire and withdrawal of
forces after the Yom Kippur/Ramadan War, the United States has invested con-
siderable time, energy, and resources in pursuit of a peaceful resolution of the
Arab-Israeli conflict. Presidents Carter and Clinton, in the 1970s and 1990s, re-
spectively, were personally engaged in the peace process; during the Reagan and
George Bush administrations, the secretaries of state actively promoted settle-
ment. Reagan’s secretary of state, George Shultz, negotiated what turned out to
be a short-lived peace settlement in 1983; Bush’s secretary of state, James Baker,
shuttled to the Middle East eleven times in a single year (1991) and hosted an
Arab-Israeli peace conference in Madrid.
There were, of course, ebbs and flow in the level of direct U.S. engagement in
the peace process, due to judgments at the time about the practical prospects for
success. What is remarkable is rather the consistently high level of effort over
three decades despite major shifts in the geostrategic environment. U.S. shuttle
diplomacy, forward military presence in the eastern Mediterranean, and sub-
stantial foreign aid investment in Israel and Egypt started during the Cold War.
Today the United States is no longer vying with a rival superpower, and its na-
tional interests in the region are presumably either different or, at the very least,
less at risk. U.S. strategies, nevertheless, appear to have changed hardly at all.
High-level emissaries still shuttle to the Middle East in attempts to mediate; the
United States gives more foreign aid to both Israel and Egypt than to any other
country; and forward military presence in the eastern Mediterranean continues.
The reason is that such enmity and distrust exist between the Palestinians and
the Israelis that no true settlement will ever be reached without long-term com-
mitment by the United States. This almost certainly will entail nation-building
assistance to the Palestinians, even more foreign aid to Israel (and perhaps to
Egypt and other moderate Arab states), and either security guarantees or the ac-
tual interposition of American peacekeepers. It may be hard to maintain steady
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levels of political support for such sustained efforts if they are “marketed” to the
American public and Congress on the basis of catchphrases and buzzwords
about national interests.
There may be other policy areas that will also require long-term support from
the public and Congress. It is not necessary to identify them here. The point is
that for thoroughly practical reasons—specifically, the mobilization and main-
tenance of resources and commitment for projects that require protracted ef-
fort—it would be wise to engage the public and Congress in a meaningful
dialogue about the national interests that may be involved. Such a dialogue is
simply not possible when national interests are so generally defined that they
mean all things to all people. So in this regard, for the future direction of the war
against terrorism, the president’s “axis of evil” speech was a useful, clarifying
step. The congressional requirement for annual unclassified national security
reports, in contrast, has proven to have little value in furthering the debate. Con-
gress would do well to consider whether the public interest would be better
served if national security reports were required only once in a presidential
term—on the assumption that interests and strategies do not, or at least should
not, change annually.
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IN MY VIEW
WAY OUT THERE
Sir:
Professor Roger W. Barnett’s critique of Frances FitzGerald’s book, Way Out
There in the Blue: Reagan, Star Wars and the End of the Cold War, is long on indig-
nation but short on substance. Dr. Barnett certainly is correct to suspect the
arms control bias that informs FitzGerald’s book. Yet his own critique suffers
from a pro–missile defense bias that distorts his analysis of an extremely impor-
tant, if ultimately inadequate, research effort.
For example, FitzGerald does not assert that Ronald Reagan’s administration
“got it wrong, at every step, all of the time.” Rather, FitzGerald claims that the ad-
ministration began getting it right in the wake of the Iran-Contra scandal, when
both the president and his wife sought to salvage his legacy through arms con-
trol agreements with Mikhail Gorbachev. Although one can dispute the cause of
this “reversal” in favor of arms control, keep in mind that another scholar, one
quite sympathetic to Reagan, argues for just such a reversal—Beth A. Fischer, in
The Reagan Reversal.
Dr. Barnett criticizes FitzGerald for finding Reagan to be “a simple-minded
president . . . surrounded and captured by hard-line anticommunists.” Here, the
reader must decide—especially after reading what Henry Kissinger has to say
about his meetings with the president (p. 175), and after contemplating how a
president who had delivered the “visionary” Star Wars speech in March 1983
could ask Secretary of State George Shultz in November 1985, “Now tell me
again, George, what’s the difference between a ballistic missile and a cruise mis-
sile?” (p. 534).
Finally and most significantly, while criticizing FitzGerald’s “lack of under-
standing of strategy,” Dr. Barnett commits an equally egregious error—that of
simply assuming that the Reagan administration’s missile defense strategy
worked. Apparently, neither FitzGerald nor Barnett knew of the following im-
portant facts from Soviet sources:
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• In 1985, the Soviet Union initiated its protivodeistvie (counteraction)
program, which explored asymmetric responses to an American missile
defense system.
• The most effective weapon to emerge from that program was the Topol-M
intercontinental ballistic missile, which ultimately was equipped with
numerous penetration aids of such sophistication that some Russian
generals today claim that it can penetrate any missile defense that the
United States might deploy during the next twenty years.
• Consequently, Gorbachev wasn’t bluffing when he informed Reagan (in
November 1985 at Geneva), “I think you should know that we have already
developed a response. It will be effective and far less expensive than your
project, and be ready for use in less time.”
• Gorbachev was proven correct on all three counts when, in 1998, Russia
began deployment of the first Topol-M ICBMs. Thus development and
deployment survived both the Soviet collapse and the economic duress that
post-Soviet Russia experienced during its first decade of existence.
These facts alone undermine any argument about the impact on the Soviet
Union of a yet-to-be-deployed and perhaps unrealizable missile defense system.
Just as no policy maker should ever assume that every strategy will achieve its in-
tended results automatically (Reagan’s almost led to nuclear war in 1983!), no
historian should ever misconstrue political and strategic initiatives as automatic
political and strategic successes—or strategy as history.
WALTER C. UHLER
Chief of Operations
Defense Contract Management Agency,
Lockheed Martin Delaware Valley
Camden, New Jersey
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Professor Barnett replies:
Last year I went to a presentation at Brown University by Frances FitzGerald on
Way Out There in the Blue. After her talk, a member of the audience stepped to
the microphone and said that as a physicist he could categorically state that bal-
listic missile defenses could never work. Spoken within those hallowed halls, this
statement astounded me. It does offer some insight, however, into how politics
and ideology can befoul one’s self-respect. For what self-respecting scientist
might sensibly argue the impossibility of an effort that in no way violates the
known laws of physics? This is, accordingly, not a scientific judgment, and no
pro–missile defense bias or any other bias can distort how such politicized
thinking permeates both Frances FitzGerald’s book and Walter Uhler’s remarks
on my review.
In his comments on my review Mr. Uhler writes: “These facts alone under-
mine any argument about the impact on the Soviet Union of a yet-to-be-
deployed and perhaps unrealizable missile defense system.” Yet, the strategic
significance of the Topol-M missile, which he cites as evidence to support his
claim, is minor at best. When Mr. Gorbachev spoke to President Reagan in No-
vember 1985 about “a response,” the Soviet Union had operational over eight
thousand ballistic missile warheads, fully half of which had been added since
1979, when the SALT II treaty was signed (and over six thousand of which had
been added since SALT I was signed). The Topol-M is a single-warhead missile,
developed to replace the aging multiwarhead heavy missiles fielded in earlier de-
cades. By mid-2002 a mere twenty-nine of them have been deployed. In terms of
warhead numbers, and in terms of the U.S. space-based defense that was being
developed at the same time (which would have negated the SS-27’s onboard
countermeasures), the case that the SS-27 had much of an impact on U.S. ballis-
tic missile defense plans is the thinnest of reeds.
As for President Reagan’s inability to tell the difference between a ballistic
missile and a cruise missile (reported third-hand in a footnote in Ms. FitzGer-
ald’s book—Robert Timberg quoting Robert McFarlane’s account of Secretary
George Shultz’s assertion), Richard Pipes has addressed this very issue head-on:
“Admittedly, Reagan showed little curiosity about [such] data. . . . Nevertheless,
he displayed great discernment and the instinctive judgment of a true states-
man, being inspired by a strong moral sense and a sound understanding of what
it is to live under tyranny. As someone involved in the formulation of Soviet pol-
icy in the first two years of the Reagan administration, I can attest that the direc-
tion of this policy was set by the president and not by his staff, and that it was
vigorously implemented over the objections of several more dovish secretaries.
It rested on a keen grasp of the vulnerabilities of the Soviet regime.” Should one
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care more whether a president exercises strong, courageous leadership or cannot
recall the technical differences between missiles?
With respect to the success of SDI as part of the overall strategy to undermine
the Soviet system, the wealth of evidence increases almost daily. For example,
Russian ambassador Vladimir Lukin asserted (to quote Bud McFarlane again!)
that the SDI “accelerated our catastrophe by about five years.”
Mr. Uhler’s parting shot that “no historian should ever misconstrue political
and strategic initiatives as automatic political and strategic successes—or strat-
egy as history” mystifies me. One can agree with such a sentiment in the abstract,
but relating it to my review—in the absence of any evidence, and in view of the
fact that I make no pretensions to being a historian—requires a significant
imaginative stretch.
The FitzGeralds and the Uhlers represent the day-before-the-day-before-
yesterday’s news. They cannot accept that the Reagan administration had a plan,
laid out explicitly in NSDD-75, and pursued it to the eventual demise of the So-
viet Union. President Reagan’s lack of interest in the details might be fine fun for
the coveys of arms control quails. But who is to say that he was wrong in the key
insight that drove, and still propels, ballistic missile defenses—that the Ameri-
can people must be actively defended against all attacks that threaten to kill
them in large numbers?
Sometime in the mid-1960s the U.S. government misplaced its compass and
embraced Mutual Assured Destruction—it literally went MAD. Ronald Reagan
found the compass, but he was unable to convince the arms control community.
It was too hung up on the difference between cruise and ballistic missiles, and,
like the scientist at Brown University, lost its credibility.
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BOOK REVIEWS
HOW INSIGHTFUL CAN THIS BE?
Campbell, Kurt M., and Michèle Flournoy et al. To Prevail: An American Strategy for the Campaign against
Terrorism. Washington, D.C.: CSIS Press, 2001. 416pp. $18.95
As death and taxes are inevitable to citi-
zens of the United States, so also are the
contemporary strategic blueprints writ-
ten after a crisis has occurred. In Novem-
ber 2001 the Center for Strategic and
International Studies, a Washington
think tank that focuses on national secu-
rity, published To Prevail, offering a
comprehensive strategy to guide the Bush
administration’s “global war on terror.”
From inception to press, the book took
less than two months to complete. How
insightful can such an “instant” piece of
strategic reasoning really be? The answer
is “surprisingly so.”
To Prevail is a decidedly mixed bag of
facts, analysis, insight, and recommenda-
tions. For example, the chapter on the
Taliban appears quaint in light of very re-
cent history (since November 2001).
Other chapters, especially those dealing
with military and economic issues, come
across as shallow and too general for real
utility. However, the overall conception
of the book and its on-the-mark chapters
dealing with intelligence, law enforce-
ment, diplomacy, and foreign assistance
make this an invaluable guide to the
post-“9/11” national security world.
Reflecting the mixed nature of the book
are findings and recommendations in the
closing chapter that call for applause but
lead to more questions. Meriting ap-
plause, the book’s recommendations re-
assert the need for engagement and an
active, focused diplomacy with the rest of
the world. Readers are reminded that the
United States must win this war with the
cooperation of a “coalition of coalitions”;
that the United States must win the in-
formation wars, not only in cyberspace
but in the international public forum of
debate (the press, television, and the In-
ternet); and that it must pay attention to
coordinating its aid efforts to focus such
assistance so as to reinforce the public
message that the country wishes and
needs to send.
Also, To Prevail summarizes the intelli-
gence needs for this conflict in ways that
are only now being discussed among ex-
ecutive and congressional decision mak-
ers. The authors point out the dangerous
parochialism within U.S. intelligence
agencies and the overwhelming need for
more and better human intelligence. This
is coupled with the authors’ argument for
expanded international engagement, for
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in the short term, other nations can
provide the human intelligence capabil-
ities that the United States currently
lacks. Finally, the authors recognize
that local and state officials rather than
members of the federal government are
on the front lines in one major theater
of operations—the homeland. Conse-
quently, the book recommends ways of
allowing decentralized coordination
among federal, state, and local authori-
ties that maintain a balance between the
civil rights of the citizenry and the ne-
cessity of prosecuting a vigorous
campaign.
However, one must ask why—in light
of their insightful recognition for the
need for an integrated command, con-
trol, and coordination of an incredibly
diverse repertoire of efforts to fight the
war against terrorism—the authors re-
fused to consider any real command
and control organization, process, sys-
tem, or doctrine. In place of such a use-
ful, even vital capability, To Prevail
merely calls for more commissions,
more coordination, and more openness,
and information sharing among exist-
ing agencies. The authors are Washing-
ton veterans who must know how naïve
their recommendations on this matter
sound. They recommend against form-
ing a powerful department of homeland
security that would be capable of inte-
grating the diverse and often contradic-
tory and self-defeating efforts of a
variety of federal agencies. One never
really fully understands who or what
the authors are suggesting will conduct
the overall campaign planning and
oversight of the global war on terror.
The fact is that at this writing, it is still
not clear which federal entity is conduct-
ing the command and control functions
of much of the global campaign. This
country learned quickly in World War
II that crises alone, even sneak attacks,
do not overcome bureaucratic turf
wars; the nation is relearning that les-
son now. The authors must know this,
and they should propose an organiza-
tional framework to implement the
wide array of global and domestic mea-
sures advocated in their strategy.
To Prevail is for the serious strategic
thinker and decision maker. It is a com-
mendable effort to bring together in
one place a comprehensive strategy that
can bring success in what promises to
be a long and unusual war. My only
quibble is the shortage of relevant cita-
tions, which is probably due to the
quickness of editing and publication.
Such is the price of currency.
JON CZARNECKI
Naval War College
Monterey Program
Baylis, John, et al., eds. Strategy in the Contempo-
rary World: An Introduction to Strategic Studies.
Oxford, U.K.: Oxford Univ. Press, 2002. 356pp.
$27.95
Although not recognized as an equal ac-
ademic discipline by mainstream aca-
demics, the study of strategy has a long
and honorable history—the result of
numerous authors who, over the centu-
ries, have developed their ideas and
placed their own imprints on the disci-
pline. Since the beginning of the Cold
War, when the threat of nuclear de-
struction concentrated the minds of
scholars, the field shifted from tradi-
tional military concerns to the study of
nuclear deterrence. But now, more than
a decade beyond the end of the Cold
War, strategic studies return to their
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origins, though in a time rife with novel
challenges. Strategy in the Contemporary
World marks a good first step for the
discipline.
The editors, strategists all, have assem-
bled a remarkable introduction to stra-
tegic studies. Not only is it the first
textbook on the subject rather than a
collection of edited readings, but it is
singularly helpful to the novice. The
book addresses a broad array of subjects
and may refresh experienced strategists
on subjects outside their expertise.
The book’s fourteen chapters by seven-
teen authors have been organized into
four sections: “Enduring Issues,” “Evo-
lution of Joint Warfare,” “Twentieth-
Century Theories,” and “Contemporary
Issues.” The subject of each chapter
varies tremendously—an introduction
to strategic studies; the causes of war;
great strategists of the past; land, air,
and naval power; terrorism and irregu-
lar warfare; international law; deter-
rence; weapons of mass destruction;
technology and warfare; humanitarian
intervention; nontraditional security
concerns (environmental degradation,
etc.); and others.
Each chapter, despite the analytical bias
of its author (or authors), explores the
fundamentals of its subject fairly well.
For example, in “Sea Power: Theory
and Practice,” Captain Sam Tangredi,
USN, traces the historical and theoreti-
cal lineage for sea power versus land
power. He defines sea power broadly to
include maritime trade and ocean re-
sources, and he analyzes the importance
of sea lines of communication. Tan-
gredi evaluates the works of Alfred
Thayer Mahan and Soviet admiral
Sergei Gorshkov as they relate to the
debate over naval strategy during the
Cold War. He follows this by discussing
naval theory for the post–Cold War era
of smaller navies, wider threats, and
only one truly global naval power. That
is to say, he covers the subject broadly,
but with finesse.
The typical problems with multi-
authored works are absent in this book.
A strong editorial hand has blended the
various chapters to read as if the same
author had penned them. In addition,
the book contains clear introductions
and conclusions; key points are sum-
marized in each section; questions are
included at the end of each chapter; and
further reading references are listed.
Students and instructors could make
good use of this book.
Only one minor inconsistency mars this
otherwise good work. Strategy and stra-
tegic studies have long recognized the
relationship between politics and war.
Karl von Clausewitz wrote that war is a
continuation of political discourse by
other means. Truth be told, to under-
stand strategy—the art of marrying mil-
itary means to political ends—one must
look constantly to its political origins.
The worth of this idea can be seen in
the want of it in some of these chapters.
For example, in “Arms Control and
Disarmament,” John Baylis entirely di-
vorces the subject from the politics of
nations. Thus when he reports on the
charges and countercharges of arms vi-
olations between the United States and
the Soviet Union during the 1980s,
without reference to politics and poli-
cies, the states’ behaviors appear mor-
ally equivalent. In contrast, James D.
Kiras emphasizes the political objectives
of war in his chapter, “Terrorism and
Irregular Warfare,” helping the reader
to make sense of how unconventional
tactics may or may not accomplish cer-
tain goals.
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This is a minor problem, however. It
does not significantly mar an excellent
work that will serve anyone desiring
grounding in strategic studies or a re-
fresher on strategy.
MARK T. CLARK
California State University
San Bernardino, California
Mearsheimer, John J. The Tragedy of Great Power
Politics. New York: W. W. Norton, 2001. 448pp.
$27.95
This monumental and ambitious work
sets out to provide the definitive account
of the “offensive realism” school of in-
ternational relations theory. Offensive
realism represents a kind of synthesis of
the classical realism of Hans Morgen-
thau and the structural or “defensive”
realism of Kenneth Waltz. With Mor-
genthau it assumes that states (or major
states) seek to accumulate as much
power as possible for themselves, but it
accepts Waltz’s view that the reason they
do so lies in the structure of the interna-
tional system rather than in the human
lust for power. Mearsheimer must there-
fore show that Waltz and his many fol-
lowers have been overly optimistic in
analyzing the implications for state be-
havior of the anarchic character of the
international system. According to
Mearsheimer, they have wrongly as-
sumed that a cautious or defensive ap-
proach to safeguarding a state’s security
is the only rational approach and hence
the norm for most states. Rather, he in-
sists, aggressive or expansionist behavior
is both more common in the recent his-
tory of the great powers than this would
allow and more rational in the sense that
it is not infrequently very successful.
Mearsheimer’s thesis is richly illustrated,
from the history of the great powers
from the wars of the French Revolution
through the end of the Cold War. It also
looks out into the future to test the the-
ory against the common if vaguely artic-
ulated belief that great-power war has
become obsolete. For these reasons, and
because it is written in a clear and jargon-
free style, The Tragedy of Great Power
Politics holds much interest even for
those with limited patience for the theo-
logical disputes of international relations
theorists. At the same time, it is a formi-
dable challenge to mainstream realism.
It scores many points off an approach
that somehow never comes to grips with
what one is tempted to call the sheer
bloody-mindedness of international pol-
itics. Particularly novel and persuasive is
Mearsheimer’s analysis of “buck pass-
ing” (not “bandwagoning”) as the fun-
damental alternative to balancing against
another power.
Yet the book has its limitations, which
are largely the limitations of the realist
school as such. Mearsheimer never quite
convinces when he argues that the do-
mestic regimes and leadership of, for ex-
ample, Britain, the United States, Nazi
Germany, and imperial Japan had no
fundamental impact on their interna-
tional behavior. But perhaps the weakest
part of the book is its disregard of the
ideological context of nineteenth-cen-
tury European diplomacy. The anti-
revolutionary alliance of Austria, Prussia,
and Russia, and the “Concert of Europe,”
were arguably at least as important in
maintaining the long great-power peace
through much of this period as were the
abstract structural characteristics of the
European state system. For that matter,
the fact that many of the wars that did
occur were connected in some way with
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the decay of the Ottoman Empire seems
to suggest, contra Mearsheimer, that
wars can be caused as much by the
weakness as by the strength of a key ac-
tor. Both these points have suggestive
applications as we look to the twenty-
first century. The war against terrorism
might well be the occasion for the for-
mation of a global “concert” of the great
powers. The greatest threat to such a
concert could well be the continuing
weakness of Russia—not, as Mear-
sheimer holds, the rising strength of
China.
CARNES LORD
Naval War College
Kagan, Donald, and Fredrick W. Kagan. While
America Sleeps: Self-Delusion, Military Weakness,
and the Threat to Peace Today. New York: St. Mar-
tin’s, 2000. 483pp. $32.50
Did the leadership of the United States
throw away a priceless opportunity to
bring stability, prosperity, and peace to
the world in the decade following the
end of the Cold War, as surely as the
leadership of Great Britain failed to
grasp a similar opportunity following the
end of the First World War? For Donald
and Fredrick Kagan, the answer is a re-
sounding yes. While America Sleeps is
their attempt not only to show how op-
portunities were squandered but also to
highlight the similarities of both situa-
tions. The Kagans argue that both
states dangerously reduced the size of
their military forces, falsely believed in
the saving power of technology,
failed to exercise strategic leader-
ship, and embarked on a pattern of
“pseudo-engagement.” The impor-
tance of the central question and the
authors’ credentials make this a book to
be taken seriously.
The Kagans, both historians of note,
make a potent father-and-son team.
Donald Kagan, the Hillhouse Professor
of History and Classics at Yale Univer-
sity, has produced an impressive body of
work, including the best-selling A His-
tory of Warfare. Fredrick W. Kagan, cur-
rently a professor of military history at
West Point, is perhaps less well known
to the general public but has impressive
credentials in his own right.
While America Sleeps is divided into
three sections. The first, “Britain be-
tween the Wars,” chronicles that state’s
transition from a globally dominant
power in 1918 to one of near-fatal
weakness by the mid-1930s. It pays spe-
cial attention to the Chanak crisis of
1922, the Corfu affair of 1923, the
Locarno Treaty of 1925, the Italian-
Ethiopian War of 1934–35, and the re-
militarization of the Rhineland in 1936.
The second, “The United States after
the Cold War,” follows a generally simi-
lar approach, addressing particularly
the end of the Gulf War in 1991, the
U.S. intervention in Somalia from 1991
to 1993, the occupation of Haiti in
1994, the Clinton administration’s at-
tempts to deal with North Korea’s nu-
clear weapons program, that same
administration’s efforts to curtail Iraqi
production of weapons of mass de-
struction, and American responses to
conflict in the Balkans. The true third
section, although actually included in
the second section of the book, is the
concluding chapter, in which the au-
thors clearly state their belief that the
United States is at risk of “suffering a
fate similar to that which befell Britain
in the 1930s.” They present an argu-
ment supporting this conclusion and
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offer the chilling suggestion that it may
already be too late to prevent such an
outcome.
While America Sleeps is rich in back-
ground material. Defense strategies,
budgets, building programs, and much
more are fully and clearly discussed.
For example, the section on how both
the United States and the United King-
dom turned to technology as compen-
sation for diminished force structure is
fascinating. Readers will find compel-
ling the portraits of both countries,
depicted as states weary of conflict,
desirous of maintaining dominance at
the lowest possible cost, and eventually
relying too heavily on inadequately led
and maintained diplomatic services.
Some areas of While America Sleeps are
open to criticism. One potential failing is
that explaining how events between 1919
and the mid-1930s led to war is a very
different thing from explaining how dif-
ferent events would have led to peace.
Also, the authors do not address in detail
the severe domestic political opposition
that choosing a different strategy might
have encountered; such difficulties are
mentioned only to remark they could
have been overcome. There are also dis-
crepancies. The authors imply, for ex-
ample, that President Bill Clinton was
never able to bring himself to order an
invasion of Haiti, that U.S. forces were
only “prepared” to invade. In reality the
forces described were actually in the pro-
cess of invasion when the military re-
gime of General Raoul Cedras yielded to
U.S. negotiators.
Some of the authors’ subjective interpre-
tations are also open to debate. The
Kagans are critical of British leaders in
1936 for being overly fearful of the Ital-
ian navy should British opposition to
Italy’s conquest of Abyssinia lead to
conflict. Yet it is hard to see how Britain
could not have been concerned with Ital-
ian naval power. The Italian ships were
new and well handled, and they would
have had air support for any operation
near the Italian Peninsula. In a more
modern example, the decision not to
force the landing of the USS Harlan
County (LST 1196) at Port-au-Prince
during the confrontation with Haiti is
strongly criticized. There is no doubt
that the image of a U.S. Navy warship
backing away from a government-
directed mob did not reflect credit upon
the United States or its military forces.
However, the authors might have more
fully explored the potential conse-
quences of a forcible landing. The ship
was there on a noncombatant mission,
with the ostensible permission of the
Cedras regime. If a landing had been
carried out, potentially killing many
Haitians, significant domestic and inter-
national repercussions could have been
expected to result. Additionally, it is un-
likely that the original mission could
then have been carried out at all.
One last criticism deserves mention. As
Richard Neustadt and Ernest May have
long reminded us, all analogies are sus-
pect. The power of analogies is so great
that arguments by analogy almost inevi-
tably result in flawed decision making.
This is in large part because all too often
historical analogies invoked as decision
aids are shallow circumstantially and far
more different from the situation at
hand than they are similar. Yet once the
analogy has been invoked the damage
often has been done, and the course of
action suggested will be followed to its
unsatisfactory end. To their credit the
Kagans remind the reader that  “the
United States at the end of the millen-
nium is not England between the wars.”
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They point out that comparisons of
present policies to those of the British at
Munich are premature and that it is not
their intention to draw precise parallels
between the British and U.S. experi-
ences. However, these admissions come
only in the very last chapter, after the
reader has had every opportunity to
make just such comparisons.
Despite these critical comments, While
America Sleeps is very much worth read-
ing. The Kagans are asking the right
questions. Their warnings about the fate
of states that reduce military capabilities
to dangerously low levels, lack consistent
strategic visions, and replace sound
strategy with wishful thinking are more
germane than ever.
So too are the questions their work
points to but does not ask. Can democ-
racies avoid reducing military capabili-
ties without the impetus of a visible
external threat? Does state behavior
motivated by self-interest weaken all al-
liances over time? Can a democracy
survive taking on the mantle of world
policeman? Can wars be prevented
through consistent displays of strength
and purpose? These are questions that
reading this book evokes, questions that
should be considered and discussed far
more than they are.
RICHARD NORTON
Naval War College
Detter, Ingrid. The Law of War. Cambridge, U.K.:
Cambridge Univ. Press, 2000. (2d ed.) 516pp.
$39.95
This is the second edition of Ingrid
Detter’s sweeping survey of the law relat-
ing to the “modern state of war.” The
first edition, published in 1987, was then
reviewed by, among others, Professors
Howard Levie (American Journal of In-
ternational Law, vol. 83 [1989], p. 194)
and Leslie Green (Canadian Yearbook of
International Law [1988], p. 473), two
distinguished former holders of the
Stockton Chair of International Law at
the Naval War College. Both reviewers
identified numerous inaccuracies and
misreadings of source documents. The
second edition is intended to explore the
changing legal context of modern war-
fare since 1987. A reader interested in
this edition should first read the earlier
reviews. Regrettably, the representative
deficiencies pointed out by Levie and
Green still persist, and a fully balanced
discussion of particularly important legal
issues is lacking.
Typical errors left unchanged include
Detter’s erroneous position regarding
the treatment of prisoners of war. She
states that the 1949 “Geneva Convention
III on Prisoners of War specifies [in Ar-
ticle 4] that there need be no fighting for
the Convention to apply; it is sufficient
for persons to be captured.” There is no
such provision in the convention. Detter
also continues to assert that the conven-
tion provides that prisoners of war must
not be subjected to interrogation, be-
cause Article 17 obliges prisoners to pro-
vide only their name, rank, date of birth,
and serial number. Article 17, however,
then continues, proscribing physical or
mental torture, or any other form of co-
ercion, to secure information from pris-
oners of war. Interrogation short of such
prohibited actions is not prohibited by
the convention. While a prisoner of war
is required to give the identifying infor-
mation, international law does not pro-
hibit a prisoner from giving more than
this, nor a captor from seeking more
—so long as torture is not used.
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Astonishingly, Detter continues to insist
that the actions taken during the Korean
War never had authorization from the
United Nations. She states that the mili-
tary operations were only “a collective
security action of certain States, as there
was no actual UN authorization for the
action.” She asserts further that “the
troops operating under the aegis of the
United Nations in Korea may not have
been forces of the United Nations as the
decision to take action had been taken
without the vote of the former Soviet
Union, a permanent member of the UN
Security Council.” Detter continues,
“The units were probably troops of the
collective operation of the Western pow-
ers, but as such, detached from their re-
spective home States and placed under a
collective command which, at least on
an ad hoc basis, functioned as an inter-
national organization.”
As noted by Levie in his review, the le-
gally significant actions taken by the Se-
curity Council were in Resolution 1511
of 27 June 1950, calling on all members
to offer assistance to the Republic of
Korea, and Resolution 1588 of 7 July
1950, requesting that members offering
assistance do so through a unified com-
mand under the United States and au-
thorizing it to use the United Nations
flag. That the Soviet Union chose to boy-
cott Security Council meetings was sig-
nificant politically but not legally with
respect to the actions taken by the Secu-
rity Council in authorizing action under
Article 42 in Korea.
It is bewildering that Detter in the sec-
ond edition did not make the proper
corrections about both the Prisoner of
War Convention and the legal basis of
the Korean conflict, given the promi-
nence and qualifications of the earlier
critical reviewers.
The last passage above also illustrates
Detter’s distracting tendency to mix per-
sonal opinions with legal analysis, which
does little to present a balanced view of
the state of the law. In discussing the ba-
sis for intervention by Nato in Kosovo,
Detter describes Kosovo as “a province
of Yugoslavia which . . . sought, and de-
served” autonomy from Serbia. She ar-
gues that nonstate “groups” should be
allowed to adhere to treaties on the law
of war, reasoning that “it is important to
abolish the unequal idiosyncrasy that
States are bound by obligations under
the Law of War by treaties but groups,
because of their inequality, are not.”
Moreover, she states that “much has
been written about the ambit of article
2(4) of the United Nations Charter
[which prohibits the threat or use of
force by members in their relations with
each other]; there is above all an area of
doubt as to whether the article covers
economic force.” The issue whether eco-
nomic force is included in the Article
2(4) prohibition (it is not) was settled
long ago—it is not at all an area of
doubt.
Claiming that the second edition is in-
tended to incorporate changes since
1987, Detter provides disappointingly
little discussion on information opera-
tions. In less than two pages, she notes
that information technology has intro-
duced a new form of warfare and that
collateral damage to nonmilitary targets
is a risk of information operations.
Much more could have been presented
about when information operations con-
stitute a use of force under Article 2(4),
when a state may consider an informa-
tion attack an armed attack and respond
in self-defense under Article 51 of the
charter, or how the law regulating the
use of force applies to information
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operations. While little was written in
the late 1980s and early 1990s about the
international legal issues associated with
information operations, a cottage indus-
try on the topic has grown over the latter
part of the decade, and Detter’s book
suffers without a fuller discussion of this
topic.
Detter’s treatment of the law of naval
warfare is similarly incomplete. She fails
to include discussion of modern mari-
time interception operations beyond a
cursory mention of the coalition opera-
tions conducted in the Arabian Gulf
since 1991, and she only briefly covers
the UN-authorized operations in Haiti
and the Balkans. Although Nato’s opera-
tions in Kosovo are discussed at great
length in other parts of the book, Detter
does not address the vigorous debate
that ensued among Nato members about
the propriety of interdicting delivery of
refined oil intended for Yugoslavia.
Some Nato members believed that the
authority to do so was based on the bel-
ligerent right of visit and search, while
others claimed that Nato was not in-
volved in an international armed con-
flict, a predicate for the belligerent right.
With respect to maritime war zones,
Detter states that “defensive” war zones
are allowed if they do not extend for
more than twelve miles offshore and are
effectively supervised, while “offensive”
zones, in which merchant ships are sunk,
are illegal even if warnings are provided.
Both these statements are patently
wrong. Customary international law
provides that within the immediate area
of naval operations, a belligerent may es-
tablish special restrictions on the activi-
ties of neutral vessels and aircraft and may
prohibit altogether such vessels and air-
craft from entering the area. The “immedi-
ate area” or vicinity of naval operations is
that area within which hostilities are
taking place or belligerent forces are ac-
tually operating. Such an area could ex-
ceed twelve miles and could also be in
some location other than near the shore
of one belligerent. Additionally, while
merchant shipping generally enjoys
greater protection from targeting than
enemy warships, it is not an absolute
protection. Under particularly defined
exceptions, merchant shipping is liable
to being targeted by a belligerent.
Detter also concludes, concerning the
torpedoing of the Argentine cruiser
General Belgrano by the submarine HMS
Conqueror when both were outside the
British total-exclusion zone during the
Falklands War, that it was “highly ques-
tionable whether the sinking was com-
patible with international law, especially
as the [warship] was heading for its
home base and posed no threat to the
British armed forces.” This too is a mis-
statement of the law. Generally, enemy
warships are subject to attack, destruc-
tion, or capture anywhere beyond neu-
tral territory. Thus the sinking of
Belgrano, even beyond the declared Brit-
ish total exclusion zone, was a legitimate
act of war.
Conspicuously absent from Detter’s as-
sessment of the law of naval warfare is
any citation or reference to the Interna-
tional Institute on Humanitarian Law’s
Manual on International Law Applicable
to Armed Conflict at Sea (the San Remo
Manual). The San Remo Manual, issued
in 1994 and published in 1995, is a con-
temporary restatement of the law applica-
ble to armed conflicts at sea. It was
compiled by a panel of international law
experts from various countries as an at-
tempt to restate the customary and treaty
law of naval warfare. It is not binding au-
thority on states, but it is nonetheless
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persuasive evidence of the current law.
The United States does not agree with
every provision in the manual, nor does
any other state. Still, it is a fundamental
source document that must be consid-
ered in any discussion of the law of naval
warfare. As such, it is inexcusable of
Detter not to cite it. Failing to do so de-
tracts greatly from the text. Using the
manual would have provided balance,
and familiarity with it should have
helped to avoid the errors described.
In Leslie Green’s review of Detter’s first
edition, he concluded that “regrettably,
it can hardly be said that Dr. Detter De
Lupis’ Law of War provides the reader
with any real practical account of ‘the
body of rules which regulates relation-
ships in war.’ ” Levie, after devastatingly
recounting the representative errors and
inaccuracies in the first edition, left to
the reader to judge “whether [these er-
rors] are important or unimportant,
could a political leader or a military
commander accept and rely on advice
based upon this volume as authority?”
Unfortunately, the passage of more than
ten years and the addition of new infor-
mation do not warrant improving these
two assessments of  Detter’s The Law of
War. Like the first edition, the second is
not a very useful book if one is looking
for a basic understanding of the law of
war, nor is it helpful in advancing the
development of that law.
GREG O’BRIEN
Commander, JAGC, USN
Naval War College
Podvig, Pavel, ed. Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces.
Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2001. 692pp. $45
This comprehensive encyclopedia of all
Russian (and Soviet) nuclear weapons
systems deserves attention not only be-
cause all earlier versions were confis-
cated by the Russian Security Service
(FSB) but because it is a complete and
authoritative chronology of the weap-
ons, warheads, and delivery systems that
enabled the Soviet Union to achieve “su-
perpower” status. Authored by Russian
physicists and mathematicians using
only unclassified data bases, the book
tells the “official” story of how Soviet
and Russian bureaucracies built the
world’s most fearsome nuclear arsenal
from World War II until the mid-1990s.
Organized by function and military ser-
vices, the story is easy to follow for a
reader reasonably conversant with the
systems and willing to plow through
tables and specifications. The book’s ob-
jective, clinical, and dispassionate treat-
ment is both its strongest and weakest
point. It presents all the facts. The data
presented in the tables and notes proba-
bly could not have been fabricated at this
level of detail. However, the book makes
no judgments or any effort to place its
contents in political context.
The chapter on the Soviet navy details
how technology shaped strategy. The de-
velopment of the R-29 sea-launched bal-
listic missile (Nato’s SS-N-8) and the
Project 667B (Nato’s Delta I) submarine
put the Soviet ballistic submarine force
within range of its American targets
while remaining in the “bastions” of
the ice-covered regions of the Arctic,
thus obviating the need for the “Yankee
patrols” (by Yankee-type submarines
carrying SS-N-6 missiles). With only
one-third of the range of the SS-N-8,
the SS-N-6 missile was a threat only
when it was brought near the U.S. coast,
where the submarine could be constantly
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targeted by antisubmarine warfare
forces. American naval strategists of this
era can take satisfaction in having cor-
rectly postulated that the central purpose
of the entire Soviet navy was to support
the submerged missile forces, particu-
larly the Deltas and their successors near
the Soviet coasts.
The authors dispassionately and authori-
tatively document the eventual decay of
the Soviet land-based and sea-based stra-
tegic nuclear edifice. Perhaps this is why
the FSB has declared the book a work of
espionage. In fact, one of its authors,
Igor Sutyagin, was arrested and held on
charges related to his research for the
book. Yet it is cold comfort even for an
American reader to note the degenera-
tion of the Russian early-warning satel-
lite system or the pollution hazard
caused by the way in which the nuclear
submarine fleet was deactivated.
The table on nuclear testing provides a
keen insight into the mindset of the So-
viet decision-making elite, as well as the
efficacy of focused, centralized planning.
The sheer size of the program and its
reckless disregard for the environment
persuasively show the political power of
the Soviet nuclear-industrial complex.
The hundred pages devoted to this pro-
gram make clear its importance. Of par-
ticular note, the Soviets conducted 135
nuclear explosions for industrial or
other “peaceful” purposes. In fact, the
Lazurit explosion of 1974 moved enough
earth to form a dam.
The authors offer no apologies for the
huge building programs or for the Soviet
Union’s unabashed desire to prevail in
the Cold War arms race. While the book
is not overtly political, one senses that
the authors believe the governmental
pronouncements justifying the building
or destruction of each weapon. They
make numerous allusions to the Soviet
desire to adhere to international agree-
ments, and to American perfidy as forcing
the Soviets to build all of this weaponry.
There is sadness in the discussion of the
demise of the Russian strategic program,
brought about by the dire economic sit-
uation facing Russia and the loss of So-
viet republics as newly independent
states, and with them the Soviet test
ranges.
Nonetheless, this book should not be
read for its political message. It is a well
referenced storehouse of knowledge on
Soviet strategic systems, useful to re-
searchers and historians alike. Against its
own standards, it is a remarkable
accomplishment.
TOM FEDYSZYN
Naval War College
Lowenthal, Mark M. Intelligence: From Secrets to
Policy. Washington, D.C.: CQ Quarterly, 1999.
264pp. $28.95
Mark Lowenthal’s professed intent in
writing this book was to fulfill the need
for an introductory text for students of
intelligence. He is well qualified to do so,
having devoted more than twenty years
in the executive and legislative branches
of government as an intelligence official
and as an adjunct professor in graduate
programs at Columbia and George
Washington Universities. (He is now the
vice chairman of the National Intelli-
gence Council for Evaluation.) The re-
sulting work is much more than an
introductory textbook; it is a trove of
valuable information and insights rang-
ing from the basic concepts and defini-
tions of intelligence to a thorough
examination of the intelligence process.
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Thus not only is this an excellent text-
book on the basics of intelligence and
ideal for a course in Intelligence 101, but
it is also an interesting and informative
examination of intelligence and na-
tional security disciplines, one that
would be of interest and value to na-
tional security “old-timers.”
This book addresses the fundamental is-
sue of what “intelligence” is and what it
is not, and it offers a detailed examina-
tion of the processes involved in the
practice of intelligence—collection disci-
plines, analysis, counterintelligence, co-
vert action, the role of the policy maker,
oversight and accountability, and the
ethical and moral issues generated by
intelligence practice. Lowenthal provides
an abbreviated but enlightening history
of the development of the U.S. intelli-
gence community, as well as a summary
of significant historical intelligence de-
velopments since the creation of the Co-
ordinator of Information and the Office
of Strategic Services during World War
II. There is not only a helpful examina-
tion of the structure of the U.S. intelli-
gence community (with the obligatory
wiring diagrams) but also an interesting
description of the relationships between
and among the players in the commu-
nity, including the important stake-
holders in the budgetary process.
Throughout the book, Lowenthal has in-
serted sidebars containing brief descrip-
tions and vignettes summarizing the
more detailed material in the text; these
add a certain panache to the work. He
also discusses historical examples of in-
telligence successes and failures, to illus-
trate the various concepts and insights
he has mentioned. At the end of each
chapter Lowenthal lists “key terms”
unique to the profession, as well as addi-
tional readings. He has also included the
key provisions of the National Security
Act of 1947, Executive Order 12333, and
the Senate resolution that established the
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence;
all these are helpful for ready reference.
Lowenthal provides an interesting and
valuable examination of the “syndromes”
that sometimes affect the analyst, result-
ing in a faulty analysis and product.
Most interesting is the “mirror-imaging”
syndrome, in which the analyst errone-
ously presumes that other states will act
in the same way as the United States
would—Pearl Harbor is a classic exam-
ple. Throughout the book, Lowenthal
emphasizes the importance of the role of
the policy maker and the fact that the
purpose of intelligence is to support the
policy makers who run the government.
He also notes the converse responsibility
of policy makers to provide clear and
unambiguous requirements to the intel-
ligence community.
In his chapter on covert action,
Lowenthal characterizes these activities
as “something between the states of
peace and war.” That may not be entirely
accurate, since covert action may consist
entirely of nonforcible measures. Never-
theless, his description of the covert-
action process and his examination of
the ethical issues that are raised in con-
nection with it are right on the mark.
However, one would have liked a bit
more discussion on what does not consti-
tute covert action. For example, section
503(e)(2) of the National Security Act of
1947 exempts “traditional military activ-
ities” from the definition of covert ac-
tion, while in the Senate Report on the
1991 Intelligence Authorization Act, the
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
went to some length to describe those
activities, including “almost every use of
uniformed military forces . . . whether or
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not the U.S. sponsorship of such activi-
ties is apparent or later to be acknowl-
edged publicly.” More along these lines
would perhaps reveal that policy makers
have quite a bit more flexibility in re-
sponding to overseas events and that
covert action is not the only option be-
tween inaction and the overt use of
force. But this is a mere quibble.
In sum, Lowenthal has written an out-
standing primer on intelligence, the in-
telligence process, and the intelligence
community.
W. H. DALTON
Department of Defense
Associate Deputy General Counsel, Intelligence
Lerner, Mitchell B., The Pueblo Incident: A Spy
Ship and the Failure of American Foreign Policy.
Lawrence: Univ. Press of Kansas, 2002. 320pp.
$34.95
Finally, an author has done a hard-
hitting analysis of the USS Pueblo inci-
dent of January 1968. Mitchell B. Lerner,
an assistant professor of history at Ohio
State University, does not exonerate the
commanding officer of the Pueblo, Com-
mander Lloyd M. Bucher, for giving up
the ship and crew, and the intelligence it
had gathered. However, of all those who
may have been culpable, Commander
Bucher emerges a hero and is no longer
the scapegoat his superiors made him
out to be. Exhaustive research, including
access to new information released from
the Lyndon Johnson White House files,
leads Lerner to place blame evenly on the
shoulders of the Navy chain of command,
the intelligence community, and Johnson’s
foreign policy advisors, due to their mis-
understanding and underestimation of
the North Korean–Soviet Union
relationship.
Lerner asserts that the intelligence col-
lection effort, code-named Operation
CLICKBEETLE, was the idea of the Na-
tional Security Agency and that it had
been patterned after the efforts of the
Soviet Union’s intelligence-collection
ships (AGIs) off the coast of the United
States. Deciding that the Navy should be
the operational commander for this stra-
tegic tasking, the National Security
Agency turned the program over to it.
Converting tired, old, and slow cargo
ships into intelligence collection plat-
forms with insufficient money, inade-
quate self-defense, little more than fresh
coats of paint, minimal training, and in-
adequate safeguards for the sensitive in-
telligence equipment on board, the Navy
mismanaged the effort from the outset.
The maladies that befell the USS Liberty
in 1967 off the coast of Israel were re-
peated in the preparation and tasking of
Pueblo just seven months later off the
Korean Peninsula.
The USS Pueblo had been tasked to collect
signals intelligence in the Sea of Japan us-
ing the “cover” of conducting hydro-
graphic research. The operation had been
deemed to be of minimal risk, based on
the analogy of the Soviet AGIs. Lerner
contends that whenever an AGI violated
territorial waters, the U.S. Navy would
turn it around with an admonishment
and no more. Would not the North Ko-
reans do the same? Herein rested the
Navy’s greatest miscalculation. The Ko-
reans were not the puppets of the Soviet
Union or its foreign policy executors.
Lerner goes to great lengths to take the
reader inside the mind of Kim Il Sung
and his vision of communism and the
greater glory of the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea.
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Shortly after the operation got under
way, the North Korean navy reacted
with surprise and precision. Com-
mander Bucher, armed only with a few
.50-caliber machine guns aboard his
slow vessel, surrendered the Pueblo after
stalling his pursuers for only sixty-five
minutes. Inadequate destruction equip-
ment and too much unnecessary classi-
fied material on board led to an
intelligence coup for North Korea. One
U. S. sailor lost his life during the short
resistance. The defensive cover that was
to have been provided by the Navy and
the Air Force in response to calls from
the Pueblo never came. The Navy and
the Johnson administration missed all
the indications and warnings that such a
fate could befall the Pueblo, even after
recognizing that the Pyongyang regime
had violated the demilitarized zone more
than fifty times, ambushed U.S and al-
lied ground forces, attempted to assassi-
nate the president of the Republic of
Korea (with a secondary target to be the
American embassy), and in the preced-
ing nine months seized twenty South
Korean fishing vessels for “entering
North Korean territorial waters.”
Lerner then brings the reader briefly into
the brutal interrogation rooms of the
communist regime and the eleven-
month negotiations that finally resulted
in the release of the crew in December
1968. Kim Il Sung used the captured ves-
sel and its crew to further his domestic
agenda and drive for greater national-
ism. His negotiators remained steadfast
in their demands that the United States
admit that the Pueblo had violated North
Korea’s territorial waters—it had not—
and that the American government
apologize to the citizens of North Korea
and assure Kim Il Sung that the viola-
tions would never happen again.
Meanwhile, President Johnson could not
negotiate the return of the crew without
considering a host of broader interna-
tional considerations, most notably the
war in Vietnam. Lerner concisely weaves
together the competing national foreign
policy objectives to ensure that South
Korea remained an active ally in South
Vietnam while simultaneously keeping the
United States out of another conflict on
the Korean Peninsula.
While negotiations dragged on, there
was little interest from the American
public: the increasingly unpopular Viet-
nam War, the struggle for civil rights,
the campaign for the equal rights for
women, two political assassinations, and
the decision of the incumbent president
to forgo a second term all diverted the
attention of the American public and
relegated the Pueblo negotiations to the
back pages of the newspapers and in
most cases erased them altogether.
Lerner presents such a thorough expla-
nation of the entire incident that it is
unnecessary to belabor here the findings
of the Navy’s court of inquiry. This im-
portant historical analysis provides the
reader with a better understanding of the
impact of seemingly harmless operations
on the conduct of foreign policy. More
importantly, the book demonstrates the
critical importance of intelligence collec-
tion, analysis of indications and warn-
ings, and the effects that ignoring such
crucial information may have on not
only fighting forces but the nation’s
interests.
DANIEL J. BRENNOCK
Captain, U.S. Navy
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Freeman, Gregory A. Sailors to the End: The Deadly
Fire on the USS Forrestal and the Heroes Who
Fought It. New York: William Morrow, 2002.
293pp. $25.95
Since its release in 1973, the training film
Trial by Fire has been seen by hundreds
of thousands of officers and sailors dur-
ing mandatory shipboard firefighting
training—training improved in no small
part by the lessons learned from the
Forrestal tragedy. Undoubtedly many
(this reviewer among them) have won-
dered what it must have been like to
have been on the Forrestal that hot July
day in 1967 when the crew fought to
save their ship. Through interviews with
survivors, relatives of victims, and the
meticulous mining of official U.S. Navy
files, Gregory Freeman, former Associ-
ated Press reporter turned freelance
journalist, seeks to capture the human
emotions of the day and explore the
question of why this tragedy happened.
Weaving a thoroughly engaging, often
riveting tale as seen through the eyes of
selected Forrestal sailors, Freeman fully
meets his remit while describing the role
that chance played that day in selecting
who would live and who would die. He
concludes, justly, that this was a tragedy
that need not have happened, and in doing
so he focuses on a causal factor—World
War II–era thousand-pound bombs—
that has been less fully recognized until
now.
The book is divided into three major
sections. The first six chapters introduce
the Forrestal crewmen who play key roles
in Freeman’s story. For the civilian
reader, this section will serve as a primer
to life in the U.S. Navy in general, and to
duty onboard an aircraft carrier specifi-
cally.  It is also in this section that the
few flaws in the book are found. Perhaps
invisible to the layman, errors—such as
calling a commander a “high-ranking
enlisted man” or stating that “landing
without killing anybody or causing dam-
age usually got you an OK grade” (gen-
erations of aviators wish it were so)—
will jump out at the informed reader.
While small, the errors do distract from
an otherwise meticulously researched
book.
The next eight chapters form the heart of
the book. Here Freeman accelerates the
pace, using literary snapshots taken
through the eyes of the crew members to
build an appreciation of the tension and
fear felt on board the carrier that day. At
1051 on 29 July 1967, a Zuni air-to-
ground rocket fired from an F-4 Phan-
tom near the aft end of the flight deck,
knocking off a fuel tank hung beneath an
A-4 Skyhawk among Air Wing 17 air-
craft preparing for a major strike in Viet-
nam. While certainly unexpected, the
initial response to the Zuni launch and
the resultant fire was by the book—a sit-
uation that changed dramatically with
the explosion (just ninety-four seconds
later) of the first thousand-pound bomb.
In stark and realistic terms Freeman de-
scribes the efforts over the next twenty
hours of Captain John Beling and his
well-meaning but inexperienced crew to
ensure that their ship would survive.
These 150 pages are exceptionally engag-
ing and so successful in capturing the
stress and emotion of the crisis that they
grab readers and leave them emotionally
exhausted. In particular, the description
of the death of sailor James Blaskis in a
remote and inaccessible part of the ship
cannot leave a reader unmoved. One
hundred thirty-three other Forrestal
crew members and air wing personnel
were killed; many died heroically.
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The final three-chapter section deals
with the aftermath. The cause of the fire
must be investigated, answers found,
survivors treated, the dead buried, and
the ship re-find its soul. Freeman de-
scribes well the aftermath of the tragedy
and the difficulty finding the truth when
some of the men had become primarily
concerned with themselves.
In the end the official causes were deter-
mined. Independently, two shipboard
groups had each bypassed one of two
in-place safety features, confident that
the other would suffice. Additionally,
obsolete and less fire-resistant bombs
had been transferred to Forrestal and
loaded on the attack aircraft that morn-
ing—a point not fully explored previ-
ously. While no specific personal blame
was assigned, without the negative syn-
ergy created by the convergence of these
three decisions this would most likely
have been just another unremarkable
and short-lived flight-deck fire.
JAMES E. HICKEY
Commander, U.S. Navy
Naval War College
Weir, Gary E. An Ocean in Common: American
Naval Officers, Scientists, and the Ocean Environ-
ment. College Station: Texas A&M Univ. Press,
2001. 403pp. $44.95
Gary Weir has scored another hit. Using
the approach he fashioned in Forged in
War: The Naval-Industrial Complex and
American Submarine Construction,
1940–1961, the head of the Contempo-
rary Branch of the Naval Historical Cen-
ter has turned his keen analytical mind
and sharp sense of political realism to
the linked topics of the U.S. Navy and
the practical science of oceanography.
The book is divided into three chrono-
logical segments: from World War I to
1940, the Second World War, and the
Cold War up to the administration of
President John F. Kennedy. In each of
these eras the submarine exerted a trans-
forming impact on naval strategy and
operations. The revolution began in
1914, when the U-boat explosively dem-
onstrated the magnitude of its threat to
the security of transatlantic shipping and
to the political survival of Great Britain.
The German undersea offensive and the
resultant Anglo-American antisubma-
rine warfare (ASW) forcibly introduced
an unwelcome third dimension into
combat at sea, the comprehension of
which exceeded the professional and
technological competence of even the
best-educated American naval officers.
The massive, opaque, and largely un-
charted subsurface domain could be
mastered as a theater for warfare only if
the Navy enlisted the expertise of ocean-
ographers, who themselves represented
little more than a loosely organized
multidisciplinary specialty operating on
the fringe of institutional academic re-
spectability. If the Navy needed their ex-
pertise in order to fight underwater, the
oceanographers needed the Navy’s fund-
ing in order to prosper in academe.
Weir begins his analysis of the subma-
rine as the deus ex machina of twentieth
century, oceanographically determined
maritime warfare with a New York
meeting on antisubmarine warfare
chaired by the inventor Thomas Alva
Edison in March 1917. The specialists at
the gathering, Weir writes, “concluded
that underwater sound and echo ranging
offered the most promising avenue of
exploration for ASW scientists in the war
effort. Physics and physical oceanogra-
phy thus immediately became vital to
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the national war effort.”  As a result, the
characteristics of sound transmission be-
neath the surface of the oceans, espe-
cially the effects exerted by thermal
layers, became the focus of scientific re-
search sponsored by the Navy. By 1918
the resulting underwater sound-sensing
and transmission systems had “helped
keep the U-boats at bay.”
World War I ended less than two years
after the United States entered, and for a
few years thereafter it seemed as if the war-
time spirit of cooperation in the naval-
scientific inquiry into oceanography’s
utility to naval warfare would continue.
However, the Republican era was a time
of American isolationism and naval re-
trenchment, and by 1924 the budgetary
axe had decapitated the fledgling naval-
scientific hybrid. A revival of the joint ef-
fort by scientists and the Navy did not
come until 1940, but not until the attack
on Pearl Harbor did the fiscal floodgates
of defense spending on such topics truly
swing open.
In the Second World War the final form
of American naval oceanography began
to emerge. Just as the submarine is the
weapons system around which Weir
weaves his story, his concept of a cul-
tural clash between naval officers and
scientists constitutes his institutional or
political theme. Still, as Weir points out,
“Effective submariners and ASW officers
soon realized that applied oceanography
improved a ship’s chance of survival and
increased the likelihood that crew-
members would again see their families
after a difficult North Atlantic convoy or
a submarine patrol near the Japanese
home islands.” Besides patriotic motiva-
tion, the scientists hoped that memory
of “the profitable wartime application
of oceanography and the lives spared
in combat would induce the Navy to
become the generous patron” of postwar
oceanography.
That was how it turned out, but only
because the unanticipated Soviet sub-
marine threat provided an irresistible
impetus for many shrewd oceanogra-
phers and some astute naval officers
who served as the “translators” between
their respective cultures. The two
groups cooperated for mutual and na-
tional benefit in the Cold War, but the
cultures of the warrior and the scientist
remained as separate as oil in water.
Their testimonials were parallel, not
unified—the invincibility of U.S. fast-
attack and fleet ballistic missile subma-
rines for the Navy, and the intellectual
fecundity of the Woods Hole Oceano-
graphic Institution and the Scripps In-
stitution of Oceanography for science.
This book is not light reading, but it is
invaluable to every serious student of
naval strategy, weapons systems, and the
marine environment that shapes and
limits modern warfare at sea.
KENNETH J. HAGAN
Naval War College
Monterey Program
Krug, Hans-Joachim, et al. Reluctant Allies: Ger-
man-Japanese Naval Relations in World War II.
Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2001.
456pp. $38.95
With the exception of Carl Boyd, John
Chapman, Gerhard Krebbs, and Bernd
Martin, historians have largely ignored
German-Japanese relations in general
and naval relations in particular. (A
further exception would be Werner
Rahn; see his “Japan and Germany,
1941–1943: No Common Objective, No
Common Plans, No Basis of Trust,” in
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the Summer 1993 issue of this journal.)
That gap in the literature has now been
filled by this collection of essays by four
eminent German and Japanese naval of-
ficers and historians: Hans-Joachim
Krug, Yôichi Hirama, Berthold J.
Sander-Nagashima, and Axel Niestlé.
Each contributes from his research spe-
cialty, and the product is a welcome re-
examination of a “missed opportunity”
based on sources in British, German,
Japanese, and U.S. archives.
Part I consists of a historical overview
and analysis of German-Japanese naval
cooperation by Captain Krug, German
Navy, and Admiral Hirama, Japan Mari-
time Self-Defense Force. Their message
is straightforward—there never existed
real cooperation between Berlin and
Tokyo, as each side was intent merely to
use the other to further its own power-
political agenda. This is as true for the
Anti-Comintern Pact of November 1936
as it is for the follow-up Agreement for
Cultural Cooperation of November
1939. Various technical, joint, and mili-
tary affairs committees were eventually
formed, mainly for “propaganda pur-
poses”; they never met before Pearl Har-
bor and thereafter only “for protocol
and courtesy.” The result was a “reluc-
tant” alliance. In August 1939 Adolph
Hitler did not tell the Japanese of Ger-
many’s nonaggression pact with the
Soviet Union until two days before its
signing. In April 1941 Hitler refused to
inform the visiting Japanese foreign
minister, Yosuke Matsuoka, of his deci-
sion to invade the Soviet Union.
Matsuoka, in turn, did not inform the
Germans that on his way home he would
sign a neutrality pact with the Soviets.
The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor
came as a complete surprise to the Ger-
mans. Hastily arranged joint warfare
agreements among the three Axis powers
on 11 December 1941 and 18 January
1942 brought few concrete measures.
Much of the book rests on the detailed
radio transmissions of the German naval
attachés in Tokyo, Admiral Paul
Wenneker and Captain Joachim
Lietzmann. These show that even in the
area of possible joint operations in the
Indian and Pacific Oceans, there was
mutual mistrust and jealousy. This
stemmed from lack of prior cooperation,
racial arrogance (by both sides), linguis-
tic difficulties, and especially the fact
that German auxiliary merchant cruisers
and submarines had to diesel more than
thirteen thousand miles across a hun-
dred degrees of longitude en route to the
Far East. Admiral Karl Dönitz reduced
the cargo capacity of U-boats by insist-
ing that they carry full loads of torpe-
does; he refused to share German
weapons and equipment technology
with the Japanese until August 1944, and
then only at Hitler’s insistence. In the
Indian Ocean, the one place where Ger-
man and Japanese naval forces might
have been able to coordinate operations,
nothing of the sort eventuated.
Part II, by Sander-Nagashima, a German
naval officer and historian, fleshes out
much of the above. Sander-Nagashima
first analyzes the command structure of
both navies and then examines technical
and personnel matters (“Cooperation
with Caution”). He is especially critical
of German duplicity in continuing to
supply Chiang Kai-shek with military
material in large quantities and in build-
ing submarines for China, stating that
they were for Germany—in the process
“purposefully fooling the befriended
Japanese.” Perhaps in return, the Japa-
nese refused to give direct help to Ger-
man warships in the Far East; supplies,
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until 22 June 1941, had to be shipped via
the Trans-Siberian Railroad. In the final
analysis, Sander-Nagashima concludes,
naval cooperation between the two allies
was restricted to “the limitation of the
operational zones through 70 degrees
east longitude.”
Part III, written by Niestlé, a business-
man and author of numerous works on
German U-boats, details the meager lo-
gistical exchanges between Berlin and
Tokyo. In terms of passengers traveling
by transport ship, a mere twenty-one
people went from Europe to Japan, and
not quite nine hundred from the Far
East to Europe; by submarine, the totals
are ninety-six and eighty-nine, respec-
tively. In terms of material exchanges, in
1941–42 Japan shipped 104,233 tons to
Germany, of which 19,200 were lost; in
1942–43 half the 104,700 tons shipped
was lost. Of the goods shipped in both
directions by submarines, only between
20 and 40 percent ever arrived. While
the Germans were anxious for deliveries
of rubber and precious metals, the Japa-
nese requested industrial products, tech-
nical equipment, and chemical goods.
Part IV consists of a conclusion by
Sander-Nagashima.
My criticisms of this superb work are
but two. First, the fact that it has four
authors writing separate sections has re-
sulted in a good deal of overlap, retelling
various aspects of the story. Second, the
title does not do the book justice; it was
hardly a “reluctant” alliance but rather a
hollow, empty, or wasted one.
HOLGER H. HERWIG
University of Calgary
Herwig, Holger H., and David J. Bercuson. The
Destruction of the Bismarck. Overlook, N.Y.: Over-
look Press, 2001. 314pp. $35
Rhys-Jones, Graham. The Loss of the Bismarck: An
Avoidable Disaster. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Insti-
tute Press, 2000. 272pp. $32.95
During the early evening hours of 22
May 1941, the German battleship Bis-
marck departed Bergen, Norway, to face
the might of the Royal Navy with only
the heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen in com-
pany. It was to be the battleship’s first
and only operational deployment. Five
days later, the ship went down with over
a thousand of its crew.
Considered then to be the world’s most
powerful battleship, Bismarck entered
the Atlantic when Britain was stretched
almost to the breaking point. With the
critical Battle of the Atlantic hanging in
the balance, the pursuit and sinking of
Bismarck was one of the war’s most dra-
matic episodes; many books and a movie
were dedicated to it. Those early works,
written mostly within twenty years after
the war, focused almost entirely on the
operation itself. None devoted attention
to the strategies, political aspects, or
operational and politico-strategic back-
grounds that shaped the battleship’s de-
ployment and the Allied responses to it.
That void has now been filled by the
two books under review, The Destruc-
tion of the Bismarck, by Holger Herwig
and David Bercuson, and The Loss of the
Bismarck: An Avoidable Disaster, by Gra-
ham Rhys-Jones. Both books bring new
information and fresh perspectives to
the tale, putting Bismarck’s operation in
its strategic context. In doing so, the au-
thors highlight the strategic impact of
the potential outcomes of Operation
RHINE, the code name for Bismarck’s
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sortie. Perhaps more importantly, these
books expose the domestic political, the
operational, and the military-strategic
considerations that drove much of the
protagonists’ decision making. The books,
however, differ in their approaches.
Holger H. Herwig and David J. Bercuson
are prominent, widely published histori-
ans who coauthored an earlier book on
an Atlantic Ocean engagement in World
War II. Prior to their recent collabora-
tions, they had specialized in German
naval history and Canadian military his-
tory, respectively. Both live and teach in
Canada, and for the most part they write
from a western Atlantic perspective; as a
result they have incorporated U.S. plan-
ning and activities related to Bismarck’s
deployment and how U.S. naval opera-
tions affected the planning of the Ger-
man navy’s commander, Grand Admiral
Erich Raeder—a heretofore unexplored
topic. They also provide detailed, com-
prehensive treatment of the domestic
political considerations behind Raeder’s
thinking and the staff’s response to his
direction and requirements, recounting
the German naval staff’s extensive objec-
tions to Operation RHINE, its timing,
and the results of their predeployment
gaming of the operation. The book then
shifts to a lively but traditional narrative
of the battleship’s deployment and loss.
The Loss of the Bismarck takes a more
Euro-centric view of the battleship’s de-
ployment, focusing on the overall Anglo-
German strategic picture, with special
emphasis on Russia and the Mediterra-
nean. Moreover, it presents the pursuit
and engagement of Bismarck from a naval
command perspective, highlighting the
operational picture, available to the
commanders on both sides. The con-
tending naval doctrines and missions are
explained and provide context to the
decisions made and executed at the time.
The book reflects the background of its
author, Graham Rhys-Jones, a retired
Royal Navy officer whose career spanned
from ship’s operations to strategic naval
planning. He is not without academic
credentials, however, for he both at-
tended and taught at the U.S. Naval War
College. (See Graham Rhys-Jones’s “The
Loss of the Bismarck: Who Was to
Blame?” in the Winter 1992 issue of this
journal.) His combined academic, plan-
ning, and operational background en-
ables him to provide an operational
context for the battleship’s destruction.
More importantly, he demonstrates how
Germany’s and Britain’s lessons learned
in previous twentieth-century naval op-
erations shaped their actions in and re-
sponses to Operation RHINE.
The Loss of the Bismarck contends that
Admiral Raeder was a man totally
wedded to the idea of major surface
combatants operating as “raiders,”
attacking an enemy’s ocean commerce.
Raeder’s naval vision called for “surface
raiding groups” operating on the high
seas, powerful enough to overwhelm
most convoy escorts but fast enough to
escape fleet engagements. The two-ship
Bismarck class was to be Germany’s
initial post–World War I class of battle-
ships; the Bismarck and Tirpitz were
designed with the raiding mission in
mind. These ships were fast and
powerful and had a long cruising range
but were of a design that essentially rep-
resented an update of late World War I
practices. The never-built follow-on H
class was to have been the primary class
of German battleships, optimized for
raiding operations against the full range
of modern naval threats. Unfortunately
for Admiral Raeder, the war started too
soon for his dream battleships to be
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built, and the war’s early operations
found the much cheaper U-boats
enjoying far more success at commerce
raiding than his surface ships. He saw
the prospects for his “surface raiding
groups” retreating into the background.
This feeling was reinforced in 1941 by
the need to transfer nearly half of his
carefully husbanded fuel reserves to the
German army for the invasion of Yugo-
slavia and Greece and the planned
invasion of the Soviet Union, as well as
the sudden requirement to supply fuel to
the oil-starved Italian navy. His hopes
were revived, however, in late March
1941 when Vice Admiral Gunther
Lütjens returned from Operation
BERLIN, a surface-raiding sortie
involving the two battle cruisers Scharn-
horst and Gneisenau that destroyed over
115,000 tons of British shipping. Em-
boldened by Lütjens’s success and
believing that the future of his surface
ships was at stake, Raeder ordered an
almost immediate Bismarck deployment,
despite his staff’s and Lütjens’s objec-
tions and the lack of supporting forces.
From that point, Rhys-Jones depicts the
operational picture available to the re-
spective commanders, from Britain’s
Commander in Chief Home Fleet, Ad-
miral John Tovey, and Admiral Raeder
down their chains of command to the
commanders at the scene. What follows
is a chess game in which the reader sees
what the commanders saw, and (unlike
in previously published books) under-
stands why those commanders acted as
they did and how those actions affected
the overall operation. It is a revealing
and fascinating look into the fog of naval
war.
Thus the reasons for the decisions of
Admiral Lancelot Ernest Holland aboard
HMS Hood become more apparent, as
do the tactical and operational impacts
of those decisions on the other players,
such as Admiral William Wake-Walker
aboard the cruiser HMS Norfolk, trailing
the Bismarck and Prinz Eugen. Britain’s
naval operations and heavy losses
around Crete, the German invasion of
which was under way concurrently with
Operation RHINE, were weighing heavily
on British commanders. They could not
afford a mistake in either the Mediterra-
nean or the Atlantic. German decision
making was hampered by inconsistent
and unintegrated intelligence support,
and it was inhibited by a complex naval
command structure in which Vice Ad-
miral Lütjens worked for no less than
three admirals in seven days—Admiral
Raeder and Admiral Saalwächter, who
coordinated operations in the Atlantic,
and Admiral Carls, who was responsible
for naval operations in the North and
Norwegian Seas. Neither country’s navy
executed its respective intentions per-
fectly, but postoperational analysis indi-
cates that the British had at least learned
their World War I lessons better. They
also then applied the lessons of Opera-
tion RHINE more effectively to their
post-1941 operations.
Both books provide an insightful, bal-
anced, and fascinatingly fresh treatment
of a well reported naval event, and they
complement each other well. In addition
to the revelations discussed above, both
expose design and equipment problems
that reduced Bismarck’s readiness and
combat effectiveness, but Loss of the Bis-
marck does better with the faults of Brit-
ish ship designs. Both show how ULTRA
contributed indirectly to Bismarck’s de-
struction, but once again Rhys-Jones ap-
plies the naval context better; more
importantly, he presents the German
intelligence picture, highlighting the
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impact of Germany’s failure to integrate
its intelligence. However, Rhys-Jones all
but ignores America’s involvement and
fails to include much of the German ma-
terials that detail the political factors
driving Admiral Raeder and explain the
naval staff’s objections to executing Op-
eration RHINE in May 1941. Neither
book tells the story completely; but if
one must choose, The Loss of the Bis-
marck provides a better naval story,
while The Destruction of the Bismarck
provides the better strategic treatment.
CARL O. SCHUSTER
Captain, U.S. Navy, Retired
Kailua, Hawaii
Strachan, Hew. The First World War: To Arms.
New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2001. 1,127pp.
$39.95
What began as a single-volume replace-
ment of Oxford University Press’s
long-running World War I survey (A
History of the Great War, by C. R. M. F.
Cruttwell [1934]) has, in Hew Strachan’s
hands, burgeoned into three mammoth
volumes, of which this is the first. The
second, we are told, will cover the years
1915 and 1916 and will be called No
Quarter. The third and final volume, en-
titled Fall Out (reader be warned that the
first volume has been in the making
since 1989), will pick up in the winter of
1916 and push through to the end of the
war.
Since this first volume alone runs to
1,127 pages, readers will want to know
how this book differs from an already
crowded field. The answer is that it looks
at topics—origins, war planning, tactics,
munitions crises, morale—in a broad
comparative context. No blundering
great power is unfairly singled out.
As is obvious from the subtitle, the
book is about the origins of the war,
mobilization, and opening campaigns.
To rephrase what has already been writ-
ten many times over by battalions of
historians is no easy task, but Strachan
rises to the challenge. Better yet, he
works through all the latest literature
in English, French, and German to pro-
vide the most up-to-date interpretation
of the war’s outbreak. In common with
most historians, Strachan points to the
shakiness of the German Empire and its
nervous quest for status and security as
the main causes of the war. A chief
abettor was Austria-Hungary, whose
own military had become so enfeebled
by the continuous Vienna-Budapest
budget skirmishes that war in 1914 ap-
peared the only way to rally the monar-
chy behind a much-needed program of
rearmament. Similar calculations pre-
vailed in Russia, where the tsar hoped
that mobilization in defense of Serbia
would heal political wounds and stop a
politico-economic strike wave that had
escalated from 222 strikes in 1910 to
3,534 in the first half of 1914. France
and Great Britain appear more benign;
Strachan concludes from the most re-
cent French scholarship that there was
no real war fever in France—révanche
was a slogan of certain pressure groups.
Britain was hamstrung between its fleet
and “continentalists” clustered around
General Henry Wilson.
Strachan’s analysis of the competing war
plans is excellent. Regarding the
Schlieffen Plan, he describes Moltke the
Younger’s growing unease with the
seven-to-one ratio set by Albert von
Schlieffen to overweight the “right
hook” through Belgium and Holland
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that would envelop a French thrust into
Lorraine. Although Wilhelm Groener
and B. H. Liddell Hart later blasted
Moltke for his timidity—he reduced the
ratio of troops on the right wing to those
on the left to three to one—Strachan
points out that “an army would [not]
behave as a united mass, gaining impe-
tus on its right specifically from the
weakness of its left,” for an army “is a
combination of individuals and not a
weight obeying the laws of physics.”
That is precisely the point: the Schlieffen
Plan was undone not by its relative
weighting but by inadequate transport
and insoluble problems of supply. Each
German corps required twenty-four kilo-
meters of road space, and there was just
not enough of that on the right wing
once the Belgians tore up their railways
and Holland was foreclosed as a corri-
dor. Add to this the fact that no fewer
than 60 percent of German trucks had
broken down by late August 1914, and it
is easier to explain the German flounder-
ing at the Marne. There was also the
small problem of French resistance.
Having begun the war with tactics that
were notoriously “perplexed by the
problems of firepower,” the German
army faced French forces, commanded
by Field Marshal J. J. C. Joffre, that
hacked five entire German corps to
pieces in the last week of August and the
first week of September 1914. Strachan’s
larger analysis of this Battle of the Marne
is interesting. The German high com-
mand’s initial response to the defeat—
Moltke and thirty-two other generals
were dismissed—was to blame individu-
als, “to make the debate about opera-
tional ideas, not about grand strategy.”
In fact, the Marne was a strategic failing
that should have discredited the kaiser
and his army, which “had failed to suc-
ceed in its prime role.” Yet there was no
healthy introspection or self-assessment;
the imperial army would simply hammer
away for another four years.
In contrast to the western front, ham-
mering seemed to work in the East,
where the Germans shattered the Rus-
sians at Tannenberg and the Austro-
Hungarians achieved some early suc-
cesses in Galicia. However, there too
the war stagnated for logistical reasons;
with Germany committed on the west-
ern front and Russia’s strength divided
by French demands for an attack on
East Prussia, it was difficult to mass
troops and artillery anywhere on the
eastern front, and yet more difficult to
move them, given the poverty of
communications.
Although the production of this
three-volume history of World War I
will take far longer than the Great War
itself took to fight, readers willing to en-
ter the trenches with this first volume
will be rewarded with a kaleidoscopic
and elegantly written presentation of the
great issues and problems raised by the
war’s origins, campaigns, and home
fronts.
GEOFFREY WAWRO
Naval War College
Uhrowczik, Peter. The Burning of Monterey: The
1818 Attack on California by the Privateer
Bouchard. Los Gatos, Calif.: Cyril Books, 2001.
170pp. $12.95
I am a resident of Monterey. Everyone
here knows about the Carmel Mission
and Father Junipero Serra. Colton Hall,
where the California Constitutional
Convention was held, still stands, as a
preserved historic landmark. Cannery
Row likewise remains, though John
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Steinbeck would barely recognize it.
Then there is the hidden history of
Monterey.
Recently the biography of Thomas ap
Catesby Jones revealed an episode in
which the city was seized in the name of
the United States. A quick withdrawal
after a festive party was required upon
the revelation that the war with Mexico
had not begun (Thomas ap Catesby
Jones: Commodore of Manifest Destiny,
by Gene A. Smith, Naval Institute Press,
2000, reviewed in the Naval War College
Review, Spring 2001). More recently, The
Burning of Monterey has appeared to re-
veal another fascinating episode in the
town’s history.
In November 1818 the capital of Alta
California fell into the hands of rebels
from Buenos Aires, the principal city of
the newly independent Provincias
Unidas del Rio de la Plata, today’s Ar-
gentina. The privateering commander
was Hipolito Bouchard. Born in France,
he had sailed from Argentina around the
world seeking to attack Spain’s assets
from South America to Madagascar to
Manila, through the Sandwich (Hawai-
ian) Islands, and on to Monterey.
Bouchard started the journey on La Ar-
gentina and picked up the Philadelphia-
built Argentinean vessel Santa Rosa in
Hawaii. The crew of the Santa Rosa had
earlier mutinied off the coast of Chile
and found their way to the Sandwich
Islands, where they sold the ship to King
Kamehameha I. Bouchard obtained the
Santa Rosa, placed it under the com-
mand of Peter Corney, an Englishman,
and replenished the crew with whatever
ragtag collection of Europeans and
Polynesians he could find. Then
Bouchard and his crew sailed on to the
California coast, where they captured
and burned the town of Monterey, sav-
ing the Presidio church (today San
Carlos Cathedral) and the mission at
Carmel.
Until now, we knew of Bouchard only
from cursory paragraphs in local history
brochures. Peter Uhrowczik has delved
into archives in Californian and Argen-
tine libraries. From original sources, he
has given us the most comprehensive
work available about Bouchard’s 1818
attack on Monterey. This study places
the events in the context of its times.
One learns nuggets of facts that could
not have been easily discovered by
studying other histories of the period.
For example, the end of the War of 1812
created a slump in Baltimore’s privateer-
ing industry, which, at least indirectly,
made these ships and crews available to
the insurgents in the Spanish-American
revolutions. The business of privateering
was not for the faint of heart. Bouchard
encountered the slave trade, scurvy, mu-
tineers, and pirate attacks in his journey
around the world. As a consequence of
Bouchard’s raid, the Anglo-Saxon popu-
lation of Alta California increased from
three to five persons; one of the new-
comers was an officer taken prisoner in
Monterey, and the other was a Scottish
drummer who had deserted. The author
has been thorough in providing maps
and illustrations so that the reader can
visualize the geography of California as
it was during the Spanish occupation.
This history is fascinating and entertain-
ing. The contrast in reputations of
Bouchard in Buenos Aires and in
Monterey is striking. In Argentina,
Bouchard’s monument sits in the middle
of a small plaza honoring him as a brave
patriot. In California, those acquainted
with Hipolito Bouchard tend to regard
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him as a pirate, not a privateer. The
distinction between a pirate and a pri-
vateer is a fine one separated by a thin
letter of marque (as provided for in the
U.S. Constitution). The Burning of
Monterey gives us an understanding
of an interesting man who lived in
turbulent times, from the perspectives of
both those who admire and those who
detest him.
XAVIER MARUYAMA
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California
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FROM THE EDITORS
WINNERS OF NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW PRIZES FOR 2001
Hugh G. Nott Prize. The President of the Naval War College has announced the
winners of prizes for the finest articles (less those on historical subjects) appear-
ing in the Review in 2001:
• First Prize ($1,000), Andrew L. Ross, “Thinking about the
Unthinkable: Unreasonable Exuberance?” Spring 2001
• Second Prize ($650), Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., “Military
Experimentation: Time to Get Serious,” Winter 2001
• Third Prize ($350), Chris Rahman, “Defending Taiwan, and Why It
Matters,” Autumn 2001.
Edward S. Miller History Prize. Through the generosity of the distinguished his-
torian Edward S. Miller, the President of the Naval War College has awarded the
Edward S. Miller History Prize ($500) to the author of the finest article on a his-
torical subject to appear in the Naval War College Review in 2001: Commander
Richard Mobley, USN (Ret.), for “Pueblo: A Retrospective,” Spring 2001.
These awards are made with the support of the Naval War College Foundation, a
private, nonprofit organization dedicated to improving the quality of the educa-
tional resources of the Naval War College in areas where government funds are not
available.
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